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THE ISSUE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN.

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The issue presented in the campaign of 1900 is the issue between plutocracy and democracy. All the questions under discussion will, in their last analysis, disclose the conflict between the dollar and the man—a conflict as old as the human race, and one which will continue as long as the human race endures.

The struggle for American independence was a culmination of the protest of the people living in America against measures which subordinated their rights to the interests of English traders. The correspondence between Lord Howe and Benjamin Franklin, about the time of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, shows that the main object of England's colonial policy was to control American trade.

In June, 1776, the former addressed a letter to Franklin, from which the following extract is taken:

"But if the deep-rooted prejudices of America and the necessity of preventing her trade from passing into foreign channels must keep us still a divided people, I shall, from every public, as well as private, motive, most heartily lament that this is not the moment wherein those great objects of my ambition are to be attained, and that I am to be longer deprived of an opportunity to assure you, personally, of the regard with which I am, etc."

To this letter Franklin immediately replied:

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"The well-founded esteem and, permit me to say, affection, which I shall always have for your Lordship make it painful to me to see you engaged in conducting a war, the great ground of which (as described in your letter) is 'the necessity of preventing the American trade from passing into foreign channels.' To me it seems that neither the obtaining nor retaining any trade, how valuable soever, is an object for which men may justly spill each other's blood; that the true and sure means of extending and securing commerce are the goodness and cheapness of commodities; and that the profits of no trade can ever be equal to the expense of compelling it and holding it by fleets and armies. I consider this war against us, therefore, as both unjust and unwise; and I am persuaded that cool and dispassionate posterity will condemn to infamy those who advised it; and that even success will not save from some degree of dishonor those who voluntarily engaged to conduct it."*

The Declaration of Independence set before the world four great truths which were declared to be self-evident: first, that all men are created equal; second, that they are endowed with inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; third, that governments are instituted among men to secure these rights; fourth, that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.

Upon these four pillars, quarried from the mountain of eternal truth, all free government must forever rest.

Then followed the War of the Revolution, with its sacrifices and its sacred memories, with its trials and its triumphs, establishing a government dedicated to liberty.

But before a generation had passed, wealth, represented by Hamilton, began to assert itself, and contempt for the rights of man and distrust of the people themselves began to be manifest. Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence, undertook the task of arousing the friends of human rights and civil liberty, and he led them to victory in 1800. The impetus given to American Democracy by its first success in the forum of politics carried it through several Presidential terms.

During Jackson's administration another battle was fought between the capitalistic classes and the people at large. The National Bank marshalled an almost irresistible army of financiers, business men, newspapers and politicians in defense of a gigantic monopoly.

Jackson sounded the alarm, rallied the hosts of Democracy,

* This correspondence can be found in the third volume of a work entitled, "Modern British Essayists," published by Carey & Hart, of Philadelphia, in 1857.

and, in a contest seldom, if ever, equalled in bitterness, won the second peaceful victory for human rights against inhuman greed.

Jackson is generally spoken of as a warrior rather than as a political philosopher. His courage and perseverance have been praised more than his logic or his rhetoric; and yet what orator or statesman has more clearly defined the purpose and scope of government than he?

In the message which accompanied his veto of the National Bank Act he said:

"It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of government to their selfish purposes. Distinctions in society will always exist under every just government. Equality of talents, of education, or of wealth, cannot be produced by human institutions. In the full enjoyment of the gifts of Heaven and the fruits of superior industry, economy, and virtue, every man is equally entitled to protection by law; but when the law undertakes to add to these natural and just advantages artificial distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of society—the farmers, mechanics, and laborers—who have neither the time nor the means of securing like favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of their government. There are no necessary evils in government. Its evils exist only in its abuses. If it would confine itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does its rain, shower its favors alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an unqualified blessing."

Benton, in estimating the work of Jackson, said that in overthrowing the bank conspiracy he saved America, as Cicero saved Rome by overthrowing the conspiracy of Catiline. No one can read the history of the country from 1845 to 1860 without recognizing the impending struggle between slavery, as an institution, and the abolition of slavery. Every important measure brought before Congress was scrutinized, and its possible bearing on the slavery question was considered, by both friends and opponents.

In 1858 Abraham Lincoln made a speech which attracted public attention to him as the leader of the anti-slavery sentiment. Taking from the Bible one of its strongest passages, he applied it to the question then paramount:

"'A house divided against itself cannot stand.' I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved; I do not expect the house to fall, but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other."

In 1859 Lincoln wrote a letter to the Republicans of Boston,

who were celebrating the birthday of Thomas Jefferson. (Think of it, Republicans celebrating the birthday of Jefferson!) In that letter he paid to Jefferson a high tribute. In the same letter, Lincoln, in discussing the relation which should exist between the man and the dollar, said that the Republicans were "both for the man and the dollar, but, in case of conflict, the man before the dollar." Man, the handiwork of God, comes first; the dollar, the handiwork of man, comes afterwards.

During his first administration Lincoln pointed out the attempt, then in its beginning, to place money, the thing accumulated, above the individual by whose toil it was accumulated, and warned his countrymen that the exaltation of matter and the degradation of man threatened the very existence of the Republic. Here are his words:

"Monarchy itself is sometimes hinted at as a possible refuge from the power of the people. In my present position, I could scarcely be justified were I to omit raising a warning voice against this approach of returning despotism. It is not needed nor fitting here that a general argument should be made in favor of popular institutions, but there is one point, with its connections, not so hackneyed as most others, to which I ask a brief attention. It is the effort to place capital on an equal footing with, if not above, labor in the structure of government."

I have quoted at length from these eminent authorities in order to convince the reader that those who, at this time, speak out against the methods and purposes of plutocracy are not sounding new and groundless alarms, but are merely reiterating the warnings which have been necessary during each successive generation.

For many years after the close of the Civil War the Republicans held undisputed control of the federal government, and an appeal to the prejudices and passions aroused by that great conflict was sufficient answer to any criticism or complaint coming from the party out of power. During this period class legislation became the order of the day, and wealth not only sought favors from the government, but secured exemption from just burdens. When war taxes were to be reduced, the taxes bearing upon the rich were taken off first. When the income tax was repealed, Senator Sherman, of Ohio, placed his protest on record in the following language:

"I hope that, after full discussion, nobody will vote for striking

out the income tax. It seems to me to be one of the plainest propositions in the world. Put before the people of the United States the question whether the property of this country cannot stand a tax of \$20,000,000, when the consumption of the people stands a tax of \$300,000,000, and I think they will quickly answer it. The property-holders of the country came here and demanded the repeal of the only tax that bears upon their property, when we have to tax everything, the food of the poor, the clothing of the poor, and all classes of our people \$300,000,000."

High duties were placed upon the necessities of life on the ground that infant industries required assistance, with the result that the owners of the aided industries grew rich, while home-owning decreased and tenancy increased among the consumers.

Railroads were constructed upon a plan which permitted watered stock, fictitious capitalization and the over issue of bonds, with the result that the patrons of the roads became the victims of extortionate rates and the manipulators of the roads became suddenly and enormously rich.

Under the euphonious plea that public credit would be strengthened thereby, the terms of government contracts were altered in the interest of the bondholders. Then, in 1873, a change was made in the standard money, a change so indefensible that nearly every public man denied any knowledge of the purpose of the act. For twenty-three years following the passage of that act every party pledged itself to restore the double standard, but the financiers succeeded in controlling the dominant party and thus maintained the gold standard in spite of popular protest.

In 1896 the Democrats refused to be any longer parties to the duplicity, and took an open and unequivocal position in favor of the immediate restoration of bimetallism by the independent action of this country at the present legal ratio. This positive and definite platform was necessary because of the cunningly devised evasions and ambiguities which had been written into the platforms of the two leading parties. The Republican leaders, on the other hand, continued their policy of deception, and held out to the Republican bimetallists of the West the delusive hope of an international agreement, while they openly promised the Eastern believers in monometallism that the gold standard would be maintained *until an international agreement could be secured*, and secretly assured them that that meant forever.

After the election the administration adopted a double standard method of dealing with the subject. A commission was sent

to Europe to plead for international bimetallism, while a gold standard Secretary of the Treasury was openly at work in this country defending monometallism. In 1896 the money question occupied by far the greater portion of public attention. Since 1896 the same sordid doctrine that manifested itself in the gold standard has manifested itself in several new ways, and to-day three questions contest for primacy—the money question, the trust question, and imperialism. There are several other questions of scarcely less importance, but the lines of division upon these run practically parallel with the lines which separate the people upon the three greater ones. If a man opposes the gold standard, trusts and imperialism—all three—the chances are a hundred to one that he is in favor of arbitration, the income tax and the election of United States Senators by a direct vote of the people, and is opposed to government by injunction and the black-list. If a man favors the gold standard, the trusts and imperialism—all three—the chances are equally great that he regards the demand for arbitration as an impertinence, defends government by injunction and the black-list, views the income tax as “a discouragement to thrift,” and will oppose the election of Senators by the people as soon as he learns that it will lessen the influence of corporations in the Senate. When a person is with the Democrats on one or two of these questions, but not on all, his position on the subordinate questions is not so easily calculated.

The human mind is consistent, but time is required for the application of fundamental principles to all these questions.

Since these secondary questions must, therefore, be settled by the same persons and along the same lines as the primary ones, I shall confine this article to the three questions which I have already described as being most important at this time.

The Republicans have dealt with all three questions during the present administration in a manner which they would not have been willing to outline in 1896. This refusal to take the people into their confidence is in itself an evidence that they are either conscious that their policies are not good for the people, or that they distrust the capacity of the people for self-government. If they believed their policies to be good, and if they also believed the people capable of understanding their own interests, they would not hesitate to set forth their plan of action on each subject.

Having taken another step toward the gold standard, and hav-

ing provided for the substitution of bank notes for greenbacks, they now declare the money question settled; but they have in reserve the withdrawal of the legal tender function from the silver dollar and the establishment of the branch bank, neither of which they now discuss, but both of which they will attempt as soon as they think it safe to do so.

The contest between monometallism and bimetallism is a world-wide contest—a contest which must go on until silver is once more a money metal equal with gold, or until the gold standard becomes universal. He takes a very narrow view of the subject who considers merely the present volume of money in this country. It is true that we have largely increased our supply of gold in the last three years (the Republicans neither promised nor expected the increase), but the action of England in placing India upon the gold standard is likely to cause a drain on the gold supply of the United States and of European countries. The gold blanket must now be stretched to cover nearly three hundred million people in Southern Asia, and China has yet to be considered. After six thousand years of search and saving, the total volume of gold and silver money is about eight billions, nearly equally divided between the two metals.

Upon this basis of metallic money rests a large volume of paper money, and upon the various forms of money rests the world's indebtedness.

Those advocates of the gold standard who know the real purpose and scope of the gold standard scheme desire to contract the basic money to one-half its present volume. This would enormously enhance the value of each dollar, represented by money, notes and bonds, and would enormously oppress the producers of wealth. We cannot afford to throw the influence of this nation upon the side of the gold standard, unless we are prepared to accept universal gold monometallism with all that that means. The increased production of gold during the last few years will act as a parachute to retard the fall in prices, but there is no assurance that it will be sufficient to enable us to dispense with silver as a standard money.

If any one is tempted to listen to the new arguments in favor of the gold standard—presented by men who advocated that standard for twenty-five years before the new gold fields were discovered—let him take a pencil and paper and estimate, first,

the annual product, then subtract from that sum the amount annually used in the arts, the amount necessary to cover the shrinkage in volume of gold coin from loss and abrasion, and the amount necessary to keep pace with the annual increase in population and business, and then see how much he has left to apply to the retirement of the uncovered paper and the four billions of silver coin. Only a few years ago Prof. Edward Suess, of the Vienna University, issued a pamphlet giving his reasons for believing that, at that time, nearly the entire annual output of the gold mines was consumed in the arts.

Those who say that bimetallism may be necessary one year and the gold standard defensible the next year are either very ignorant of the subject themselves or they underestimate the intelligence of those to whom they address the argument.

In March, 1896, the English Parliament by a unanimous vote pledged the English government to aid in restoring the par of exchange between gold and silver.

If the Republican platform was honest in 1896, bimetallism was desirable at that time, because 13,500,000 voters supported candidates pledged to bimetallism, differing only as to the means of securing it.

In November, 1898, two years after the last Presidential election, and two weeks after the last Congressional election, Secretary of State Hay wrote a letter to Lord Aldenham, for many years a director of the Bank of England, saying that the President and a majority of his Cabinet still believed in the great desirability of an international agreement.

A still later argument in favor of bimetallism can be found in Section 14 of the Currency Law recently enacted. It specifically declares that the law is not intended to place an obstacle in the way of international bimetallism. The only way to destroy the force of the bimetallic argument contained in the Republican platform, in Secretary Hay's letter and in Section 14 of the Currency Law, is to say that they were all intended to deceive the public. But, while such a defense would strengthen the gold standard argument, it would place the Republican leaders in a position which they would scarcely desire to occupy.

It is needless to discuss the ratio, since there is no division of sentiment among those who are actually trying to secure bimetallism. There is a positive, earnest and active force behind the

present legal ratio of sixteen to one; there is no positive, earnest or active force behind any other ratio. Neither is it any longer necessary to discuss international bimetallism. The contest upon this question must be between those who believe in the gold standard on the one side and, on the other side, those who believe in a financial policy made by the American people for themselves.

Mr. Carlisle, in his speech in 1878, divided the people into two classes. In one class he placed those described by him as "the idle holders of idle capital," and in the other "the struggling masses."

When the money question is fully understood, the struggling masses and those who sympathize with them will support the double standard, and the money-owning and bond-holding classes and those who sympathize with them will favor the gold standard.

Those who favor the gold standard, as a rule, favor national bank notes as against greenbacks, while those who oppose the gold standard, as a rule, believe that the issue of paper money is a function of government and should not be delegated to national banks. A currency issued and controlled by banks, and secured by government bonds, creates a paper-money trust and must, if it is to be permanent, rest upon a perpetual and increasing national debt.

The trust question is more easily understood than the money question. The appreciation of money is slow, while the rise in the price of trust-made articles is sufficiently rapid to attract attention.

When prices fall a little each year, the friends of a rising dollar talk about over-production, improved machinery, etc.; but when prices rise rapidly and the trusts declare large dividends, the connection between cause and effect is so direct and obvious that only those blinded by partizanship can fail to see it.

The trust question was in the campaign of 1896, and the menace of the trust was then pointed out, but the warning was unheeded. Now the heavy hand of monopoly is laid upon so many that there is a growing protest against a system which permits a few men to control each branch of industry, fix the rate of wages, the price of raw materials and the price of the finished product. Until four years ago no Republican of prominence defended the trusts; now, the Republican leaders speak of the trusts in guarded terms.

The Ohio platform recently adopted demands that "*so-called* trusts shall be *so regulated* from time to time and *so restricted* as to guarantee immunity from *hurtful* monopoly." The word "*hurtful*" is as broad as charity, and enables the trust defender to shield every trust behind the plea that it is not hurtful.

A monopoly is not hurtful *to those who operate it*, and, if they can control the government, they will be sure to decide that it is not hurtful to any one.

The recent action of the barbed wire trust illustrates several phases of this question. It shows that a monopoly *can* raise prices when it desires to do so; and it also shows that a monopoly *will* raise prices when it can. It shows how an artificial rise in price will lessen consumption and thus decrease the demand for labor; it shows how a monopoly can shut down factories to work off the stock, throwing upon the laborer the burden of maintaining prices (in this case twelve factories were shut down and six thousand two hundred men thrown out of employment); it shows how even the stockholders may be victimized if the manager desires to speculate in stock; and it further shows how those in charge of a great monopoly may, in the future, bring great wealth to political friends by disclosing intended raids on the stock market and thus earn legislative favors. The ordinary forms of bribery sink into insignificance when compared with this new and more dangerous method. That this is no idle fear is evident from the testimony taken by the Senate committee which investigated official speculation in sugar stock. That monopolies contribute to campaign funds is also shown by the testimony taken by another Senate committee. A few great monopolies could without loss to themselves make on the stock market enough to supply a campaign fund as enormous as that used by the Republican party in 1896.

On the trust question, as on the money question, the line is drawn between those who believe that money is the only thing to be considered and those who believe that the people have rights which should be respected.

If one asks for the annihilation of private monopolies, he is confronted with the statement that they are a part of our industrial system and have come to stay. If one suggests restrictions upon corporations, he will be told that the government cannot interfere with the way a man uses his money. The difference between the natural man of flesh and blood and the corporate man

created by law is overlooked by those who can see nothing higher than the dollar argument.

The God-made men do not differ greatly in size or strength, they labor under similar conditions as to life and health, and they are subject to the same moral restraints. Competition between them, therefore, is reasonably equal and fair. But corporations differ in size, in strength and in longevity; and, having no life beyond the grave, have neither the fear of future punishment nor the hope of future reward to restrain them. Competition, therefore, between the natural man and the great corporation may be grossly unequal and unfair.

The line must be drawn at the point where the corporation seeks to establish a monopoly and deprive individuals or smaller corporations of the right to compete. In other words, the legislation necessary at this time must be directed against private monopoly in whatever form it appears. Those who desire to protect society from the evil results of the trust must take the position that a private monopoly is indefensible and intolerable. The power to control the price of anything which the people need cannot safely be intrusted to any private individual or association of individuals, because selfishness is universal and the temptation to use such a power for personal advantage is too great.

As soon as any private monopoly is admitted to be good, the question degenerates into a comparison of the character and conduct of those who stand at the head of the monopolies. To defend a private monopoly on the ground that the monopolist in charge is a benevolent and well-meaning man, kind to his employees and generous with his earnings, is like defending a despotism on the ground that the despot is occasionally kind-hearted and sometimes uses his unlimited power for the benefit of his subjects.

The Republican party cannot be relied upon to deal with the trust question. The sympathies of those who control the policies of the Republican party are entirely with organized wealth in its contest against the masses. An evidence of this is to be found in the fact that the trusts have grown more rapidly under the present administration than in all the previous history of the country. This remarkable growth shows that, at this time, the trust magnates neither fear the enforcement of the present law nor the enactment of new and more stringent laws.

Another evidence that the Republican party will not deal

effectively with the trust question is to be found in the fact that the leaders of that party have no plan of action. When they are called upon to say anything on the subject they confine themselves to generalities and protest that it is not a political question. If ambiguity is proof of either lack of knowledge or lack of sincerity, the Republicans can be convicted either of not knowing what to do or of not desiring to do it.

While the inspiring cause of monopoly is to be found in a selfish desire to enjoy the fruits of monopoly, several things have contributed to its growth and success. First, a constant fall in prices has led people who have invested money in plants to seek in combination a protection against loss upon their investments. The Republicans do not propose to take away this incentive to the organization of trusts. Second, railroad discriminations have sometimes given to a favored corporation an immense advantage over less fortunate competitors.* The Republican party is making no effort to remedy this evil.

The high tariff has been a bulwark to the trusts. Foreign competition was first excluded and then domestic competition was destroyed by combination, but the Republican party is not only not trying to reform the tariff in the interest of the people, but it boasts of the Dingley law as a panacea for all economic ills.

While State legislatures can do much, Congressional action is necessary to complete the destruction of the trusts. A State can prevent the creation of a monopoly within its borders and can also exclude a foreign monopoly. But this remedy is not sufficient; for, if a monopoly really exists and is prevented from doing business in any State, the people of that State will be deprived of the use of that particular article until it can be produced within the State. Instead of shutting a monopoly out of one State and leaving it forty-four States to do business in, we should shut it up in the State of its origin and take the other forty-four away from it. This can be done by an act of Congress making it necessary for a corporation, organized in any State, to take out a license from the federal government before doing business outside of that State, the license not to interfere, however, with regulations imposed by other States. Such a license, granted only upon evidence that there is no water in the stock of the corporation, and that it has not attempted and is not attempting to monopolize any

* A number of these discriminations are mentioned in Lloyd's "Wealth Against Commonwealth."

branch of business or the production of any article of merchandise, would compel the dissolution of existing monopolies and prevent the creation of new ones.

The Democratic party is better able to undertake this work now than it was a few years ago, because all the trust magnates have left the party. The Republican party is less able than ever before to make a successful war against the trusts, because it numbers among its membership all the trust magnates it ever had, and in addition to them it has all the Democratic party formerly had.

The Philippine question is even plainer than the trust question, and those who will be benefited by an imperial policy are even less in number than those who may be led to believe that they would share in the benefits of a gold standard or of a private monopoly. Here again the Republicans dare not outline their policy. When the present Congress was elected, in 1898, the treaty of peace had not yet been signed. No definite issue was before the country, and the people could not sit in judgment upon the purposes of the administration.

When the treaty was ratified, in February following, it was expressly declared by several Republican Senators that the ratification of the treaty did not determine the policy of the government, but merely concluded the war with Spain. The McEnery resolution, adopted by the votes of Republican Senators, declared that it was the sense of the Senate that the Philippine Islands should never become an integral part of the United States, but left the policy open for future consideration. The resolution was as follows:

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That by the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain, it is not intended to incorporate the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands into citizenship of the United States, nor is it intended to permanently annex said islands as an integral part of the territory of the United States; but it is the intention of the United States to establish on said Islands a government suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants of said islands, to prepare them for local self-government, and in due time to make such disposition of said islands as will best promote the interests of citizens of the United States and the inhabitants of said islands."

The nearest approach to a plan which has received any considerable support among the Republicans is that outlined in the Spooner Bill, which provides that:

"When all insurrection against the sovereignty and authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands, acquired from Spain by the treaty concluded at Paris on the tenth day of December, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, shall have been completely suppressed by the military and naval forces of the United States, all military, civil and judicial powers necessary to govern the said islands shall, until otherwise provided by Congress, be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property and religion."

But this is far from definite. It means that, when the war is over (no one knows when that will be), the President is to do something (no one knows what), and is to keep at it (no one knows how long); and that then Congress is to take some action (the nature of which no one can guess). Why this evasion? There can be but one reason for it, that the Republican leaders have decided upon a policy which they are not willing to outline, because they dare not risk the judgment of the American people in an open contest between the doctrine that governments rest upon force and the doctrine that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.

If the Filipino is to be under our domination, he must be either citizen or subject. If he is to be a citizen, it must be with a view to participating ultimately in our government and in the making of our laws. Not only is this idea negatived by the McEnery resolution, but it is openly repudiated by every Republican leader who has discussed the subject. If the Filipino is to be a subject, our form of government must be entirely changed. A republic can have no subjects. The doctrine that a people can be kept in a state of perpetual vassalage, owing allegiance to the flag, but having no voice in the government, is entirely at variance with the principles upon which this government has been founded. An imperial policy nullifies every principle set forth in the Declaration of Independence.

The Porto Rican tariff law illustrates this new doctrine. The flag is separated from the Constitution, and the Porto Ricans are notified that they must obey the laws made for them and pay the taxes levied upon them, and yet have no share in our Bill of Rights or in the guarantees of our Constitution. No monarch or tyrant in all history exercised more despotic power than the Republicans now claim for the President and Congress.

The theory that our race is divinely appointed to seize by force or purchase at auction groups of "inferior people," and govern them, with benevolent purposes avowed and with trade advantages on the side, carries us back to the creed of kings and to the gospel of force.

Lincoln condemned this doctrine with characteristic vigor in a speech made in 1858. He said that it was the old argument employed to defend kingcraft from the beginning of history; that "kings always bestride the necks of the people, not because they *desire* to do so, but because *the people are better off for being ridden.*"

Those who advocate an imperial policy usually assert that the Filipinos are incapable of self-government. It might be a sufficient answer to quote the resolution of Congress declaring that "the Cubans are and of right ought to be free," and the report made by Admiral Dewey declaring that the Filipinos are far more capable of self-government than the Cubans. But there is even a broader answer that may be made. Clay, in his defense of the people of South America, said:

"It is the doctrine of thrones, that man is too ignorant to govern himself. Their partisans assert his incapacity, in reference to all nations; if they cannot command universal assent to the proposition, it is then demanded to particular nations; and our pride and our presumption too often make converts of us. I contend that it is to arraign the dispositions of Providence Himself to suppose that He has created beings incapable of governing themselves, and to be trampled on by kings."

There are degrees of intelligence; some people can and do govern themselves better than others, and it is possible that the people living near the equator will never, owing to climatic conditions, reach the governmental standards of the temperate zone. But it is absurd to say that God would create the Filipinos and then leave them for thousands of years helpless, until Spain found them and threw her protecting arms around them; and it is equally absurd to say that Spain could sell to us the right to act as guardians of a people whom she governed by force.

The purpose behind the imperial policy is the extension of trade. Franklin, in the letter above quoted, denies that the securing or holding of trade is a cause for which men may justly spill each other's blood. The man who says that an imperial policy will pay must be prepared to place a pecuniary value upon

the soldiers who have already lost their lives in the Philippines or have become insane from the effects of the climate, and upon the soldiers who will be sacrificed in future wars of conquest. The Republican party, which boasts that it sprang into existence in the defense of human rights, now coolly calculates the value of human life measured by Oriental trade.

Abraham Lincoln wrote the following letter to Mrs. Bixby, of Boston:

"Executive Mansion, Washington, Nov. 21st, 1864.

"Dear Madam—

"I have been shown in the files of the War Department a statement of the Adjutant-General of Massachusetts, that you are the mother of five sons who have died gloriously on the field of battle. I feel how weak and fruitless must be any words of mine which should attempt to beguile you from the grief of a loss so overwhelming. But I cannot refrain from tendering to you the consolation which may be found in the thanks of the Republic they died to save. I pray that our Heavenly Father may assuage the anguish of your bereavement, and leave you only the cherished memory of the loved and the lost, and the solemn pride that must be yours to have laid so costly a sacrifice upon the altar of freedom. Yours, very sincerely and respectfully,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

No more beautiful expression of sympathy can be found in literature. Compare it with the sordid consolation which an imperialist would extend to a sorrowing mother, assuring her that the trade purchased by her son's blood would be worth all that it cost!

It will be noticed that Franklin also denied that trade could be profitably purchased and held by fleets and armies. History supports his contention. A nation never makes a profit out of a forcible extension of trade. Such a policy is defended by the few who make a great deal out of the trade, while the expenses of the war are borne by the taxpayers. There is no doubt that an imperial policy will be advantageous to army contractors, and to owners of ships who rent their vessels to the United States to carry live soldiers to the Philippine Islands and to bring dead soldiers back; and it may be advantageous to carpet-bag governors and to those who can secure good paying positions in the army, but it will be a constant drain upon the wealth producers. The amount already spent upon a war of conquest in a single year would almost construct the Nicaragua Canal; or, if used for the reclamation of arid lands in the West, it would furnish homes

for more American citizens than would go to the Philippine Islands in a thousand years.

If an imperial policy is indorsed by the people, a large standing army will always be necessary. The same influences which lead to a war of conquest in the Philippines will lead to wars of conquest elsewhere, and an immense military establishment will not only become a permanent burden upon the people, but will prove a menace to the Republic.

One of the great objections to imperialism is that it destroys our proud pre-eminence among the nations. When the doctrine of self-government is abandoned, the United States will cease to be a moral factor in the world's progress. We cannot preach the doctrine that governments come up from the people, and, at the same time, practice the doctrine that governments rest upon brute force. We cannot set a high and honorable example for the emulation of mankind while we roam the world like beasts of prey seeking whom we may devour.

John Quincy Adams asks the question, "What has America done for mankind?" and he answers it thus:

"America, with the same voice which spoke herself into existence as a nation, proclaimed to mankind the inextinguishable rights of human nature, and the only lawful foundations of government. America, in the assembly of nations, since her admission among them, has invariably, though often fruitlessly, held forth to them the hand of honest friendship, of equal freedom, of generous reciprocity. She has uniformly spoken among them, though often to heedless and to disdainful ears, the language of equal liberty, equal justice, and equal rights."

Not only does she give to the world an example of enlightened self-government, but, according to Adams, "wherever the standard of independence or freedom has been or shall be unfurled there will her heart, her benediction and her prayers be."

But how can she pray for those who unfurl the banner of liberty in Europe or in South Africa if she wars against those who unfurl the banner of liberty in the Orient?

While the Republican party has been evading a direct issue and trying to unload its mistakes upon Providence, the Democrats have urged a plain and simple remedy, viz., that we treat the Filipinos as we have promised to treat the Cubans. The Bacon resolution, which was defeated by the vote of the Vice-President just after the treaty was ratified, was supported by nearly every

Democrat in the Senate, and was indorsed by a Democratic caucus in the House. It read as follows:

"Resolved, further, that the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intention to exercise permanent sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said islands, and assert their determination, when a stable and independent government shall have been erected therein, entitled in the judgment of the government of the United States to recognition as such, to transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and control of the islands to their people."

Had this resolution been accepted by the Republicans at the time it was introduced, and acted upon by the administration, not a drop of blood would have been shed at Manila. Hostilities can be terminated at any moment by a declaration of this nation's purpose: first, to establish a stable government; second, to give the Filipinos their independence; third, to give them protection from outside interference while they work out their destiny. Such a declaration would be in harmony with American principles, American traditions and American interests. Such protection would be valuable to the Filipinos and inexpensive to us, just as protection to the South American republics has been of vital importance to them, while it has imposed no burden upon us.

The Bates treaty, negotiated by the administration last summer, provides that the United States shall protect the Sultan of Sulu from foreign interference. It ought to be as easy to protect a republic as to stand sponsor for a despot.

Surely, the rapid development of plutocracy during the last few years will arouse the people to the dangers which threaten our Republic. The warning voice of history cannot longer be disregarded. No nation has ever travelled so far, in the same space of time, from democracy to plutocracy as has this nation during the last ten years. Foreign influence, described by Washington as "one of the most baneful foes of republican government," has been felt as never before. Fortunes have been made more suddenly than ever before. Wealth has been concentrated in the hands of a few more rapidly than ever before. Corporate capital exerts an influence over government more potent than ever before. Money is more freely used than ever before to corrupt elections.

What is to be the end? Can any thoughtful person believe that these conditions promise well for a republic? Are we not following in the footsteps of Rome, as described by Froude?

"To make money, money by any means, lawful or unlawful, became the universal passion. Money! The cry was still money! Money was the one thought, from the highest Senator to the poorest wretch who sold his vote in the Comitia."

Again, he says:

"The proud privilege of Roman citizenship was still jealously reserved to Rome itself, and to a few favored towns and colonies; and a mere subject could maintain no rights against a member of the haughty oligarchy which controlled the civilized world. Such, generally, the Roman republic had become, or was tending to become, in the years which followed the fall of Carthage, B. C., 146. Public spirit in the masses was dead, or sleeping; the commonwealth was a plutocracy."

If it is said that we are prosperous and that we live under the reign of law, let the reader review the lecture delivered by Dr. John Lord, a Connecticut scholar, on Rome in the days of Marcus Aurelius. After describing the conditions which existed when "about two thousand people owned the whole civilized world," he says:

"But I cannot enumerate the evils which co-existed with all the boasted prosperity of the empire, and which were preparing the way for ruin—evils so disgraceful and universal that Christianity made no impression at all on society at large and did not modify a law or remove a single object of scandal."

And again:

"Is there nothing to be considered but external glories which appeal to the senses alone? Shall our eyes be diverted from the operation of moral law and the inevitable consequences of its violation? Shall we blind ourselves to the future condition of our families and our country in our estimate of happiness? Shall we ignore, in the dazzling life of a few favored extortioners, monopolists and successful gamblers, all that Christianity points out as the hope and solace and glory of mankind?"

Instead of regarding the recent assault upon constitutional government—the attempted overthrow of American principles—as a matter of destiny, we may rather consider it as the last plague, the slaying of the first-born, which will end the bondage of the American people, and bring deliverance from the Pharaohs who are enthroning Mammon and debasing mankind.

W. J. BRYAN.

AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION AND ITS BASIS.

BY EDMUND BARTON.

The Constitution under which it is proposed to unite the Australian Colonies establishes a federation under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. It is more democratic than the Constitution of the United States, and not only more democratic, but more federal, than the Constitution of the Dominion of Canada. Let me make a few comparisons. It is a constitution markedly of the British type, in that it operates not only by way of constitutional government, but by way of responsible government. The Federal Ministry are liable to be displaced at any moment by the vote of one House, the House of Representatives: and the overwhelming power of its vote is assured by giving over to it the control of the purse-strings. The Senate has a veto, of course; but, as we shall see, that veto may be rendered ineffective in the case of continued disagreement between the two houses.

Of the sixteen federations of the world, fourteen recognize the principle of equal representation in one of the two chambers of the National Legislature. I hold the opinion that the federal idea naturally suggests such a condition; and that, apart from academic arguments, federalists may well demand it, in view of the fact that its maintenance has secured so fair a balance in the federal evolution. It will amuse American readers to be told that Australian provincialists daily, and through great numbers of their speakers, insisted that the War of Secession was entirely traceable to the existence of equal representation in the United States Senate. One of the strangest incidents of this contention is that it was most loudly asserted by the men who professed academic superiority. Was their fault an ignorance, or an ignoring, of history? In the

Australian Federation, original States will have equal representation in the Senate.

The plan of the Australian Constitution will probably not surprise an American; yet, if it were largely different, it would surprise an Englishman. One of the striking sayings which marked the debates of the Convention which met at Adelaide in 1897 for the purpose of framing the Constitution was an utterance by Sir Richard Baker, shortly before his appointment to the Chairmanship of Committees. He said of the idea of implanting Responsible Government in a Federal Constitution: "Either Federation will kill Responsible Government, or Responsible Government will kill Federation." Sir Richard Baker supports the new Constitution. We may infer that he does not believe that either Responsible Government or Federation has received its death blow. A problem which appeared to a strong and learned constitutionalist to be insoluble at the outset has probably been solved, and in such a way that we shall see the mainspring of a federation, the principle which aims at blending the voice of the people and that of the States, preserved, while no jot is lost of those strong principles which, among men of British race, are now considered indispensable to their instruments of self-government.

Now, the Constitution of the United States provides that "all bills for raising revenue must originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur in amendments as in other bills." Under the Australian Constitution, not only must revenue-raising bills originate in the House of Representatives, but appropriation bills also must begin there, and the power of amendment in the case of money bills is emphatically denied to the Senate. There is a power to suggest amendments by message; such a power would perhaps exist, without express authority in the Constitution; but it is impossible to mistake the sternness with which the Australian charter declares and conserves the power of the people to decide questions of taxation and expenditure, through the House which represents the voting power according to its numerical value.

I have said that the Constitution is attacked on the ground that original States are equally represented in the Senate, and that the Senate will thus be the stronger of the two houses. How would American citizens appraise the power of a Senate which cannot originate or amend either a revenue or an expenditure bill? It will

require more than a personal assurance to make one of them believe that a Senate so pent is still, to quote the adversary, "the dominant House."

Although the United States Senate represents the States in the light of their equal contractual capacity, Americans have not told the world that it fails to represent the people of the States. Ours, however, is a case in which, "in the grips," citizenship rules according to numbers, and not according to States. It will be said that the rule of numbers will destroy the separate life of States; this is delicate ground. Are States to prevail in their numbers, irrespective of citizenship majorities? Are citizens to prevail in their numbers, irrespective of the future interests and existence of States? If either of these things were true, there could be no federation. The quarrel that our anti-Federalists raise is in the assertion that one, the latter of these propositions, is essential. It is cloaked by the assertion that it means majority rule; but the majority of the States and the majority of the people must both be reckoned with. If we fail as to one, we approach unification; if we fail as to the other, we draw nearer to a form of union which proclaims its weakness in every step. Surely, the true solution of a difficulty of this kind is one which enables the machine of government to continue its work, while it is made clear that the vital force of the equally represented States is not exercised in vain. While it is made certain that the will of the majority will prevail, it is also made certain that arguments must be heard. There is only one ultimate tribunal; to ignore that would have been to ignore the popular force which impelled the union of the colonies. But it is possible to recognize this in all its strength, and still to ensure that the minority is to have the fullest opportunity to offer to a reasoning community the supreme influence of argument on behalf of State interests.

As I have mentioned, the operation of responsible government is secured by making the House of Representatives the real custodian of the purse. There is further security in a provision which will be of interest to Americans. After the first general election, no Minister of State is to hold office for a longer period than three months, unless he has become a member of one or other of the houses. In the insistence on the principle of continuous responsibility lies the main difference between the Australian Constitution and that of the United States.

The power of the national or collective voice will be greater in Australia than it is in America. The power of the individual States will be greater than it is in Canada. But these two powers will not be allowed to continue in a condition of deadlock. If the two houses differ twice upon the same bill, then, if it has originated in the House of Representatives, the two houses may be dissolved simultaneously. If afterwards the difference continues, the Governor-General, with the advice of his ministers, may order a joint sitting, in which all the members, whether of the Senate or the House of Representatives, may deliberate together, and must vote together on the bill as last proposed by the House of Representatives, and on amendments made therein by one House, and not agreed to by the other. Any amendments affirmed by an absolute majority of the combined strength of the houses are to be taken as having been carried; and if the bill, together with any amendments so carried, is affirmed by an absolute majority, it is to be taken as passed by both houses, and it is to be presented to the Governor-General for assent. How effective this provision will be as to money bills, which have been the usual subjects of deadlocks under the several local constitutions, will appear from two facts; first, that it can only be called into action when the bill on which the difference arises has originated in the House of Representatives; secondly, that, as money bills must not be amended in the Senate, a final determination must be upon the precise form in which the House of Representatives chooses to leave the bill. Inasmuch as the House of Representatives is to contain as nearly as possible two members for every one in the Senate, there is little doubt that the cases will be few indeed in which the will of that house will not prevail at a joint sitting. Personally, I doubt if we shall ever reach a joint sitting, because the power to dissolve both houses simultaneously is, in itself, so drastic that, in all probability, its exercise will be avoided by reasonable concession.

But the people have yet further security for the absolutism of their self-government. Instead of being elected by the several Legislatures, as in the United States, senators are to be directly chosen by the people. They will each represent the whole of the State which elects them; while, in the House of Representatives, the members will be representatives of districts. The voters for each house will be the same persons, the difference being that, in voting for senators, each State is to be one entire electorate, and

will have equal representation without respect of number; while, in voting for the House of Representatives, each State will be represented in electoral divisions, purely according to the numbers of inhabitants. There is one broad fact which secures that each house will be popularly representative. This is that the franchise will be the same for the electors to each chamber.

Until a franchise, to operate uniformly throughout the Commonwealth, is made by the Federal Parliament, the suffrage will be in each State that which exists in elections to its lower chamber, which, in most of these colonies, is called the Legislative Assembly. The Federal Parliament, however, has no power to make a restrictive suffrage for Federal elections. It cannot by any law prevent any adult person, who has or acquires a right to vote at elections for the Legislative Assembly of a State, from voting at elections for either house of the Federal Parliament. Now, there is one colony, namely South Australia, which already gives the suffrage to women, as well as to men. It will follow that the federal franchise law must, in order to be uniform, extend the suffrage for the Australian Parliament to women in all the States. The conditions of membership of either of the Federal houses are:

1. The attainment of the age of twenty-one years;
2. The qualification of an elector for the House of Representatives;
3. A three years' residence within the limits of the Federal Commonwealth;
4. The being a British subject, either natural born or for five years naturalized.

It will be of interest next to state the principal powers of legislation which the Federal Parliament is to possess. There are thirty-nine of these, of which the principal are: Trade and commerce with other countries, and among the States; taxation, but so as not to discriminate between States, or parts of States; bounties on production or export, which must be uniform throughout the Commonwealth; borrowing on the credit of the Commonwealth; posts, telegraphs, telephones, and the like; defence; light-houses, light-ships, beacons and buoys; naturalization and aliens; immigration and emigration; influx of criminals; the people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in any State, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws; external affairs; the acquisition, with the consent of a State, of any railways of the

State on terms arranged; railway construction and extension in any State, with the consent of that State; conciliation and arbitration in industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State; invalid and old-age pensions; marriage; divorce and matrimonial causes, and, in relation thereto, parental rights, and the custody and guardianship of infants.

Among the remaining powers may be mentioned quarantine, currency and coinage, banking, insurance, weights and measures, bills of exchange and promissory notes, bankruptcy, copyrights, patents and trade marks, and company laws.

The Parliament may declare by law the powers, privileges and immunities of each house, and of the members and committees; and, until so declared, they are to be as in the House of Commons in the United Kingdom.

I shall be thought to have enumerated legislative powers of pretty wide range. Will there be any restriction on their exercise, so long as the authority given is not exceeded? In my view little, if any. Under the instructions issued to the Governors of the various Australian Colonies in the past, there are few subjects on which a Colonial Governor is required to reserve bills for the Royal assent, instead of giving the assent himself; and, in case of such reservation, instances of withholding the Queen's assent have been rare. It is unlikely that the Governor-General of the Australian Commonwealth will be instructed to reserve any class of bills, unless, perhaps, such as may appear to be inconsistent with the treaty obligations of the British Crown, or bills of unusual importance affecting the royal prerogative, or the rights of property of British subjects not living within the Commonwealth, or prejudicing the commercial interests of other parts of the Empire; and experience renders it probable that, even in such cases, the self-governing powers of the Federal Parliament will be restricted as little as possible.

The Governor-General will be an imperial officer. He will reign without ruling; for he will be guided by the advice of his responsible ministers, except in the very limited instances in which his instructions may direct an independent course; and we may be sure that these instances will be as few as they are to-day in Canada.

The Australian Parliament, however, must act within the limits assigned by the Constitution. I mean that it will not be

able to decide for itself whether any law which it passes is constitutional or not. It is laid down that "every power of the Parliament of a Colony which has become or becomes a State shall, unless it is by this Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth or withdrawn from the Parliament of the State, continue as at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment of the State, as the case may be."

State laws on subjects of concurrent jurisdiction will, of course, continue in force, except to the extent of the exercise by the Federal Commonwealth of its legislative powers, subject to the powers of alteration and repeal resident in the individual State; but when a State law is inconsistent with a Federal law the latter is to prevail, and the former is to be invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.

The Constitution is to be guarded by a Federal High Court, which is to consist of a Chief Justice, and not less than two other judges, and other courts may be invested with federal jurisdiction. Judges are to be appointed and removed by the Governor-General in Council, but must not be removed, except on an address from both houses of the Federal Parliament in the same session, and on the ground of proved misbehavior or incapacity.

The original jurisdiction of the High Court embraces matters arising under any treaty, or affecting representatives of other countries; or in which the Commonwealth, or a person suing or being sued on its behalf, is a party; or between States or residents of different States; or between a State and a resident of another State; or in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth: and original jurisdiction may be conferred on the High Court in any matter arising under the Constitution, or involving its interpretation, or arising under any laws made by the Federal Parliament, or in cases of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, or cases relating to the same subject-matter claimed under the laws of different States. The High Court is also to have a wide appellate jurisdiction, whether as to the subjects of its own original jurisdiction, or as to appeals from any other federal court, or from any State court from which an appeal at present lies to the Privy Council. The High Court will also decide appeals, from the Interstate Commission, but on questions of law only. There is a saving of the

Queen's prerogative to grant special leave of appeal from the High Court to the Privy Council, subject to any future Federal laws limiting the matters in which such leave may be asked; and the general appeal to the Privy Council is expressly restricted, so as to exclude matters involving the interpretation of the Federal Constitution or of the constitution of a State, unless the matter involves public interests of some part of the Empire, other than the Commonwealth or any of the States.

It is clearly intended that the Federal High Court shall be a tribunal charged with most important duties, in the maintenance of the balance of the Constitution. It is well that its independence is sufficiently secured; for, in time, occasions will of necessity arise in which it must decide conflicts between laws of the Commonwealth and laws of the several States; for all Americans know that, in a constitution delegating to the National Parliament, not only certain exclusive powers, but many others which are for distinction called concurrent, the latter class of powers, touching as they do a number of questions upon which individual States have already legislated, and that with much variety, cannot possibly be exercised without occasional controversies as to the extent to which local laws are displaced by Federal laws. There are strong hopes that the Commonwealth will find within it judicial capacity equal to the occasion. It can be said with confidence that the judicial career and conduct in these colonies up to now have been such as to give good grounds for this expectation, and for the bold assertion, conveyed by the provision I have quoted, that the people who have made this Constitution are fit to be, through their judges, the final expositors of its meaning.

Adhering to the order observed in the instrument itself, it may here be said that the manner in which the Constitution deals with questions of finance and trade has been a subject of bitter controversy. In each of these colonies, the principal sources of revenue are the customs and excise, and it was clearly necessary to hand over to the central body, with the control of inter-state free-trade, the receipt of this revenue and the making of future tariffs. With six different tariffs operating not only upon external but also upon internal trade, there has, of course, grown up an apparent difference in the rates of consumption per head. It is an actual difference in the rates of consumption of dutiable articles. But here the difficulty arises, well known to American readers, of de-

termining the total rate of consumption when plain *data* exist for ascertaining the rate as to articles imported, while there are few or no *data* as to articles internally produced. It will be seen that this difficulty led to many of the misapprehensions of the opponents of the bill as to its financial provisions. The chief of these provisions are as follows: As soon as the Constitution takes effect, the collection and control of all customs and excise duties will pass to the Federal Government, but the proceeds of these duties will be far more than sufficient for any probable purposes of the Commonwealth. A Federal tariff must be passed within two years from the establishment of the Constitution, and, on its passage, trade and intercourse among the States, whether by land, river or sea, are to be forever free. Until the first Federal tariff is passed, the Commonwealth is to credit to each State the revenues collected therein by the Commonwealth. It is to debit to each State, first, whatever the Commonwealth spends in that State for keeping up, as at the time of transfer, any department transferred from the State to the Commonwealth; and, secondly, it is to debit to each State its proportion *per capita* of all other expenditure of the Commonwealth. The resultant balance is to be paid each month to the State. But this system will also go on, with a slight change, during the five years following the passage of the first tariff. As the enactment of the tariff brings with it inter-state free-trade, it is provided that, during the five years following the enactment, customs duties chargeable on goods imported into a State, and afterwards passing into another State for consumption, shall be taken to have been collected not in the former, but in the latter, State; and the same consideration is to apply to excise duties paid on goods produced or manufactured in a State, and afterwards passing into another State for consumption. With this deviation, the crediting of revenue, the debiting of expenditure, and the payment of balances to each State will proceed, for the five-year period, just as they are to be carried on for the period preceding the making of the first tariff. When the five years shall have elapsed, the Parliament will have collected the necessary *data* as to the operation of inter-state free-trade, and the consequent changes in the commercial and financial conditions of the several States; and it will then be more clearly apparent in what degree the consumption, per head, of dutiable articles has approximated in different parts of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth is

then charged to provide, on such basis as it deems fair, for the monthly payment to the several States of all surplus revenues of the Commonwealth.

But is the expenditure of the Commonwealth to be unrestricted? No. A clause which is to operate for ten years after the establishment of the Commonwealth, and afterwards until the Parliament makes other provision, deals with the net revenue of the Commonwealth from customs and excise, and provides that, out of this, the Commonwealth may not spend more than one-fourth, and must return the balance to the several States, subject, of course, to the financial provisions I have outlined. If, however, a certain other provision is acted upon, a deduction may be made from the balance payable to any State. This will occur if the Commonwealth takes over any part of the public debts of the States. If it does, the interest paid by the Commonwealth on such proportion of debt will be deducted from the balance payable to that State. It is wisely provided that the Commonwealth may take over from the States either the whole of their public debts, as existing at the establishment of the Constitution, or a *per capita* proportion. Such debts, or any part of them, may be converted, renewed or consolidated. It is the general hope that this enactment may be turned to account at a very early stage in the life of the Commonwealth, with the result that the superior credit of the Commonwealth will much reduce the interest as the process of renewal and conversion goes on.

The requirement that the Commonwealth must not retain for its own expenditure more than one-fourth of the net customs and excise revenue has been the butt of bitter attack. Passed at the instance of Sir Edward Braddon, the Premier of Tasmania, it has been vituperated in New South Wales under the name of "Braddon Blot." Its object was to afford some security against extravagance on the part of the Commonwealth, and consequently some guarantee of a return to the States substantial enough to prevent any severe dislocation of their finances; but because the restriction of the Commonwealth to the expenditure of one-fourth makes it necessary that the remaining three-fourths should be distributed among the States, it has been asserted that the Commonwealth will be obliged to raise an enormous customs revenue, amounting in every case to four dollars as against every dollar which it may require. The fact that the Commonwealth is not bound to raise

all of its revenue from customs and excise has been studiously ignored; and altogether, no clause has been more deftly used by the opponents of federation to terrify its friends than has this one. American readers will require no argument as to the position which has been taken up, because they know, as many Australians have not yet realized, that it is the same people who make local and Federal legislators and tariffs; and it is only those who have not yet entered into a federation who can possibly entertain the apprehension that the effect of their united efforts of self-government will be tantamount to their domination by a foreign power.

The seat of government of the Commonwealth is to be determined by the Parliament. It must be within territory granted to or acquired by the Commonwealth, in which it is to be vested. In short, it will be Federal territory, and the Federal Parliament will have the exclusive power to make laws for its government, and to determine the extent of its representation in either house of that Parliament. It is to be within the State of New South Wales; and, in return for that concession, it is to be distant not less than one hundred miles from Sydney, the State capital. The area is not to be less than one hundred square miles. Any Crown lands which it may contain—probably a considerable area—are to be granted by the State to the Commonwealth without payment. The Parliament is to sit at Melbourne, until it meets at the seat of government. It will be seen that the law as to the seat of government will follow that of the United States rather than that of Canada, inasmuch as the area containing the capital will be exclusively under the federation and not under the jurisdiction of any State. There can be very little doubt that the representatives of New South Wales in the federation will lose little time in urging the early choice of this territory. As the Legislatures of the several States sit generally in the winter, and as a member of a State Legislature is not excluded from sitting in the Federal Parliament, if elected, it is probable that convenience will be on the side of summer sessions. In that prospect, it is likely that the area chosen will be at a sufficient altitude to give the advantage of a good summer climate; and, happily, several such areas are open for choice in New South Wales.

The Constitution can be altered much more easily than that of the United States. A bill for the purpose must first, in

ordinary cases, be passed by an absolute majority in each house. It is afterwards to be submitted in each State to the electors qualified to vote for the election of members in the House of Representatives. This is to be done not less than two nor more than six months after the passage of the bill through both houses. If, however, an amendment passed by an absolute majority of one house fails to pass the other, or is passed with an amendment as to which the two houses differ, and if after an interval of three months, a similar difference occurs, the amendment may be submitted to the popular vote, just as if it had secured an absolute majority in both houses. In order to become law, the amendment must, at the referendum, secure a majority of the electors who vote, and it must also secure majorities in a majority of the States. The difficulty which will exist because in South Australia women as well as men have a vote is met by prescribing that, until there is a uniform suffrage throughout the Commonwealth, only half the electors voting for and against the amendment may be counted in any State in which adult suffrage prevails. If an amendment would lessen the proportionate representation of any State in either house, or would alter the limits of a State directly or indirectly, it is not to become law until it receives the approval of a majority of the electors voting in the State affected.

I have endeavored, in giving a summary of the provisions of this Constitution, to discharge the duty in such a way as to enable American readers to see clearly the points in which it differs from the Constitution of the United States and from that of Canada.

In this interesting labor it may be thought that I have left out some matters which would have been useful to observers across the ocean, but I believe that I have given the real substance and meaning of the instrument. The struggle for federation has lasted between eight and nine years, if we leave out of account the good work of many who advocated it before it became a tangible public question. In the actual labor of the struggle it has been my duty to take as active a part as any man, but it is unquestionable that it was the mind and the hand of the late Sir Henry Parkes which first gave practical direction to popular feeling and reason on the question of questions, and all Australians will hold his memory dear for the gift he strove so hard to win for them. Full of years, he passed away in 1896. He did not live to share or see

the labors of the elected convention of fifty men, who, representing five colonies, framed the Constitution in 1897 and 1898. Would that we had had his help in the battles which have ensued.

I believe this Constitution will be found a well-considered instrument of government, adapting the best conclusions of liberal statesmanship to the difficult problems presented by the necessity of preserving the force of federalism in the government of an aggregation of democratic States. As was the case with the Constitution of the United States, its enemies will attack it for many a day; but I have no fear either as to its strength against attack or as to its fitness for its appointed work in the hands of a free people, of keen insight and active reason.

EDMUND BARTON.

WILL EDUCATION SOLVE THE RACE PROBLEM?

BY PROFESSOR JOHN ROACH STRATON, OF MERCER UNIVERSITY,
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The race problem is again occupying a large place in the public attention. The renewed focusing of interest on it arises from two causes—first, the conditions at the South growing out of the rape and lynching evils; second, the disquisitions of Professor Booker T. Washington and other thinkers on the problem, maintaining that education will solve it. The educational argument opens an interesting field for thought and investigation. Let us consider it briefly under the following heads:

I. Will education solve the race problem? That is, will it bring about such an advance on the part of the negro as will adapt him fully to his environments and make him a worthy integer in our national life, if he is allowed fully to enter that life, by the breaking down of the race prejudice and antipathy against him?

II. If education will not accomplish the desired advance, what are the causes which prevent such a result?

I.

There are reasons for fearing that the hope for the solution of the race problem through education is based upon inadequate grounds. One of the most vital factors in the problem is the negro's tendency to immorality and crime. This tendency in the colored race is of fundamental importance in any consideration of the problem, because, if it continues, it means, instead of the hoped-for growth, permanent decay and degeneracy in every particular. No race can make a true advance which has not beneath its feet the firm foundation of the moral idea. The tendency is of fundamental importance, further, because, if it continues to develop, the gulf between the races will grow ever wider and the

friction ever more intense, thereby rendering the proposed solution more difficult.

How is the tendency being affected by education?

It is necessary to use the *ante-bellum* conditions as an aid in tracing tendencies among the colored race. Two things are reasonably certain about those conditions. The first is that, previous to the war, the negro was not educated. In most of the Southern States there were laws prohibiting education among the slaves. Such occurrences as the Nat Turner rebellion, in 1831, tended to the rigid enforcement of the laws, and it is safe to say that *practically the entire negro race was illiterate*. The second is that, previous to the war, the negro was not more criminal than other men. The slaves were noted for their docile and peaceable natures. Petty misdemeanors were usually their worst offenses. There were surprisingly few crimes against the person among them. So far as the writer can ascertain, there was only one case of the negro's crime against womanhood during all the days of slavery, while his fidelity and simple discharge of duty during the Civil War, when the whites were away fighting against his liberty, have challenged the admiration of the world.

Starting with these conditions, the changes which have come about may be traced. After the war, the education of the negro began and advanced rapidly; but side by side with it has gone his increase in crime and immorality in even greater ratio. Measured by the proportion of negro criminals to the entire negro population, the race grew more criminal between 1870 and 1880 by as much as twenty-five per cent. ;* this despite the fact that illiteracy decreased by over ten per cent.† During the decade from 1880 to 1890, the negroes grew more criminal by thirty-three and a third per cent. ; yet illiteracy decreased during that decade by over eighteen per cent. So by the census of 1890, twenty-five years from their emancipation in the South, we are confronted with the fact that the race, though constituting less than twelve per cent. of the population of this country, furnished thirty per cent. of all the crime of the country, including thirty-

* Stated thus because the Census of 1870 is faulty as regards facts pertaining to the negro. The seeming increase, from the Census, was larger than twenty-five per cent., but on account of the errors in the Census of 1870, the comparisons between it and that of 1880 make the negro's growth in crime for the decade appear too large. (See Census of 1880, Vol. I., p. 38.)

† Unless otherwise specified, all statistics are from the United States Census.

seven per cent. of all homicides, fifty-seven per cent. of all female homicides, and forty per cent. of all assaults. This in the face of the fact that over \$100,000,000 had been spent on their education in twenty-five years,* and that illiteracy among them had decreased by forty-two per cent.† Though there are as yet no census reports covering the period, any one who has been observant of criminal records in recent years must conclude that the increase in the proportion of negro criminals has gone on from 1890 to the present time. Especially has this been true of the negro's horrible crime against female virtue. When Henry Smith was burned at Paris, Texas, in 1893, for mutilating and murdering a little white girl of four years old, it was predicted by Bishop Haygood, of Georgia, and other observers, that the restraining influence of that terrible example, coupled with the efforts of the good negroes to prevent them, would stop these shocking crimes. Since then, however, despite all that has been done, they have increased with alarming rapidity, until, during the few weeks following the Sam Hose burning in Georgia recently, it is not extreme to say that there were more outrages and attempts at outrage than in the two preceding years combined. The papers were laden almost daily with accounts of one, two, and sometimes three of these crimes, within or near the borders of Georgia, followed by the swift and awful vengeance of the whites; and some are committed, followed by the usual punishment, news of which never reaches the papers. The worst spirit seemed to have taken possession of the vicious elements of the negroes. There were several of these crimes committed by negro boys, little more than children; an organized band of negroes bound together by oath for outrage was discovered near Bainbridge, in Georgia; while it was reported from Little Rock, Arkansas, that one brute, in the very prodigality of wantonness, committed five of these crimes in one day before he could be apprehended.

Now, it might be thought by some that, as the majority of the race live in the South, the criminal record of the negro arises, in part, from discrimination against them by the Southern courts. But this cannot be true, for the same tendencies prevail in the

* From estimates by Dr. Mayo, of Boston, substantiated by estimates by the National Commissioner of Education.

† These figures do not include the very large number of domestic larcenies and other small offenses for which the negroes are not punished at law, on account of the forbearance of the whites.

North where the objection cannot be urged. In Pennsylvania, for instance, in 1894, the proportion of male negro criminals to the entire number of criminals was 16.61 per cent., that of the females 34.61 per cent., and yet the negroes compose only 2.16 per cent. of the population of Pennsylvania.*

The negro's growth in sexual immorality goes on like his growth in crime. The report of the health office of the District of Columbia† shows that, while the percentage of illegitimate to the total number of births decreased among the whites during the decade, 1884 to 1894, from 3.60 per cent. to 2.56 per cent. (28.8 per cent. decrease), it increased among the negroes from 19.02 per cent. to 26.46 per cent. (39 per cent. increase), and stood in 1894 at over ten times that of the whites. Like conditions prevail in other localities. And even these figures, it is thought, do not adequately indicate the extent of the sexual sin of the negro, for it is the common belief among the whites, especially in the South, that the idea of chastity is scarcely known to the vast lower strata of the race.

As a further illustration of tendencies, let us turn to the conditions in the North alone, where the negro has had his liberty for some generations longer than in the South, where he is far better educated, and is freest to follow his natural bent, by reason of at least a partial absence of the idea of negro inferiority which holds him in check in the South. It is held by the advocates of the educational solution that, if the negro is but given the opportunity, he will grow and improve in all respects. It may also be thought by some that it is too early to reach a judgment as to these tendencies in the South, since the negro has had but a short time there since slavery to demonstrate what he will do. The record of the negro in the North, now, meets both of these conditions, and should shed, therefore, a valuable light on what may be expected of him in the future. Turning to the North, we will find that the evil tendencies prevail there in even greater degree than in the South. The number of negro criminals in the North is much larger, in proportion to the negro population in those States, than in the South. In the North Atlantic States, there were, in 1890, 7,547 negro criminals to the million of negro population; in the South Atlantic States, there were only 2,716

* Annual reports State Board of Charities and Lunacy, 1886 and 1894.

† 1894, p. 152.

to the million. Now, the proportion of illiteracy among the Northern negroes is but 21.71 per cent., whereas it is 60 per cent. for those of the South. It is apparent, therefore, that the negroes of the North, despite the advantageous conditions there, are almost three times as criminal as those of the South, although they are also about three times as well educated.

Going a step further in the investigation, we will find, not only that the negro is more criminal in the North than in the South, but that, dividing the South into groups of States, he is most criminal in the States where he is best educated. Grouping South Carolina, Mississippi and Louisiana, we find that the average negro illiteracy is 65.70 per cent. The number of negro criminals to the million of negro population in those States is 1,600. Grouping Texas, Tennessee, Maryland and West Virginia, the average negro illiteracy is only 50.31 per cent. The number of negro criminals to the million of negro population in those States is 4,120. So we see that in the group of States where the negro's literacy is 15 per cent. higher than in the other group, his criminal record is two and one-half times as high.

Let us notice here, too, that in the three States where their crime is least (Mississippi, Louisiana and South Carolina), the negro population is densest. They constitute 56 per cent. of the population of those States; while in the States where their crime is greatest, the negro population is sparsest. They constitute but 20 per cent. of the population of Texas, Maryland, Tennessee and West Virginia.

It is a noticeable fact, also, that in the three States where his criminal record and educational development are lowest and his population densest, there has been the least advance on the part of the negro away from his simple *ante-bellum* life. The conditions on the plantations of Mississippi, Louisiana and South Carolina are more nearly as they were before the war than in the other Southern States. The small farm system has not grown up there so much as it has elsewhere. Great plantations, with overseers and large groups of negro laborers, are more the predominating type than elsewhere in the Southern country.

Compare the two extremes. In the three Southern States, where the negro has made the least advance, and where, according to all of our accepted standards (education, worldly condition, etc.), his status is the worst, he furnishes but 1,600 criminals to the

million of his population; whereas, in the North Atlantic States, where his condition, according to our standards, is the best, he furnishes 7,547 criminals to the million of his population. The illiteracy of the negro in the States where he furnishes only 1,600 criminals to the million of his population is 65.70 per cent.; while his illiteracy in the North, where he furnishes 7,547 to the million, is only 21.71 per cent.

Another significant fact bearing on these considerations of the negro's crime is that, looking at the race as a whole, the element which is educated is more criminal than the element which is illiterate. Only 42 per cent. of the entire colored population can read and write, whereas 46 per cent. of the negro criminals can read and write.

Now, the point is well taken that we should not expect too much of the negro, in view of the fact that he has only recently emerged from slavery. But, in the light of all the conditions, this fact does not satisfactorily account for the negro's moral decline. To argue that the low moral status of the slaves accounts for the present ethical condition of the negro, overlooks the startling increase in *crime* since the war, although there was little criminality among the slaves. Further, the negro has not stood still at what may be granted to have been a low moral status during slavery, but has since rapidly declined ethically. It is also true that his *ante-bellum* sexual immorality took the form of concubinage, while in *post-bellum* days it is the more pernicious system of prostitution for gain. So we have the right, on account of the fact that these evil tendencies are growing ever stronger, not only in the South, but more so in the North, where the negro has been free for several generations and has had every advantage, to ask ourselves the questions what these things mean, how far they are to go, and how long our civilization can stand the strain which they bring about. The constantly recurring epidemics of rape and lynching, and the numerous race riots and incipient wars force these questions upon us. Optimistic though we be, we cannot overlook the fact that there have been a dozen times, within the past year or two, when the least indiscreet act on either side might have precipitated a race war in the locality affected, involving the burning of towns and the shedding of much blood.

The consideration in this article, however, is not how much

blame is to be attached to the negro for these things, but what effect our remedies are having. Though the foregoing statistics, like all other statistics, are liable to the criticism of a lack of absolute finality as indicators of conditions and tendencies, still there must be some strong element of truth in them when they are so decisive; and, judging from them, the educational work for the negroes does not seem to be realizing the expectations based upon it. Education may not be the cause of these evils, as some go so far as to claim; but the facts seem to warrant the conclusion that it is not checking them and therefore is not solving the problem.

II.

If we accept the foregoing facts, one or two inductions can be made from them: either that the negro has received the wrong sort of education, or that there are causes which prevent the beneficial effects which usually arise from education from prevailing in his case.

The movement for industrial education, with that great and good man, Booker T. Washington, as its chief champion, has arisen as a result of a widespread, though not specifically expressed, opinion that the first of the above conclusions is true.

While industrial education may be the best present policy and worthy for that reason of support, pending the final solution of the problem, there are reasons for fearing that its effect on the ethical condition of the negro—the vital element of the problem—will not be sufficiently marked to compass the needed reform. It has been the policy in the past educational efforts among the negroes to lay especial emphasis on the development of moral ideals; and it is difficult to see how efforts looking to moral advancement, in connection with industrial training, are to be more efficacious than have been the efforts looking to moral advancement in connection with academic and collegiate education up to the present time. In addition to this, it is by no means certain that the movement for industrial education will eventually prevail over and in large part replace the old system. In fact, it is being viewed with a skeptical, if not unfriendly, eye by a large element of the colored race, composed principally of the partisans of the old system; and it is being opposed by another element, composed of those who have had implanted in their minds the idea

of immediate equality with the whites, engendered for the most part during the carpet-bag régime, and who do not seem willing to wait for any process of growth. As illustrations of this opposition, Mr. Washington was denounced by some of the delegates to the recent Negro Convention at Chicago; and a book containing criticisms of him and his policies has also been published. But, granting that it will ultimately prevail, we must still realize that the industrial education cannot reach, directly or indirectly, for long generations at least, the mass of the negro race. And how it is to elevate this vast body of people, now seemingly far more weak, criminal and immoral than at the close of the war, and with these tendencies growing ever stronger, would be difficult of demonstration.

These considerations warrant our taking up the second possible induction. Before considering it, let us note certain parallel tendencies to the ones before examined, which may give us further light.

There are some indications that, in connection with the seeming ethical degeneracy discussed, there has set in a physical deterioration among the negroes equally marked. It is claimed by some students of the question that it is capable of scientific demonstration that the negro is weakening perceptibly in his physical manhood year after year.* The death rate of the negroes in cities is nearly double that of the whites. The ravages of pulmonary, venereal and other diseases among them is something distressing. And while there are few direct comparative vital statistics for the rural districts, that the same conditions prevail there, more or less, as in the cities, may be inferred from the fact that the colored race is increasing far more slowly than the white. The whites outstripped them nearly twofold in the South during the decade from 1880 to 1890, and there was practically no immigration to the South and no migration of negroes away to change the value of the comparison. Had not the whites been weakened by the war, it is possible that the difference might have been even greater.

Parallel with the greater ethical decay in the North, the tendency to physical degeneracy there also seems to be more marked than in the South, as illustrated by the fact, deducible from statistics from several States North and South, that, while

* See, for instance, F. M. Hoffman's "Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro."

the birth rate is greater than the death rate by about two to one in the South, it is actually less than the death rate in the North. That is to say, the race is not sustaining itself in the Northern States.

There are also some indications that the negro is degenerating as regards thrift and industry. Such students of the problem as Mr. Hoffman and Mr. Bruce have reached this conclusion. The complaints so frequently heard about the "triflingness" of the younger generations of negroes may be indications of this tendency toward lessened industrial efficiency; while the School Commissioner of Georgia states in his last annual report (1898, p. 10) that, upon careful investigation, he had found that ninety per cent. of the property owned by negroes in Georgia was acquired by ex-slaves. This fact is rendered the more significant when it is remembered that the ex-slaves constitute less than twenty per cent. of the negro population of Georgia (Census of 1890). The commissioner says further: "Most of the property owned by the negroes was acquired prior to 1890. Very little has been added to the tax books since. The younger class, or the educated class, does not seem to be adding much to the property-holding of the race."

Do not these apparently well defined tendencies toward decay among the negroes, despite the educational efforts in their behalf, point to the conclusion that there are causes which prevent the beneficial effects usually arising from education from prevailing in their case? Is this an unreasonable conclusion, in the light of the nature of the negro and the conditions surrounding him here? In our educational work for him have we not overlooked, more or less, the real nature of racial advancement? The true civilizing process is not a sudden and artificial development from without, but a gradual and harmonious growth from within. Plato's dwellers in the cave could not be suddenly transferred from their accustomed darkness to the dazzling light on the outside. The African cannot be lifted to the plane of the Anglo-Saxon by the use of either logarithms and Greek roots or formulæ for cultivating a field or constructing a pair of shoes. The Anglo-Saxon has reached his present high civilization after a long and laborious struggle upward. Through a series of well defined steps, he has risen from barbarism to his present plane. The system in which he now dwells is the logical outcome of all

that has gone before, and consequently the white man of to-day is thoroughly suited to his environment. Now, it is reasonable to think that, since Anglo-Saxon civilization is thus the culmination of a series of steps, all the steps must be taken before it can safely be reached. To suddenly introduce another race, therefore, to any step near the top before it has taken the preceding steps in the series, and then to attempt to hurry it over the other steps in the hope of having it reach and occupy the culminating one, must be a hopeless undertaking. The evolutionary process cannot be supplanted by artificial stimulants. Should we wonder, then, that our educational efforts in behalf of the negro seem to have failed of their intended purpose? Nay, more—does not the history of races show that the effort on the part of a superior people to lift up inferiors at a single stroke not only fails but establishes conditions which lead to the actual destruction of the weaker race? And is not this the largest element in the cause of the seeming failure of the educational movement among the negroes?

Here is a question that we must face, however distasteful it may be. The fact—illustrated by the conditions in Mississippi, Louisiana, and South Carolina, where the colored population is densest and where the status of the negro has not changed since the war so much as in the remainder of the country—the fact that the more the negroes live to themselves and the nearer they remain to the simple life which formerly characterized them, the better they are, while the more they scatter as a race and the closer they come into contact with our civilization and the more they endeavor to take it on, the worse they become, lends pertinence to the query. There is historical justification for the statement of the principle that a weak race, which is unassimilable in its nature, when brought suddenly into contact with the higher civilization of a strong race, unconsciously destroys itself. When a weak race which is assimilable comes into contact with a stronger the former is absorbed, as illustrated by the familiar history of the Anglo-Saxon. When the weaker race is unassimilable, however, it has not been the custom of the stronger to exterminate the weaker *vi et armis*, but rather to subordinate it. So that the ultimate extinction of the weaker peoples, where they have touched the stronger historic nations, would indicate that the weaker gradually died out of their own accord. A reason for

this phenomenon might be found in the ethical effects upon a race of this subordination—the recognized hopelessness of its position, the aimlessness of life arising from removal of incentive to effort, etc.—and the wasting effects of a struggle, involving a complete change of habit, to take on, through imitation, a civilization for which it was not prepared. The disappearance of the Turanian peoples of Europe after the Aryan invasion (their only modern representatives being the Lapps and Finns of the far North, who were protected from contact with the invaders and their customs by the snow and ice of their Northern home, and the Basques of the Pyrenees, who had a protection in their mountain walls) suggests that then as now the weaker was destroyed by the struggle to adopt the new customs of the stronger, in conjunction with the ethical effects before mentioned. In modern times, the principle has been illustrated by the natives of South America and the West Indian islands, who sadly degenerated as a result of their contact with Spanish civilization; in some of the islands—as San Domingo—even disappearing in the end entirely.

As better authenticated illustrations of the principle, we may note the following examples. The natives of Tasmania, as a result of their contact with the English, suffered total extinction in a few years. Dr. Strong, a student of these racial phenomena, remarks that the death of the race was caused “by the attempts to civilize them.”* It was not caused by any movement for extermination, as the policy of the whites in dealing with the natives was most humane. Mr. Calder, one of the chief authorities on the Tasmanians, estimates that a total of 500 far exceeds the number of blacks killed by the whites.† The natives simply destroyed themselves.

The same results have supervened among the Maories of New Zealand, an originally strong and highly intellectual race, since they came into contact with European civilization. Degeneracy, leading to ultimate extinction, began among them as soon as they came under the influence of the new-comers. There was a decrease in their population during the fourteen years preceding 1858 of 19.42 per cent.; and in the fourteen years following 1858, of 32.29 per cent. of the remainder.‡ The Maories them-

* See Darwin's “Descent of Man,” p. 187.

† “Native Tribes of Tasmania.”

‡ “Observations on the Aboriginal Inhabitants of New Zealand,” by Mr. F. D. Fenton. Published by the British Government.

selves "attributed their decadence, in some measure, to the introduction of new food and clothing, and the attendant change of habit"—in other words, to their efforts to become civilized.

"It is evident," says Mr. Darwin, "from many statements in the life of Bishop Patteson, that the Melanesians of the New Hebrides and neighboring archipelagoes suffered to an extraordinary degree in health, and perished in large numbers, when they were removed to New Zealand, Norfolk Islands, and other salubrious places, in order to be educated as missionaries"—that is, to be civilized.

The same tendencies to decay and death began among the natives of the Sandwich Islands upon the advent of European civilization to their shores. This vital decay progressed rapidly up to the taking of the first Census in 1832; and for the forty years immediately following that Census, the remnant of natives decreased by 68 per cent. !—only 51,531 remaining of the 300,000 originally on the islands. Dating from the arrival of missionaries in 1819, "there was a rapid change in almost all the habits of the natives, and they soon became 'the most civilized (!) of the Pacific Islanders.'"^{*} Their degeneracy is still going rapidly forward. The native death rate for Honolulu per thousand in 1893 was 29.5; in 1894, 33.6. The European rate for Honolulu in 1893 was 17.7; for 1894, 16.8. The people who are thus miserably perishing, as a result of their contact with a higher civilization, were originally a strong and in many ways an admirable race. Mr. Featherman describes them, at the time the missionaries first visited the islands, as "the uncorrupted children of nature." They had a magnificent physical manhood, and were "open-hearted, generous, and hospitable to a fault." Since then, however, their physical strength and moral integrity have wasted rapidly away, and Mr. Bishop described them in 1888 as a hopelessly debauched and degenerate people.

Finally, a more striking and familiar example of the principle is at our very doors in the story of the American Indian—his metamorphosis from a sturdy, natural manhood into a weak, vicious, and besotted wretch, slowly withering up in the white heat of the civilization about him. It is an interesting and striking fact, too, that there is an exact parallelism between the recent histories of the Indians and the negroes, in that the Indian

^{*}"Descent of Man," p. 187.

tribes which have touched the whites closely have degenerated far more than those which have not. Mr. Hoffman shows that four tribes which have not come into close contact with the whites have retained a high standard of morality, that chastity is the rule among them, that venereal diseases are rare, and that they are increasing numerically; while, in the case of seven tribes which touch intimately the higher civilization about them, morality is scarcely known, venereal diseases are "excessively prevalent," and the population is rapidly decreasing.*

Do not these facts demonstrate that the weaker races imitate most what is bad and profit little by what is good in the higher civilization, and consequently that the principle of the unconscious self-destruction of a weaker people in contact with a stronger is tenable? We take these savages from their simple life and their low plane of evolution, and attempt to give them an enlightenment for which the stronger races have prepared themselves through ages of growth. This we call "The White Man's Burden," but it seems rather to mean the Black Man's Death. These weaker races are brought into contact with all the allurements, temptations and dangers, the terrible strain of this civilization, without having grown into the strength which would enable them to safeguard themselves against the dangers, to eschew the bad and use merely the good in the higher forms. Like little children in a tropical garden, they eat all fruit merely because it looks pretty or tastes sweet, not knowing that deep in its dangerous heart lies the poison which destroys. It is like taking a strong stimulant. It exhilarates and buoys up for the time; but, all the while, it is quietly eating out the very vitals of its victim.

We have now to face the momentous question of whether this principle is not the one which has been behind the history of the American negro for the past thirty years. Are there not ethnological tendencies that lie deeper than all of our surface discussions? We have given the negro Latin and Greek and looking-glasses and steam engines, and have observed as a result a seeming advance; but below the surface it appears that there has been going on this ethical and even physical decay. The manifestations of racial degeneracy, according to Mr. Darwin and other authorities, are lessened fertility and the prevalence of venereal and other diseases, caused by immorality and resulting in a large

* Hoffman's "Tendencies," p. 325.

infant mortality. Judging from the declining rate of racial increase, the conclusively-proven abnormal infant mortality and prevalence of venereal diseases, these manifestations seem to be strongly of force within the colored race. Are there not grounds, therefore, for thinking that the negroes are simply not able to take on this civilization in the true meaning of that term? Have they reached a stage of development which demands or which can support this higher status? Are they not merely taking the weapons of our civilization and unconsciously turning them upon themselves? If they remain in their present environment, should we be much surprised to see the vast body of the race presenting in the future a parallel history to that of the Indian? The negro has undergone a greater change in habit of life within a few decades than has the Anglo-Saxon in a thousand years. Leaving out of consideration the undoubted racial effects which a sudden change of habitat, a transition from a warm to a colder climate, has upon uncivilized peoples, should we feel surprised if evil, even fatal, results supervene from the shock of this rude and sudden arresting of the orderly development of a race—this turning of its life into new and dangerous channels?

The theory here suggested is not invalidated by the advance of individual negroes. We must not confuse the rapid development of exceptional individuals with the evolution of a race. Picked individuals, strengthened often in mental vigor by infusions of white blood, may grow rapidly; but the evolution of the race comes slowly—a part of each new element of strength being transmitted by the laws of heredity from father to son and on to succeeding generations; and so, slowly and painfully, a race advances. It is not a matter of decades, but of centuries. The negro race as a whole, however, may go forward higher yet in outward forms, but still deep down beneath these things may lie the tendencies which give color to the fear that they are a decaying people.

Now, it might be thought that, because these tendencies seem to have developed only since emancipation, they arise simply as a result of the inclination toward license which comes as a natural result of sudden liberty, and that the tide will turn. The sudden liberation of the negro doubtless hastened the development of these tendencies, but it scarcely accounts for their existence. If we could believe that the pendulum had swung to its limit on one side and was destined now to swing back, there would be grounds

for an optimistic outlook in many respects. Unfortunately, such a hope is discounted, however, by the fact that there has been no such swing back in the North, but that, as a result of the negro's longer freedom there, these evil tendencies have grown steadily stronger and become more clearly defined. The same thing is true of the West India Islands, where the negro was fully emancipated in 1838. To believe that these evil tendencies are merely temporary, and will be corrected in the future, would be to ignore the history of all the weak races which have perished as a result of their contact with superiors. When once the cold hand of degeneracy is laid upon a people, it seems as remorseless and unyielding as the hand of death. In the case of the Tasmanians before referred to, every effort was made to save them, but, despite good treatment and all advantageous conditions, the race slowly but surely died out. The same has been true of the natives of Australia. Mr. Sutherland, in his able work on "The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct," says (p. 120) :

"The colony of Victoria was not occupied at all by white men till 1835; and the early founders had among their articles of association most humane rules in regard to the blacks, rules which were strictly carried out. . . . The authorities appointed five protectors of aborigines, who lived among the blacks and reported once a year as to their condition, and who were especially commissioned to report on any outrage committed by white men. . . . Yet the aborigines of Victoria are practically a vanished race."

Just when this tearing-down process within the colored race began is unknown. We understand little about the workings of these ethnological tendencies, and consequently cannot say what subtle, though unseen, forces may have been at work during slavery, preparing the way for the manifest decline when the conditions were ripe for it to set in. That the tendencies seem to have been delayed in manifesting themselves in the case of the negro might be accounted for on the ground that his physical well being was carefully guarded during slavery, while his ethical side was protected by his peculiar situation. He was isolated from temptation and danger, in large measure, by his peculiarly subordinate position, his simple life, and the rigid restraints upon him.

Are not these, then, things which all wise and earnest thinkers on this vexed problem should keep in mind with their other facts and theories, educational and otherwise? Must not the theory

here suggested be included as a trial factor in any equation for the solution of the race problem? We cannot say finally that it lies in the realm of truth; but it would scarcely be the part of wisdom to ignore the facts upon which it is predicated. Nor does the theory necessarily mean despair of the negro race as a race. The question is not, What of the race? but, What of the race *under its present strange and abnormal environment*? There are many elements of strength in the negro's nature. The rare sense of humor and the homely wit of the old-time negroes are signs of latent capabilities; while, for intuitive knowledge of human nature and rugged native eloquence, they are scarcely surpassed by any race. The negroes in their unalloyed nature are hard workers and are faithful to a trust. It is possibly true, too, that they are the best natured people on earth; and this is by no means the smallest element in the foundation of racial greatness. What the negro would do if he were removed from the environment which seems to be sapping his racial life, it is impossible to say; but an optimistic hope for him would find strong foundations.

What the final solution will be, time alone can tell. We can only wait, watch and hope. In the mean time, as before remarked, Mr. Washington's plans appear to be the best tentative policy, and are worthy of all support. His industrial idea is a recognition of the significance of the evolutionary process in racial development. The question is, however, whether even industrial education goes back far enough, and whether the temptations and dangers which environ the negro here will not prevail over his weakness before his judgment to choose and his strength to overcome have developed. If time and further experience demonstrate the applicability to the negro of the theory here presented, we will then be confronted with the question of what action philanthropy as well as civil policy calls for. If the present relationship between the whites and blacks points to the permanent degeneracy and ultimate racial death of the negroes, it will become our duty to save this simple-minded and in many respects worthy people, who are not here through any choice of their own, who served our fathers faithfully and well, and who in many ways contributed to the upbuilding and wealth of our country. If racial contact is seen to prove disastrous to the weaker, then segregation must be effected. It will then be no longer a question,

of what can, but what must, be done. The enlightened conscience of humanity would see it so. Nothing is impossible to this age and this people. We have spent over \$5,000,000,000 in bringing the problem up to its present stage of uncertainty—we might say chaos; we could spend a few millions more in carrying it out to a wise, just and humane solution. No plan for picking up the negro race *en masse* and moving them from the country, or to some isolated portion of it, is practicable. But by establishing conditions elsewhere which would invite the negro there, and then assisting him to go, the problem might be solved. As many foreigners as there are members in the colored race have come to this country within the past few decades, on account of the inviting conditions here. It is possible, therefore, for the negroes to go elsewhere if conditions invited them there. All of the negroes would not go, nor is it needful that they should do so. The old negroes are rapidly passing over to a country which lies much nearer our shores than Africa or the islands at our Southern doors. But by granting any government assistance on the age-limit plan, a sufficient number of the negroes could and would go to ease the present strain in this country on the one hand, and to insure them a racial future on the other.

Until the solution of the problem is found, the whites have a great responsibility on their shoulders in the presence of this simple-minded, impressionable and imitative people. The best elements of both races must co-operate in every legitimate way to better existing conditions, to devise ways and means for wisely lifting the negro up. The dealings of the Anglo-American with the Afro-American must be characterized by sympathy, tolerance, justice and absolute fairness. The influence of the self-seeking politician must be destroyed, and in our strength and wisdom we must lead this weaker people's steps aright, giving them examples of honesty, sincerity and righteousness, not of duplicity, chicanery and injustice.

JOHN ROACH STRATON.

THE MEETING OF THE OLYMPIAN GAMES.

BY BARON PIERRE DE COUBERTIN.

The Olympian Games of ancient times brought the Greek world together every four years in the beautiful valley of Olympia, to contemplate a spectacle the uniformity of which seems to have constituted an additional charm in the eyes of the spectators. On starting, they knew beforehand almost exactly what they were going to see, and they delighted in the knowledge. In this respect, the inclination of the modern world is entirely different: our contemporaries take pleasure in variety and novelty, and for two reasons—first, because the facility and rapidity of our means of transport have intensified their curiosity; and, second, because, as the duration of their existence has not been prolonged in proportion to the number of objects soliciting their attention, they have not the leisure to see the same things twice.

When, nearly ten years ago, I conceived the plan of reviving the Olympian Games in a modern form, it was necessary for me to observe this tendency and take it into account. To-day, as in former times, the Olympian Games respond to a natural and healthy inclination of humanity: in all times and in all countries, if young men are active and in good health, they will be fond of manly games and competitions in which they display their strength and agility, and, incited by the instinct of emulation, they will desire to contend, in the name of their country, against young men of other lands. But, as regards the arrangement of these periodical festivals, the situation has changed, and the sole means of insuring their success and of rendering them as splendid and brilliant as possible consists in giving them a great variety of aspect.

This is the reason why the International Congress which met in Paris in June, 1894, decided, at my request, that each of the

new Olympiads should be celebrated in a different city of the world, and why Athens was chosen as the scene of the first Olympian meeting in 1896, and Paris as that of the second, four years later. Personally, I cannot repress a strong desire that the third Olympian Games, those of 1904, should take place at New York; then the distinctly cosmopolitan character of my enterprise will be clearly shown.

As concerns variety, I have good reason to rejoice; for nothing will resemble the festivals at Athens in 1896 less than those at Paris in 1900. We have not been drawn into the error of constructing a cardboard Stadium to reproduce that of Pericles, with the hill of Montmartre in the background to replace the Acropolis on its rock. This would have been ridiculous and paltry. We began by considering with good reason that there was no need to trouble ourselves about the preparation of amusements and special festivities, because the Exposition in itself would constitute a permanent festival full of attractions, and hence the organizing committee need only be engaged with the technical part of the sport in question. It happened that at Athens this point had been rather neglected, because the committee was also engaged with the interests of the spectators, and had to take measures for their amusement, for the decoration of the sights and monuments, and for the preparation of attractions of all kinds, in order to bring spectators together in as large numbers as possible and to detain them. Now the same anxiety does not exist, and the interests of the athletes predominate above all else.

I.

The Olympian organization created by the Congress of 1894 is very simple. It consists in an International Committee, of which I have the honor to be President, which numbers about twenty members belonging to the chief nationalities of Europe and America. These include, for example, Prince Serge Beliossel-sky for Russia, Lord Ampthill for England, Count Brunetta d'Usseaux for Italy, Commandant Balck for Sweden, Baron de Tuyl for Holland, Professor William M. Sloane, of the University of Columbia, for the United States, etc. The whole business of the International Committee consists in promoting the celebration of the Games, and in deciding in what country they shall take place. This being done, the International Committee leaves the

immediate preparations for the Games to the sub-committee appointed for that purpose, contenting itself with seconding this sub-committee and supporting it abroad with all its influence. The committee which organized the Olympian Games at Athens in 1896 was not nominated by the government, but by the Crown Prince, who presided over it. That of 1900 has been appointed by the French Government, and is placed under the direction of a Delegate General, who is M. Merillon, a former deputy, now a magistrate, a most distinguished, agreeable and competent man. A statement of the plans for the preparation of the different competitions may interest my readers.

There are ten sections. The first comprises Athletic Sports and Games; the second, Gymnastics; the third, Fencing; the fourth, Shooting; the fifth, Equestrian Sports; the sixth, Cycling; the seventh, Motor Car Racing; the eighth, Aquatic Sports; the ninth, Firemen's Drill; the tenth, Ballooning. It might be objected to this classification that it comprises neither Alpine Climbing nor Skating; that, on the other hand, Firemen's Drill is not sport, and that balloons and the art of guiding them are still in their infancy. But it is impossible to obtain a faultless classification, or to contrive that all kinds of sport without exception should be seen at the same meeting. If, as has been suggested, Sweden should some day organize Olympian Winter Games in ice and snow, they will include Tobogganing, Snow-shoes and Skis, but they will be forced to exclude Cricket, Football and Foot Races. It is an amusing paradox to consider that, in order to render the Olympian Games complete, one would have to go to St. Moritz in the Swiss Engadine, where sun and snow agree all the winter so well that men skate in flannel slippers, and women open their parasols when going for a sleigh-ride. There, indeed, one might, if forced to do so, combine summer sports with those of winter.

Meanwhile, it is a question of spring in Paris, and the restrictions imposed by the place and climate must not be forgotten. On the other hand, the programme as it stands is sufficiently complete to provide most interesting competitions. Thus, the first section comprises athletic sports, foot races, jumping, etc., and games. The distances of the foot races are those of the French championships, in which the best English runners have taken part on several occasions within the last ten years. That is to say,

the distances are very nearly the same. If the "100 yards" has become with us 100 metres, and the "one mile" 1,500 metres (instead of 1609, the exact equivalent of the mile), the hurdle race corresponds exactly to the English distance; the hurdles are of the same height, and they are arranged in the same manner. As to the running competitions, the long and high jumps, pole-vaulting, and putting the weight, they are performed in identically the same fashion. The games entered as international are Football (Rugby and Association), Hockey, Cricket, Lawn Tennis, Croquet and Golf; there will also be a match at Bowls. All these games are played in France. There are others, such as Baseball, La Crosse, etc., of which exhibitions only can be given, as they are not played in France. For example, if the Americans resident in Paris succeed in forming a baseball team to play another team from America, this contest will receive the patronage and support of the Committee of the Exposition, which perhaps will give a prize; but it will necessarily retain an American—that is to say, a purely national—character.

Gymnastics are only open to foreign gymnasts as individuals. Gymnastic societies will not be invited to compete in groups, but only to send their best gymnasts to take part in the international championship, which will be individual. Several gymnastic festivals reserved for French societies only will take place during the course of the Exposition. This is a prudent decision; in adhering to it, no attempt has been made to exclude certain nations whilst admitting others, but the aim has been to avoid trouble and dispute. Gymnastic societies, to whatever country they belong, always behave in a more or less martial fashion; they march in military order, preceded by their national flag. After the troubled circumstances of late years, it would be a delicate affair to unite the flags of recent opponents upon the field of contest.

Fencing includes, of course, matches with foils, with sabres, and with swords. One can foresee a fine contest, in which the French and Italian schools will be opposed, and will establish in a sensational manner their respective merits. Boxing will, of course, be subdivided into English and French boxing, it being impossible to combine the two methods, as has been sufficiently proved by the recent match which took place in Paris between Charlemont, our best French boxing champion, and Driscoll, a second-rate English boxer. The contest will, no doubt, give rise

to some difficulty with regard to the rules to be observed, for these are not yet drawn up with all the clearness desirable.

Then follow the Equestrian and Aquatic sports, *i. e.*, polo, and rowing, sailing and swimming matches. There had been some question of having an equestrian competition in the real sense of the term, but the difficulties of transporting valuable horses, especially during Exposition time, are so great that the idea has been abandoned. There will be target-shooting, pigeon-shooting, archery, and shooting with the cross-bow and with firearms. For cyclists there will be a whole week of track-racing, preceded by a sensational twenty-four hours' race. Lastly, the seventh, ninth and tenth sections will include motor-car races, competitions of sappers and firemen, free balloon races, and trials of carrier-pigeons. All this is doubtless interesting; only it is not pure sport, and for that reason I shall pass it over in this paper.

II.

To judge by the series of letters I have received for many months, American athletes appear to be desirous of participating in large numbers in the Olympian Games on the banks of the Seine; and, as the opportunity of imparting information is afforded me by the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, I wish to take advantage of it by replying as far as possible to all the questions that I have been asked. These questions are generally the following: What will the competitions consist of? Who will organize them? When and where will they take place? Will they be reserved for amateurs? As to the first question I have already given an explanation. On the second, there is only one word to add—the business of preparing the competitions of 1900 has been assigned to the most competent individuals and societies. For a time the directors of the Exposition appeared to be wanting in interest for sport. Thereupon, a private committee was formed with the object of organizing the Olympian Games, since the Exposition seemed on the point of renouncing them. Last spring, or rather later, the point was reconsidered, and it was decided that sporting competitions should form part of the Exposition in some way or other.

But the Directors, not having the necessary competence, appealed to the societies. This appeal was answered, and with striking unanimity; offers were made to assist the Official Organiz-

ing Committee presided over by M. Merillon. Thus the Paris Polo Club, presided over by Vicomte de la Rochefoucauld, has undertaken the preparation of polo matches; the Society for the Encouragement of Fencing, of which M. de Villeneuve is the devoted director, is empowered to arrange the fencing contests; athletic sports are entrusted to the care of the French Athletic Union, which is not only the most important in France, but also is connected by treaty with the celebrated Amateur Athletic Association of England. Lawn Tennis is directed by the Société de l'Île de Puteaux, founded by M. de Janzé. This suffices to show that, in all branches of sport, care has been taken to enlist competent aid, and this is certainly not an insignificant detail. In how many circumstances have not these very athletic competitions failed, for want of competence in those by whom they were arranged?

At the request of my American friends, I made it a special point that the athletic sports should take place toward the middle of July. In this way the athletes of the American universities, on their arrival in Europe, can take part in the English championships, which take place on the first Saturday in July, and thence travel to the Continent to take part in those of Paris. The gymnastic championship will also be held in July. For fencing, the period chosen is from May 15th to June 15th. The polo matches will take place in succession from June 1st to June 20th. The cycling will take place in September, about the 8th; the rowing matches in June, the swimming in July; generally speaking, the competitions, with the exception of football, which is a winter game, will be held between May 15th and September 15th. This is, doubtless, too long a period; it would have been better for the whole to take place in the space of six weeks, but the Commissary-General of the Exposition insisted on the duration being prolonged as much as possible, and his desire was acceded to.

Just as the competitions will not all take place at the same date, they will not all be held at the same place. Vincennes had been first chosen as capable of uniting them all; but although possessing a wood which almost rivals that of Boulogne situated on the other side of Paris, just at the other extremity, Vincennes does not offer the conditions indispensable to certain sports. It is perfectly adapted for athletic sports, gymnastics, cycling and lawn tennis; a cycling track of fine dimensions is already in

course of construction; there will be tracks for the foot races and good tennis grounds. But it is wanting in space for golf, shooting and polo; as for the lakes, there can be no question of having the rowing, still less the sailing, matches upon them. It is therefore almost decided that the shooting will take place at Satory, near Versailles, in the ordinary exercising ground of the troops garrisoned in Paris; that the polo matches will be played on the Polo Club ground in the Bois de Boulogne; that the rowing matches will take place at Courbevoie, and the sailing matches at Meulan, two pretty spots in the neighborhood of Paris, where the Seine is wide and straight. As for the golf matches, in order to find good links one will have to go to Compiègne, an hour's railway journey from Paris. The Society of Sport at Compiègne has made links which would satisfy the wishes of the most exacting players.

There still remains the most important question—that of amateurism. As different countries have not the same definition of an amateur, one can imagine the difficulties that arise when it is proposed to include representatives of all nations in the same competition. In regard to this point, the conditions are not the same for all branches of sport. The gentlemen who shoot pigeons or who take part in a yacht race look forward to gaining cash prizes, and are not disqualified on that account. In fencing, there are no professionals, strictly speaking, but, on the other hand, professors fence with amateurs; and until of late years all the matches have shown both to be in equal numbers, and no prizes of any kind were ever given—they fought for honor alone. Personally, convinced as I am that amateurism is one of the first conditions of the progress and prosperity of sport, I have never ceased to work for it; and when in 1894 I proposed to revive the Olympian Games, it was with the idea that they would always be reserved to amateurs alone. This time, however, a slightly different theory has prevailed. It was decided that if it was necessary to reserve the first rank for pure amateurs, and in all cases to guard against any person suspected of the slightest taint of professionalism slipping in amongst them, it would be right to have classes for professionals also. There will, therefore, be special competitions for professionals, but the line of demarcation between amateurs and professionals will be strictly laid down and closely adhered to.

The motive which, perhaps, has chiefly influenced this decision is as follows: We are at the beginning of a new century, and the Paris Exposition is certainly a unique, almost an exceptional, occasion for attracting and bringing together representatives of foreign nations of all classes. It is, therefore, a matter of importance to establish records which will be a sort of athletic starting-point for the twentieth century. The amateurs and professionals, without intermingling in the least, will be able to see each other at work, and comparisons advantageous to sport will be the result. I do not say that I am a convert to this way of thinking; it is not my own, and I shall do all in my power that the following Olympian Games may revert to the true theory of amateurism, which declares the uselessness of the professional and desires his disappearance. But I am now explaining another view of the question, which is not without interest, and which, besides, may be accepted, since, by maintaining an absolute separation between amateurs and professionals, it prevents the former from losing their quality of amateurs by commingling with the latter. The direct and personal interests of amateurs will thus be protected and safeguarded in 1900, and that is the important point.

III.

By giving these details, I hope I have sufficiently characterized the competitions of the Exposition of 1900; it may be seen that it will be above all a sporting manifestation of great interest. The fact of the coincidence of the Exposition has the advantage of relieving the organizers of all other anxiety. It is certain that there will be no lack of spectators, and it is certain, also, that foreign athletes will not find their stay in Paris tedious, and that they will carry away a pleasant remembrance of it. On this head it may be, perhaps, as well to remark that the exaggerated statements of the expenses visitors will incur are without foundation. Paris is one of those cities which possess the greatest number of hotels, even in proportion to the enormous number of foreigners who visit it on an occasion of this kind; they are of all descriptions; there are many of those modest, picturesque and comfortable hotels such as are never seen in the New World; in view of the Exposition others will be added to those which already exist. All this constitutes a guarantee that competition will prevent the

prices from being raised beyond reasonable limits. But I could not too strongly recommend the teams who wish to take part in the athletic competitions to intrust the care of preparing and engaging lodgings and making the necessary arrangements for food, etc., only to managers speaking French well, and accustomed to life in Paris or French life in general. Not only, by acting thus, will the team effect a great saving of expense, but they will have the chance of being more comfortably lodged and much better served. It is unnecessary to mention that the sporting societies, and especially the French Athletic Union, which has its offices in Paris, at 229 rue St. Honoré, will take pleasure in assisting foreigners who are coming in any way in their power.

They are coming, by all appearance, in very large numbers. In the course of last summer I visited several European towns, in order to make arrangements with the members of our International Olympian Committee, and I found everywhere a strong desire to send representatives of all kinds of sport to compete in Paris. What struck me during this journey was the astonishing progress made by sport in the last ten years. Anglo-Saxons have some trouble in getting used to the idea that other nations can devote themselves to athleticism, and that successfully. I can understand this, and the feeling is certainly excusable, for they are those who, especially for the last fifty years, have best understood and practiced bodily exercises; but if this honor is incontestably theirs, it does not follow that young men of other races, with blood and muscles like their own, should not be worthy of walking in their footsteps.

The countries that surprised me the most in this rapid advance are Germany and Sweden. Berlin is really on the way to becoming a great sporting centre. I visited with interest the rowing clubs which succeed each other along the banks of the Spree, at the gates of the capital; they are rich and prosperous. It is to be noted that the Emperor takes great interest in rowing; from his private purse he has built a club for the students at the Berlin colleges, and he has founded imperial regattas, for which he gives important prizes every year, and which he often presides over in person. I should be much surprised, after what I have seen, if Germany has not a very fine sporting future before her. She already builds and manufactures boats and all kinds of sporting articles, and this industry seems very prosperous, a proof that it finds a market in

Germany herself, for certainly neither the English nor the French purchase sporting implements from her. As for Sweden, the progress of sport was impeded for a long time by the rather exorbitant pretensions of the famous Swedish Gymnastics, which, having cured numbers of invalids and strengthened countless children, laid claim to suffice also for young men, and to supply for them the place of manly games and exercises of strength. This is, of course, not the case, and the fact that, by the action of the Crown Prince and representatives of gymnastics, with Major Balck at their head, all kinds of sport are more and more practiced, indicates clearly that no system of gymnastics, however complete and scientific it may be, can supply the place of their beneficent action. There are notably two establishments at Stockholm, *Tattersall* and *Idrottspacken*, which include all kinds of sport, from riding to skating, in conditions absolutely worthy of the finest American clubs of New York, Chicago or Boston.

At Vienna, in Austria, an athletic club has been recently opened in the celebrated Prater; the building, which is very elegant, is surrounded by football and lawn tennis grounds and tracks for cycling and foot-races. Lastly, even at St. Petersburg, where they are backward in this respect, a movement in favor of physical exercises is noticeable. It is thus clear that sport is gradually spreading over the whole world, and taking the place of unhealthy amusements and evil pleasures in the lives of young men. This fact will rejoice all true friends of youth and progress. Doubtless, one can discern and regret certain abuses. These may be found in everything; but when one compares the abuses which sport causes with those to which it puts an end, one cannot refrain from singing its praises and laboring for its propagation.

It is for this very purpose that I have revived the Olympian Games, and all that I have said here encourages me in this task. It has enemies, like every other free and living work, but it has also staunch friends who are of great assistance. It is to these that I appeal to prepare from this time onwards the celebration in America of the Olympian Games of 1904, in the persuasion that they will be a great success, and that they will draw across the ocean qualified representatives of all the sporting societies of the world, for a manifestation which will be both worthy of the noble and ancient Olympian past and of the glorious future of the great American Republic.

PIERRE DE COUBERTIN.

HOW ENGLAND SHOULD TREAT THE VANQUISHED BOERS.

BY SIR SIDNEY SHIPPARD, K.C.M.G., D.C.L., FORMERLY ADMINISTRATOR OF BRITISH BECHUANALAND AND ONE OF THE JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

MUCH has been written on the history of the past and on the present in South Africa, but as yet there have been comparatively few attempts to forecast the best permanent arrangements to follow upon the conclusion of the present hostilities. I have been honored by a request to contribute to the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW a statement of my opinions on this complicated question. I gladly avail myself of the opportunity of submitting my views to the consideration of American readers, but I need hardly say that mine is not a prophetic soul. So far from being able to foretell the future of South Africa, I cannot even predict the probable duration of the present war. My belief is that the struggle in the Transvaal will be long, obstinate and sanguinary; that, unlike their more civilized and better informed brethren in the Orange Free State, large numbers of the Transvaal Boers will hold out to the very last; that even after their capital is taken they will carry on a guerilla war in the mountainous country to the northeast of Pretoria; that they will make desperate efforts to conquer southern Rhodesia, and even to cross the Zambesi; and, failing that, that they will endeavor to find a way of escape through the Bechuanaland Protectorate into German or Portuguese territory. I sincerely hope that I may prove to be mistaken in this estimate of the probable action of the Transvaal Boers. When the right moment comes, no efforts should be spared to induce them to accept the position of British subjects on terms which, in due time, will secure to them not only freedom and justice, but adequate representation and responsible government;

but the history of past struggles between the English and the Dutch, and my own knowledge of the Boers' character, their intense love of liberty for themselves, with the right and power of domination over all others, their strong and deep religious faith, their ardent patriotism, their dogged tenacity, their courage in defensive warfare, their fatalism, their ignorance and their ferocity, all make me think that they will hold out stubbornly, at any rate so long as they can obtain supplies, contraband of war, and the aid of Continental mercenaries by way of Delagoa Bay and certain other points on the eastern seaboard.

The Franco-Dutch race in the Transvaal would prove an invaluable acquisition to the forces of the British Empire if their confidence and loyalty could be secured by fair means. How this most desirable consummation is to be reached is a question which would demand a long and elaborate answer. No more difficult problem could be submitted to any British statesman than how to secure the good will, respect and fidelity of the Transvaal Boers after the conquest of their territory. Unfortunately, we have still a long way to go before we can arrive at the point where we may hope even to begin the task of finding a satisfactory solution.

As regards the final results of the military operations, no loyal Englishman has ever entertained a moment's doubt. No matter what the cost and loss, the conquest of the Boer Republics must be achieved. The Republican Governments are bound to disappear, and the territories of the two States, together with Swaziland, will form part of Her Majesty's dominions. Any other settlement, any surrender or compromise which would leave a nucleus for future political intrigues in South Africa, or a fulcrum for any European Power hostile to England, would evoke a storm of indignation, an outburst of disgust and fury in this country and throughout the British Empire, that no English Ministry could possibly survive. It may be safely added that no conceivable Ministry in this country would seriously contemplate at the present day any such repetition of imbecility, in view of the increased knowledge of South African affairs now possessed by the British public. Throughout Great and Greater Britain the vast majority of men of all shades of political opinion are agreed on the policy which must be pursued, so far as the extinction of the Dutch Republics is concerned. The half-measures by which

the evil day might have been postponed before the Boer invasion of British territories are no longer possible, and it is well for the cause of freedom and civilization in South Africa that this is so. It is well that the heart of the Pharaoh of Pretoria was hardened at the right moment.

There are well-meaning people even in England who are still laboring under delusions with regard to the justice and necessity of our struggle against the forces of darkness in South Africa; but even they must see that the "Majuba Magnanimity" farce will not bear repetition. The very small minority of Pro-Boer or "Stop-the-War" fanatics in this country are a negligible quantity. Their theories are unsound. Their allegations of fact are based upon imagination. Their contentions will not bear argument. Their proposals, if acted upon, would involve the loss of South Africa and of all our other colonies, together with our Indian Empire. The greatest civilizing Power in the world, the most potent agency for diffusing the blessings of peace throughout the dark places of the earth, would be destroyed. Why these presumably sincere visionaries so persistently advocate a policy which, if pursued to its logical and inevitable conclusion, must ultimately leave the dismembered corpse of the British Empire for the vultures of the European Continent to gorge at leisure, they best know. Sane and sober-minded Englishmen, at home and in the colonies, are not prepared to perform the "happy despatch" at the bidding of these gentlemen.

Whatever the duration of the war, there must be a transitional period before the territories of the two Republics can be brought under a regular administration as part of Her Majesty's dominions. During the interregnum, martial law—which is only another name for the will of the commanding officer—must necessarily prevail throughout the disturbed districts and the conquered territories. Martial law under British officers is always administered with fairness, and justice is tempered with mercy. The aid of competent legal advisers whenever available is duly sought, and if in a hostile or unsettled country a British court-martial errs at all, it is usually on the side of undue leniency. The brutal methods and sanguinary sentences of French and German military tribunals are repugnant to the gentle and chivalrous British officer. Martial law in South Africa would not necessarily interfere with the action of the ordinary tribunals in civil cases

nor even in criminal cases between civilians; and a judicious commanding officer, of course, would take care to preserve as much of the existing machinery of government as he could consistently with allegiance to the Queen and a loyal acceptance of the new *régime*. The happy results of this policy are already to some extent manifest in the Orange territory. Even there, however, there are already signs that the English besetting error of undue generosity to the vanquished is bearing evil fruit.

The true medium between extreme severity and weak indulgence may at times be hard to find, but in the interests of order and good government the perpetrators of outrages against the rules of civilized warfare ought not to go unpunished, any more than sufferers for loyalty should go without due compensation. If this be true even in conquered territories, *à fortiori* it applies to the cases of those Dutch inhabitants of the Cape Colony and Natal who have risen in rebellion against Her Majesty's Government, and have raided, plundered and wrecked the property of their loyal neighbors. These men are absolutely without excuse, and should be dealt with as ordinary criminals on charges of treason, murder, theft, housebreaking, arson, or malicious injury to property, as the case may be; the possession of loot or stolen goods being in all cases sufficient proof of guilt.

It is obvious that trial by jury in the disturbed districts, or anywhere in the Cape Colony or Natal, would be a mere farce in the present state of public feeling throughout South Africa. Acquittal or condemnation would be a foregone conclusion in all cases, according as the jury happened to be pro-Boer or anti-Boer. Verdicts must be unanimous, and the ends of justice could always be frustrated, either by packing a jury or by taking care that one irreconcilable at least should be secured. Under the circumstances, the only safe and just course would be for the Imperial Government to appoint a judicial commission to try rebels without a jury, and also to take evidence and frame a report on all claims for compensation. Such a commission might be appointed with the sanction of an Imperial Act of Parliament if necessary, and might be proclaimed by Her Majesty's High Commissioner in South Africa, with the concurrence of the Cape and Natal Ministries, respectively. If either the Bond Ministry at the Cape, or the Cape or Natal Supreme Courts, raised legal difficulties on constitutional grounds, such obstruction might,

I think, be got rid of by the proclamation of martial law throughout the Cape Colony and Natal, and this is a course which, under present circumstances, I should strongly recommend. It would remove many legal and technical difficulties, it would give confidence to the loyalists, and it would be a terror to evil-doers. The case of the loyal farmers of the Cape Colony and Natal, whose property has been destroyed in many instances by their disloyal neighbors, is a peculiarly hard one, and I cannot imagine a more unjust and suicidal policy for any Government to pursue than to leave these men and their families destitute, in order to gain a cheap reputation for magnanimity by letting rebels, murderers, burglars and thieves go off scot free. Rebels and robbers should in all cases be made to pay in purse or person or in both, as the case may be; and the excuse that in their innocence they were beguiled by Mr. Krüger's wicked emissaries ought not to be too lightly admitted. These men had no just cause of complaint against Her Majesty's Government, and even if, instead of having all the political power in their own hands and enjoying perfect liberty, they had had political grievances, they would still have been without excuse for availing themselves of a state of war in order to steal or destroy the goods of their next-door neighbors.

I should deprecate any idea of inflicting capital punishment for treason or rebellion in South Africa, though the Roman-Dutch Law, the common law of all South Africa, decrees the penalty of death in all such cases. In this, as in many other respects, the example set by Mr. Krüger himself furnishes useful lessons. Whatever his faults may be, it must be imputed to him for righteousness that, save in forcing on this war, he has not shown himself hitherto to be bloodthirsty. On the contrary, he has repeatedly restrained the truculence of his followers. When Dr. Jameson and the officers of his ill-starred expedition were confined in Pretoria gaol, one commandant after another urged the President to allow the burghers to drag the prisoners out into the square and put them to death. Mr. Krüger knew that they had surrendered on a promise that the lives of all the party should be spared, and he steadily refused to yield to very great pressure. Again, when the four leaders of the reform movement in Johannesburg were placed on their trial for high treason at Pretoria, before a "hanging" judge specially imported from Bloemfontein for the purpose, and after the prisoners had been denied

the benefit of the new treason law with its milder penalties, only intended for Transvaal burghers, and had been sentenced to death under the old Roman-Dutch Law as embodied in the Criminal Code of Philip II., Mr. Krüger in the last resort shrank from bloodguiltiness, and only screwed £100,000 out of the four prisoners by way of ransom instead of hanging them. Again, when the members of the Johannesburg Reform Committee had been sentenced to imprisonment with hard labor at Pretoria, Mr. Krüger took ransom for them at the rate of £2,000 apiece. All this must, I say, be counted to him for righteousness, comparatively speaking. These cases afford an indication of the measures of punishment deemed adequate in cases of alleged treason, rebellion or sedition by the Dutch themselves, and might afford a useful guide to courts passing sentence on prisoners convicted of similar offenses in the Cape Colony and Natal.

On the other hand, though strictly just and legal, it might not be expedient to reduce a large number of Dutch families to indigence by a total confiscation of landed property or by excessive fines. The measure of punishment may be safely left to the discretion of the court, provided the court or judicial commission be above suspicion in respect of integrity and impartiality, and be empowered to sit with assessors, but without a jury.

With regard to compensation to be awarded to loyalists in respect of losses sustained during and in consequence of the war, much time, labor and patience will be required to frame a complete and satisfactory report on which Her Majesty's Government might rely. The damage done by the ignorant, malicious and semi-savage Boers up to date has been enormous, and we are not even near the end of the war yet. They seem to have taken a fiendish delight in blowing up bridges, wrecking railway lines, destroying telegraphs, houses and private property of all kinds, and generally in uprooting every trace of the civilization of which they are unworthy. Their deeds of vandalism recall the excesses of the *Commune* of Paris or the *sansculottes* of the French Revolution. Of course, the plea of military necessity may be urged in excuse for the destruction of bridges, railways and telegraphs; but gutting farmhouses, insulting women, killing children in women's laagers, or wantonly destroying the personal property of non-combatants, is not a military necessity any more than firing on a hospital or an ambulance, or committing murder under cover

of a white flag. Crime should be punished in war as in peace, and I see no reason why a criminal should escape the just penalty of his misdeeds merely because he happens to be a Dutchman. The due punishment of criminal offenses should therefore be one of the first cares of the Imperial authorities, both during the continuance and after the conclusion of hostilities, and no amnesty should be proclaimed until all wrongs have been redressed and all just claims satisfied.

The question of compensation is a wide one. In my opinion a clear distinction should be drawn between the infliction of punishment and the recovery of compensation. Where it can be shown that an offender has enriched himself by the plunder of loyalists, the penalty should include a fine sufficiently heavy to deprive him of all the benefit of his crime and of something more into the bargain. But the proceeds of all fines, whether derived from money paid or from the sale of land or other property, should be paid into a general fund to be applied to the compensation of loyal sufferers or to war expenses, at the discretion of Her Majesty's Government. The payment of compensation should, however, be independent of the recovery of any such fines or penalties. It is quite clear that the total value of all the property owned by the rebels, even if it were expedient to reduce them and their families to utter destitution, would not nearly suffice to make good the damage they have done, especially if the cost of bridges, railways and telegraphs destroyed were taken into account. The war is an Imperial war, waged for the salvation of the British Empire, as well as for the preservation of the South African Colonies, and it would be a grievous wrong if the loyalists who happened to be living at or near the scene of hostilities were to be reduced to penury through no fault of their own. It seems, then, certain that provision will have to be made in the first instance by the Imperial Government for the payment of compensation to loyalists for losses incurred through the war, though in the final adjustment of liabilities the loss must, as far as possible, be made to fall on those by whom it was occasioned. The British taxpayer may have to find the money in the first instance, but only as an advance to be ultimately refunded by the Transvaal and Orange territories. In strict justice, a certain portion of the debt should be made to fall on the members of the 'Afrikander Bond in the Cape Colony, and this might to some

extent be effected by leaving the Cape Government to make good all damage to their railways and telegraphs without assistance from the Imperial Government, and by debiting the Cape Government with the amount of all compensation to Cape loyalists, and crediting them with all fines recovered from Cape rebels.

The case of the Natal loyalists is peculiarly hard, and on every account Natal deserves exceptionally favorable consideration. There is no getting over the fact that the Bond Ministry of the Cape, while professing the lip-service of loyalty, allowed enormous stocks of warlike material to pass over the Cape railways into the Republics for the avowed purpose of making war against the British Government in the Cape Colony and Natal. There is no denying the notorious fact that the Bond Ministry studiously left places like Mafeking, Vryburg, Kimberley, De Aar and Naauwpoort absolutely undefended, and even refused to allow arms, troops and ammunition to be forwarded to Kimberley for defensive purposes, when they must have known that war was impending. It is impossible to deny that but for the De Beers Company at Kimberley and the British South Africa Company at Mafeking both those places must have fallen long ago. That they were enabled to hold out so long was no thanks to the Bond Ministry at Cape Town; nor is it possible to avoid the conclusion that the final success of the Boers in their efforts to drive the English out of South Africa would have rejoiced the hearts of many in the Cape Colony besides the members of the Afrikander Bond.

In Natal, on the other hand, the attitude of the Government and of the entire people, with the exception of the Dutch rebels in the north, left nothing to be desired. As regards gallantry in the field, honors are divided between the loyalists of the Cape Colony and those of Natal. Both have done splendid service to the Empire; but in the final settlement after the conclusion of hostilities Natal will, as already observed, be entitled to special consideration on many accounts.

In the number of the *Nineteenth Century* for last December, under the heading "South African Problems and Lessons," I stated very briefly the principal points of such a final settlement as I would recommend after the war, and in the main I still adhere to the views and opinions which I then expressed. Much water has flowed under the bridges since that time. The magni-

tude of the task before the British army has been better realized by the public, though I doubt whether it is even yet sufficiently grasped by those who have never seen South Africa. However prolonged the struggle, however terrible the losses still to be endured, there can be no turning back. The reactionary forces of barbarism, even though backed by all the swashbucklers of the European Continent, must be subdued. England must win this fight or relinquish her foremost place in the vanguard of civilization. She must save South Africa or lose her Empire. And loss of Empire would mean for us starvation. The teeming millions in these little islands of the North Sea could not even be fed, were we to lose the command of the ocean and the possession of our colonies. For the Boers of South Africa, the struggle is one partly of sentiment and partly of love of dominating and tyrannizing over others. For us it is a question of life or death, and we shall act accordingly. Altruism is all very well in private life as an exhibition of Christian virtue, but in struggles for existence between States, in what is called the higher politics, enlightened selfishness is and must be the only true guide. A statesman's first duty is to safeguard the interests of his own country, and if this cannot be done without hurting the feelings of others, *tant pis pour les autres*. Boer sentiment within the limits of right and justice toward others is no doubt entitled to respect, but when the Boer turns housebreaker it is time to provide him with handcuffs. We cannot afford to let him turn us out of our own house, neither can we leave him at liberty to summon other housebreakers to his aid. The lesson of self-preservation as the supreme political duty has been taught us by our friends, the Germans, and it shall go hard but we will better the instruction. Our first care must always be to keep our navy in a state of perfect efficiency, able at any time to vanquish the strongest combination of hostile navies likely to be brought against us; and if in view of the increase of the navies of Russia, Germany and France it becomes necessary for us to double or treble our present naval force, we must double it or treble it, as the case may be. The life of the British Empire depends on its navy. As regards the army, this war has taught us invaluable lessons. We know now that for us conscription is as unnecessary as it would be detrimental to our manufacturing and mercantile interests. All we need to do is to keep up a standing army for the colonies and India, with all the requisites for

mobility and offensive action; while for the defense of the Empire otherwise we need only see to it that our boys shall be well drilled and instructed in all manly and warlike exercises, especially riding and rifle-shooting. They will spring to arms fast enough when the motherland is threatened. Our soldiers are all volunteers, and we now know what boundless resources we possess in our colonies and what manner of men are the sons of Britain across the seas. One effect of this war will be to make the Anglo-Saxons the greatest military Power in the world, while strengthening their command of the seas.

Whatever form of government be introduced at first into the conquered territories of the Transvaal and the Orange districts, it is certain that a considerable military force must be kept there for some time. The pacification of a country torn by what is, from some points of view, almost a civil war can only be effected by force and by a gradual process. I am much mistaken if our troops will be enabled to leave South Africa in so short a time as many people in England seem to fancy. The work of administration will become impossible unless supported by forces strong enough to prevent, or at any rate punish, any future attempts at insurrection. The object to be kept in view should be the substitution of Colonial for Imperial troops as soon as possible. A large proportion of the Canadian, Australasian and other volunteer forces will, in all probability, elect to settle permanently in South Africa, and any such wish or intention on their part should be cordially welcomed and encouraged in every possible way by Her Majesty's Government, and also by the British South Africa Company. Land grants should be made to them on the most favorable terms, and every facility should be afforded to enable them to prospect for minerals, in addition to engaging in agricultural and pastoral pursuits. The climate is perfect, the wealth of the country is still unknown, notwithstanding the millions already extracted from the diamond and gold mines hitherto opened. The Transvaal and Rhodesia possess undeveloped mineral wealth as yet undreamed of, save by the few who know those countries well and keep their knowledge to themselves. The influx of these splendid young colonists who are now fighting under the British flag will be a blessing to South Africa and a gain to the whole Empire. If they can be induced to settle in sufficient numbers in South Africa, they will in time change the whole face of the

country. They will completely redress the political balance by counteracting the preponderance of the Boer vote, and they will introduce enlightenment, reform and fresh energy into every department of the State and every branch of social life. In time they may even civilize the Boers to some extent. Arrangements ought to be made to enable them to bring out to South Africa any members of their families who might be willing to join them; and even apart from this, committees of ladies should be formed in England and elsewhere, in conjunction with religious bodies of various denominations, for the purpose of sending out, under safe escort and to the care of reliable guardians, as many well-educated young ladies of British birth as might care to go out, after a preliminary training in nursing the sick, teaching, cooking, sewing or such other arts of domestic economy as might be found necessary. All arrangements for their safety and comfort could be made by local committees, and in the event of their getting married others might doubtless be found to take their places from time to time. In this way a sure foundation might be laid for a race of colonists in South Africa second to none in the world. The number of girls who remain unmarried and without sufficient objects in life in England is appalling, and I would beg to commend this suggestion to the serious consideration of philanthropic ladies who take a sincere interest in the welfare and happiness of their sex, and at the same time are willing to promote emigration in its best form.

I may here briefly recapitulate the principal points in such a settlement as I would recommend on the conclusion of hostilities, bearing in mind the duty of dealing justly both by the loyal Colonists of the Cape Colony and Natal and also by the Boers, the necessity of rendering impossible any repetition of attempts at a Boer conquest of South Africa with foreign aid, and the desirability of conciliating our Dutch fellow-subjects by all fair means and gradually reconciling them to their lot as British citizens.

With regard to territorial limits, I am of opinion that the best plan would be to establish in Southeastern Africa one great colony, to be called Natal, comprising Swaziland, the Transvaal and the Orange territory. If the necessary understanding could be arrived at with the Cape Colony, Griqualand East and Pondoland should be added to Natal, the St. John's or Umzimvubu River to be the boundary.

No effort should in my opinion be made to force on a federation of the South African Colonies. Federation, if it comes, must be spontaneous; but, as regards the rich southeastern portion of South Africa, Her Majesty's Government will have, when the war is over, such an opportunity as seldom occurs in the history of any Empire or any people. They will have *tabula rasa*, *carte blanche*, a sort of virgin page on which to write what they will. It is indeed a golden opportunity, and on the use made of it may depend not only the destiny of South Africa, but the fate of the British Empire.

The advantages of uniting the present colony of Natal and the Transvaal and Orange territory in one great colony would, I think, be very great. It would have an excellent seaboard. It would be a fair political and commercial counterpoise to the Cape Colony. An appeal court for all South Africa below the Zambesi might at once be established at Cape Town, with rights of ultimate appeal to the Privy Council. The Cape University system might be extended over all South Africa. The postal and telegraph systems would be uniform and could be worked from one centre. Due provision would be made, of course, for extradition and for the reciprocal enforcement of legal process. Union as between the great Eastern and Western Colonies for defensive purposes could be easily arranged. The laws of Natal and of the two extinct Republics would have to be examined and compared, and a law commission should be appointed to draft a series of consolidating enactments applicable to the entire territory. These enactments, of course, would have to be submitted to the present Natal Legislature, whose consent would be a condition precedent to any such arrangement; but, as regards the conquered territories, legislation should be by proclamation, pending the establishment of a limited form of representative government. Full parliamentary institutions with responsible government could not be safely introduced until all danger of disturbances shall have been finally removed. The task of simplifying, assimilating and consolidating the laws would not be so difficult in reality as would seem likely at first sight. The Roman-Dutch Law is the common law of all South Africa. Special laws where necessary could be expressly limited to certain localities. Mercantile laws could be assimilated as far as possible to those of England, as has been done in the Cape Colony. Mining laws could be so drawn as to

be applicable to the whole territory. The criminal law would in the main be similar to that of the Cape Colony, which is a not infelicitous mixture of Roman-Dutch and English law. English would be the official language, but all laws and proclamations would have to be published in Dutch as well as English, and due provision would have to be made for interpretation in all courts of justice. The language question would present no insuperable difficulties, as most officials in South Africa understand both languages; and in any sound educational system to be hereafter introduced into the Transvaal and Orange districts, the teaching of English should be made a condition *sine qua non* in all cases in which a Government grant in aid might be applied for.

As regards the choice of a new capital, I should be inclined to suggest the formation of a new city in a high and healthy situation as near the western side of the Drakensberg as possible; but if that be thought too great an undertaking the best existing position would, on the whole, be Johannesburg.

Municipalities for large towns and village management boards for small ones should be established as soon as possible.

Monopolies should be abolished without compensation. Free trade should be adopted. There are no manufactures or industries worth protecting. All customs dues for revenue purposes would be levied at the coast, as at present in the Cape Colony. Inland custom houses would not be required. An excise should be imposed and rigorously enforced. Equal rights should be secured to all white men; equal justice for all men, white or black.

The supply of liquor to natives should be absolutely prohibited. As regards land, the South African system of registration of title and government survey is perfect. Land commissions could be appointed, of course, wherever necessary.

There is a wide difference between the late actual administration of government in the Orange Free State and that in the Transvaal. In the Orange territory, the late government may be described as honest, fair and even liberal. It would therefore be desirable to make as few changes as possible in that part of the country; the oath of allegiance being required, of course, from all officials. A firm, just and conciliatory policy, steadily pursued with due regard and consideration for the natural feelings and sentiments of the respectable inhabitants of the Orange dis-

tricts, and the prospect of representative institutions, and, ultimately, of responsible government will do much to reconcile all but the hopelessly irreconcilable to a change which, after all, will prove to them a blessing in disguise. Leniency, however, must not be carried too far at first. No crimes or offenses should be condoned, and the rights of all claimants for compensation should be duly considered and strictly enforced. In a conquered territory there is no danger that British officers will show excessive severity. It is quite the other way. Much harm may be, and often is, done by mistaken kindness. Justice should in all cases come before generosity.

In the Transvaal many drastic changes will be necessary which it is needless for me to specify in detail. The Uitlanders' legitimate grievances will need prompt and complete redress, and the whole Augean stable of corruption will have to be swept out with an unsparing hand. Indeed, the reforms needed may be summarized briefly as the substitution in the government of the country of honesty for dishonesty, of purity for corruption, of justice for injustice, and of freedom for slavery.

As regards that weightiest of questions, the financial settlement—the crucial test of all sound government—it may be necessary for Great Britain to provide cash in the first instance; but, as already remarked, the burden must be made to fall in due course on the two extinct republics, and especially on the Transvaal. That this will heavily tax the resources of the Transvaal is certain. The gold-mining industry in particular will have to a great extent to meet the cost of striking off its shackles, but it is well able to support it. English shareholders will probably face their liabilities under the circumstances with resignation. The foreign shareholders who are so largely interested in Transvaal gold mines will grumble; but they can hardly expect much sympathy from us. The almost universal Anglophobia on the European Continent throughout the present war has occasioned equal surprise and regret in England. Our foreign foes rejoice at our misfortunes, minimize our successes and exhaust their extensive vocabularies of vituperation in writing and speaking about us. Their malice is only surpassed by their ignorance of the real merits of the case they so glibly discuss. If their support of the Boers should culminate in pecuniary loss to themselves, they will have no right to blame us for the result.

England is in the proud position of needing no foreign alliance. She fears no foe, no combination of foes. Her own sons can protect her. Her fixed policy is to avoid the entanglements of any alliance with foreign States. Englishmen well know who are their real enemies and what their relative strength is. Not even with the United States of America will Great Britain ever seek alliance; but the British value the sympathy and appreciation of their kinsmen across the Atlantic far more than the good opinion of all other nations put together. The moral support of American citizens of British descent is most highly esteemed in England by all classes. The present deplorable struggle in South Africa, in which so many of England's best and bravest have already perished, is the war of freedom, justice and equality before the law, against the powers of darkness, and we feel sure that the verdict of enlightened American citizens will be as just and impartial as the future judgment of history.

SIDNEY SHIPPARD.

MODERN PERSIAN LITERATURE.

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THROUGH the medium of Omar Khayyâm and his inspired interpreter, Edward Fitzgerald, a peculiar interest has of late been aroused, on either side of the Atlantic, in Persian Thought and Literature. The object of the present article is to offer to those amateurs whose acquaintance with Modern Persian Literature is confined to translation a brief survey of its rise and of its present status in the kingdom of the Shah.

It is curious to note how universal the opinion is, among the uninitiated, that the Persians do not possess a Literature in the accepted sense of the term. This popular misconception is, no doubt, partly due to the fact that those who have undertaken to clothe the Persian Muse in English dress have confined their choice to a limited number of poets, and have produced fresh versions of the poems of Sâdi Hâfiz and Omar in large numbers, to the almost entire neglect of the other great singers of Iran. After all, it is the scholar who must be the first means of introducing a foreign poet into a new language; and Persian, for a long time, suffered from a marked neglect at the hands of Orientalists. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which produced many notable Oriental scholars—especially in Hebrew and Arabic—Persian was merely regarded as a side-study, and hardly taken seriously; almost the only Europeans who turned their attention to that language were resident diplomatists in India and travellers in Persia. Although many of these obtained a fair knowledge of Persian, they merely learnt it for official or practical purposes; and in acquiring it, under the guidance of natives, they probably seldom read anything beyond a few of the best-known classics, without inquiring into, or even hearing of, any Literature be-

yond. The interest of scholars in Persia was, however, at length aroused by the "discovery" of the sacred books of the Zoroastrians, and the decipherment of the Achemedian Inscriptions. And it was through this new interest in Persia that, at the beginning of the present century, Persian began to be studied for its own sake, and assumed an important place in the list of Oriental studies.

In 642 A. D. the Persians suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Arabs at the battle of Nahāvand, and, with the fall of Merv, in 651, the fate of the old Zoroastrian State was decided. The overwhelming progress of the arms of the Arabs was only equalled by the rapid dissemination of their creed and language. Wherever the conquering Arab established himself, there, too, sprang into practice his new religion and his old language. In Persia, with the suddenness of magic, Ormuzd and Ahriman were changed for Allāh and Satan, and the solar for the lunar year. Such was, at any rate, the case to all outward appearance, and, so long as the Kalifate remained in the hands of the powerful house of Omayya, the language of Persia seems to have relapsed into silence, and her national spirit into obscurity. For a period of about one hundred and fifty years we find no trace of a national literature, nor have we any means of forming a precise notion of the language spoken by the Persians during that time. As far as documentary evidence is concerned, we pass directly from the old Parsī of the "Fire Worshipping Guebres" to the modern Persian, with its predominant element of Arabic words and expressions—an essentially Mohammedan language.

So long as the Central Government in Baghdad made its authority to be felt throughout the Eastern conquests of Islam, which extended from the Persian Gulf to the frontiers of Chinese Turkestan, the language and culture of the Kalif were predominant in every province. It must, however, be admitted that the Court of Baghdad owed more than half its brilliancy to the Persians themselves; it was conducted on lines closely imitative of the late Sassanids court at Ctesiphon, and though the Arabs, at the period of their emigration from the deserts of Arabia, possessed a rich and powerful language, together with an innate taste for poetry, they had but a small degree of culture. Moreover, wherever the Arabs carried their arms, they were on the look-out for men of genius and learning among the conquered,

and, having found them, would send them to Baghdad to add lustre to the literary circle gathered round the Kalif. And thus the very circumstances which retarded the growth of a national Persian Literature were those which conduced to the intellectual brilliancy of the Kalif's court.

In the middle of the eighth century the Umayyads fell and gave way to the House of Abbās, whose power in her Eastern Provinces was never firmly established, and became weaker every year. And thus, at the beginning of the ninth century, we meet with the establishment of semi-independent dynasties in the East and Northeast of Persia.

The first poem composed in the modern Persian language, which has come down to us, is a short ode, by a certain Abbās, in honor of the arrival in Merv, in 809, of Māmūn, the son of the famous Hārūn al-Rashīd. It is most probable, however, that very little encouragement was given to the development of the new language by Governors who were anxious to keep in favor with the central authority. All the business of state, even in the most outlying provinces, was at this time conducted in Arabic, and if any intellectual Persian felt the "itch of the pen," he doubtless found it answered his purpose better in every way to write in Arabic. In the case of prose compositions this was certainly the case. With Mohammedanism—an outward profession of which was almost universally enforced—the Persians found themselves obliged to adopt into their spoken language Arabic terminology, and to employ in their writing the Arabic alphabet. In adopting this latter they, however, went from bad to less bad; for, unsuitable as that alphabet is for conveying the sounds of any other language, it was at least an improvement on the alphabet it superseded, which was limited, confused and in every sense unpractical.

Now, a learned Persian of this period, on whatever subject he might wish to write, had three distinct incentives for composing in Arabic: firstly, that being an exceedingly difficult language, fame would accrue to him for having mastered it; secondly, a knowledge of Arabic implied an intimate acquaintance with the Koran, which, in its turn, was a guarantee of piety; thirdly, he would win favor in high quarters. Such, doubtless, were among the causes which led all the early Persian *prosateurs* to write in Arabic, and it is a notable fact—and one often overlooked—that

many Persian authors, whose works have been translated from Arabic into European languages, have wrongly attained celebrity as Arabs. Avicenna (died 1037), to quote one example out of many, was a Persian bred and born, but as he wrote exclusively in Arabic, he is not always recognized as such.

Let us now turn to Persian Literature proper. Though we hear incidentally of one or two poets who wrote in Persian during the first half of the tenth century, it is not until we reach the establishment of the national Samanid dynasty in Central Asia that we find any real development in this direction. As the founder of this new school we may take the blind poet Rūdagi, who died about 950 of our era. He and his followers wrote, indeed, in Persian, but their vocabulary was surcharged with Arabic words, and their style was in pure imitation of Arabic poetry. The rulers of the national dynasty, who were yearly becoming more independent of the Kalif, naturally spared no effort to encourage the growth of a national literature.

Great as was the encouragement given by the Samanids to letters, the fame of their court was cast into comparative shade by the brilliancy of the Court of Ghazna. Sultan Mahmūd of Ghazna, the second of his line, who reigned from 998 to 1030, was not only a glorious general, but the greatest early patron of Persian Literature. He is said to have assembled at his court no less than four hundred poets, of whom one was elected to the post of "King of the Poets," or Poet Laureate,—an office that has continued to exist at the Court of Persia to the present day.

The compositions of these poets consisted mainly of occasional odes and panegyrics, with here and there a lyric in praise of some imaginary beauty. They took as their models the two principal forms of poetical composition of the Arabs, namely the *Kasīda* and the *Ghazal*. These two styles are almost identical in form and in order of rhyme; but, while the former usually exceeds twenty-five couplets, the latter seldom exceeds twelve, and has this distinct characteristic that the poet always introduces his *nom de plume* into the last couplet. With regard to subject, the *Kasīda* corresponds to the Greek *Idyllium* or our elegy, while the *Ghazal* corresponds to our ode or lyric. The rules of metre are as strict as those of the classical languages, while their variety is far greater. In both the above mentioned forms the rhyme is on one and the same sound throughout each separate poem, and it is

essential that the first two half-couplets should rhyme together, and after that every second half couplet.

Perhaps this method may be best explained by an attempt to render into English one or two Persian *Ghazals*. In a *Ghazal*, the sense of each couplet is complete in itself, and seldom has any direct connection with what precedes or follows it. The following is a rendering of one of Hāfiz's most beautiful odes. The running rhyme is preserved, and the metre adopted is as follows:

- u - - - | - u - - - | - u - - - | - u - - -

Now from out the graceful cypress doth the patient bulbul cry:
 "From the rose's face be distant ever more the evil eye!"
 Though the Zealot hopeful be of Houries and of Palaces,
 My Belov'd my Hourie is, the Tavern is my palace high.
 On account of Separation from thee no complaint I make,
 Only after Separation can our Union Joy supply.
 And if others do derive their pleasures from the Dance and Song,
 My chief source of Joy and Pleasure, is my Lover's grief and sigh.
 To the harp's sound drink the wine; but be not sad, and if some one
 Say to thee, "Oh, Drink no wine," say, "There's a Pardoner in the Sky!"
 Hāfiz, why dost thou of Grief at Separation make Complaint?
 There is Light in Darkness; Union, Separation doth imply.

The following ode is taken from the works of the greatest mystic poet of Persia, Jalāl ud-Dīn Rūmī, who died in 1273:

From all the world 'twas thee alone I chose,
 Wilt thou from grieving give me no repose?
 My heart is as a pen within thy hand,
 Thou canst of both my grief and joy dispose.
 Save what thou wilt, what desire have I?
 Thou mak'st to grow from me, now thorn, now rose.
 If thou wouldst have me thus, lo! thus I am;
 If otherwise, thy will I'll not oppose.
 And in the vat where souls their color take,
 Who am I, what shall Love or Hate disclose?

The following ode from the pen of Irāki, who lived in the thirteenth century, may serve to exemplify the manner in which the real rhyme is sometimes thrown back into the body of the verse. The beauty of the Persian original is so striking that it may not be out of place to give a transcription of it:

u - - - | u - - - | u - - - | u - - -

1. Ba fuz 'ishk-i-tu jānānī, namībīnam, namībīnam
 Dīlam rā fuz tu jānānī, namībīnam, namībīnam.
2. Zi khūda sabrī ve āramī, namībīābam, namībīābam,
 Zi tu lutfī ve ahsānī, namībīnam, namībīnam.
3. Zi rūyi lutf binumā rā, ki dardī rā ki mandāram
 Ba fuz rūyi tu darmānī, namībīnam, namībīnam.
4. Baḡir, ay dāst, dast-i-man, ki dar daryā'i uftādam
 Ki āmrā hich pāyānam namībīnam, namībīnam.

5. *Zi rah-i-lutf u dildari biyā sāmān-i-kār-i-man*
Ki khūd rā bi tu sāmān namibnam, namibnam.
 6. *Irāki rā bā dargāhat rahī binamā ki dar 'ālam*
Chu ā sar-gashā hayrānī, namibnam, namibnam.

Translation:—

1. Beloved, aught but Love of thee, I cannot see, I cannot see,
 And in my heart aught else but thee, I cannot see, I cannot see.
2. Within myself or peace or rest, I cannot find, I cannot find,
 Pity or kindness meant for me, I cannot see, I cannot see.
3. Out of thy mercy let me see thy face, to heal my malady
 For any other cure for me, I cannot see, I cannot see.
4. Beloved take my hand in thine, for I have fallen in a sea
 Of which the shore, if shore there be, I cannot see, I cannot see.
5. By way of pity and of love, come thou and settle my affairs,
 For means of succor without thee, I cannot see, I cannot see.
6. To poor Irāki show the road that leads to thee, for in this world
 A mortal more distressed than he, I cannot see, I cannot see.

Among the earliest Arab poetry we find not only *Kasīdas* describing the wild life of the desert, but also *Ghazals* of remarkable beauty. Antara, one of the most famous pre-Islamic poets, was the author of many charming lyrics. The following little extract from one of these may give the reader an idea of Bedouin hyperbole. A warrior thus sings to his lady:

"Nor did I forget thee while spears fell around where I stood,
 And the points of the White Indian blades were all wet with my blood;
 And fain I had kissed the bright swords of my enemies vile,
 For they flashed like thy teeth when thy lips go apart in a smile!"

It was at the court of the great Sultan Mahmūd, above mentioned, that Firdausī flourished, the Homer of Iran and author of the great Persian national epic, the "Shah Nāma," or "Book of Kings." Without being the actual founder of the epic style in Persian, Firdausī was one of the earliest and by far the greatest of its exponents. The poet form adopted for narrative verse in Persian is technically known as *Mathnavi*, i. e., the double (rhyme), so called because each half-couplet rhymed, and, unlike the Arabic *Kasīda* and *Ghazal*, the rhyme varied in every couplet.

Now, the epic was essentially Persian in origin and growth, and quite foreign to Arabic poetry, as was also the *Rubāy*, which had its origin about the same period, as the mouthpiece of a new school of thought. Although, as has been already observed, the Persians were quick to adopt the religion and language of their conquerors, their national spirit was not of the sort to die out, or be obliterated by the new spirit of Islam. In fact, it may be affirmed that the Persian, in thus readily acquiescing in the new order of things which was imposed upon him, allowed his national

sentiments and instincts to suffer far less damage than would have been the case had he offered a protracted outward opposition to Mohammedanism. Moreover, if Persia was quick to accept Islam, she was equally quick to set her own stamp upon the new religion.

Firdausi's great Epic was a reaction in favor of the old order, but one executed under the very auspices of Mohammedanism. The poet put into verse the old legendary history of Iran, and brought his narrative down, through historical times, to the defeat of the last Sassanian king at the hands of the Arabs. He took his materials from what he could find of the old books of the Zoroastrians, and from the legendary tales of public storytellers. The example set by Firdausi was soon followed by many poets, who sought for inspiration in his verse, and took for their subjects those episodes which had received only brief treatment at the hands of the master: none of them, however, approached him in genius and power.

In his old age, Firdausi, moved perhaps by a religious sentiment, wrote a romantic poem entitled "*Yūsuf and Zulaykhā*"—also in the *Mathnavi* form—which told of the loves of Joseph and the wife of Potiphar, basing his narrative on that version of the Bible story which Mohammed had incorporated into the Koran. In this style of composition, however, he was surpassed by his later imitators, and Nizāmi (died in 1203), who composed five famous romantic poems, holds the undisputed field as the greatest master of the romantic school. The last great representative of this school was Jāmi, who lived in the fifteenth century, and who may be regarded as the last poet of the classic period.

It is not within the scope of this article to deal with the engrossing subject of Persian mysticism, known as Sufism. The "mystic" movement in Mohammedanism began in the eighth century, and although it was in the first place an essentially orthodox movement, it took rapid growth in the direction of free-thought and heterodoxy when transplanted to Persian soil. The first great exponent of Sufism, in its fully developed form, was Abū Sā'id ibn Abi l-Khayr, who was born in Khorasan in 968, and who died in 1049. He was the first to compose that style of epigrammatic quatrain with which readers of Omar are now so familiar. The quatrain, therefore, was even more than the epic, an original Persian product, both in form and spirit.

Thus we see that there are four principal types of poetical

composition used by the Persians; namely, the *Kasīda*, the *Ghazal*, the *Mathnavi* and the *Rubāy*. Of these, the two former were borrowed from the Arabic, while the two latter were of Persian invention. Most of the earlier poets confined themselves to one of these styles, but in later times a single poet would try his skill at all of them, as did notably Sādi and Jami. The collected *Kasīdas*, *Ghazals* and *Rubāys* of a poet are called his *Divān*, and in manuscripts they are usually placed in this order, each style being, in its turn, arranged alphabetically according to the rhyme. One cannot, however, speak of the *Divān* of Firdausi or of Omar, because they confined themselves to one style and did not write *Ghazals*. If a poet wrote romances and ornate prose as well as the other styles, his collected works then receive the name of *Kulliyāt*, or "Complete Works."

Few, probably, among the reading public who are interested in Omar have any conception of the state of the book-market, or of the manner in which literature is diffused, in Persia. Some may picture to themselves a state of affairs similar to that in Europe, with a certain admixture of Oriental slowness and lack of method; while others may suppose that Persia can boast of no book-market at all, beyond the casual buying and selling of manuscripts.

Now, in some parts of the East, printing, bookselling and journalism have—especially during the last ten or twenty years—been developed to a comparatively high degree. Both Constantinople* and Cairo possess excellent printing presses, which are responsible for numberless books and journals; nor are these two capitals the only Oriental towns which boast of a printing press. Nevertheless, Persia is at the present day entirely dependent upon lithography for her native production of books and journals—which are very rare. At the beginning of the present century a press with movable types was set up in Tabriz, at which a certain number of books were printed. The effort, however, met with no encouragement, and had shortly afterwards to be abandoned. The unpopularity of type-printing in Persia is due to two principal causes; firstly, the straightness of the lines offends a Persian's artistic sense; and, secondly, in printed books the *character* of the letters is entirely lost. The same cause which leads a Persian to esteem so highly great calligraphers, makes him deplore all absence

* The first book printed in Constantinople bears the date of 1719.

of character in a type-printed book. What most delights him is a well-written manuscript, and he takes the same delight in the copyist's work as we take in the touch of an old master. Failing this, he contents himself with a lithograph, which is usually the fac-simile of the writing of some fairly good scribe, and has, at any rate, a human element about it.

It is hard for us to credit the vast amount of attention that is paid to calligraphy in the East, where men of learning devote years to its acquirement, and their best days to making artistic copies of classical works. Although this art is dying out to a certain extent, owing to the cheapness of lithography, a man may even to this day in Persia become as famous for his writing as a poet for his verses.

In every big bazaar a certain number of shops are set apart for the sale of books. In these one finds the bookseller—in his long, dark, outer mantle and his high, black, lamb's-skin hat—seated on the floor, surrounded by his little stock-in-trade. The front of his shop is open, like a butcher's, while his books are either arranged in shelves against the three walls, or in heaps upon the floor. His collection usually consists of lithograph editions of Korans, school-books, favorite poets and historians, but the assortment is limited. Besides these, hidden away in a corner, he often has one or two manuscripts which he has either bought as a speculation or is trying to dispose of for a friend.

The number of standard works that have been lithographed in Persia is comparatively small, and a great many important compositions—both poetry and prose—to this day exist only in manuscript. Many Persian classics owe their release from this state of relative oblivion to the efforts of Indians and Europeans. It will, doubtless, surprise some to hear that the works of many Persian poets who enjoy celebrity among their own countrymen have been neither lithographed nor printed.

The ordinary family library consists of a copy of the Koran, in Arabic, the works of one or two poets, a dictionary and a book of general history. Large libraries are rare. Books are not kept, as with us, in an upright position, but lying on their sides, one above the other, with their backs to the wall, while the title of the book, when indicated at all, is written across the front edge.

During the present century Persia has produced three poets of a high order of genius, Kāāni of Shiraz, Yaghmā of Khorasan

and Mirza Serūsh of Ispahan, all of whom, in clearness of diction and elegance of style, fall very little short of Hafiz and Šādi. In fact, so great was Kāāni's command of language, and so musical his ear, that some of his poems surpass in charm anything else in Persian literature. Besides these real poets, Persia has produced and continues to produce numberless poetasters, whose chief aim is to imitate as closely as possible the classic standard, and who care little or nothing for originality in either thought or treatment. Every Persian is more or less of a poet, and has a natural instinct for rhyme; perhaps no language lends itself more readily to versification. Apropos of the readiness of Persians in *extempore* verse, countless tales are told of men and women who composed verses, quatrains and even *Ghazals* just before their death. Very well known are the lines composed by the popular minister of Fath Ali Shah, when the executioners suddenly came and told him that his master—who feared his minister's extreme popularity—had ordered him to be put to death at once: "Such is the way of the world; first it covers one with honors, then it smothers one with thorns. Fate, the Juggler, many tricks of this sort loves to use."

The actual state of Persian literature cannot be called flourishing. Its latest development is in the direction of popular plays, chiefly comedies: but, though they offer interesting specimens of modern colloquial Persian, they are merely translations from the Turkish of Trans-Caucasia, and do not, therefore, represent any literary activity in Persia.

If education has become more general in Persia than formerly, it is certainly less serious: if one can find more people who know how to read and write than would have been possible in former times, on the other hand one rarely encounters serious study of any branch of science, unless it be in the direction of philosophical speculation.

E. DENISON ROSS.

WHAT HAS BECOME OF HELL?

BY THE REV. GEORGE WOLFE SHINN, D. D.

This title has been selected, not because of any leaning it may have towards sensationalism, but simply because it states precisely the purpose of this inquiry.

There has been a remarkable change of late years in religious teaching with reference to future punishment. Whereas formerly, in theological papers, in sermons and in books of instruction, much was said about hell, now it is but rarely mentioned. In fact, by many an accredited teacher it is not mentioned at all. It is pertinent to ask, therefore, What has become of hell?

We still use the word "hell" in the Apostles' Creed, but we are always careful to explain that there it does not mean the place of punishment, but simply the place of departed spirits; that it has no reference to their condition as happy or unhappy, but simply refers to the separation of soul and body, and to the residence of the soul in an intermediate state or place until the resurrection day. We are not concerned with that use of the word in this inquiry. We have started out to find what has become of hell as a place of punishment. We hear very little about it except in the profanity of the day. We do not hear of it in the pulpit, nor see any reference to it in the religious press, nor in the modern theological book, nor is it often brought up in religious conversation. It is tabooed by the pulpit generally. When, under stress, the preacher has to refer to it, he may adopt the euphemistic method of one who spoke of "the place which could not be named in the presence of cultured people."

It was not always thus, as we may learn by taking up almost any book of sermons delivered fifty years ago, or by reading the diaries kept by people who lived in the days of our grand-parents, or by perusing the history of religious controversies. In a day

not very long past men argued with each other concerning the place and concerning the people who were on their way thither. Some of us are not too old to remember the terrible appeals made by the revivalists to flee from the wrath to come, and so to escape the pains of hell. The stories which have been handed down to us concerning the great revival movements in this country show that the prominent theme, which was repeated again and again in every possible way, was how to escape from hell.

We know, for example, that so superb a thinker as Jonathan Edwards, the author of "The Freedom of the Will," was also a revivalist of the most intense type, and that he had such power in portraying the dangers of the impenitent that men screamed out during his sermons.

If we go back further, we find that religious literature is full of allusions to hell. We need hardly refer to Milton's *Paradise Lost*, and to Dante's *Divina Comedia*. The theology of the Middle Ages was so full of it that men have sometimes thought hell was a creation of that period.

Still further back, in patristic literature, we find it in large profusion. St. Polycarp said to the pro-consul, "With fire which burns for an hour or so and is extinguished, thou dost threaten me; but dost thou not know of the fire of the future judgment and of the eternal punishment reserved for the ungodly?" St. Augustine took pains to refute the opinions of those who thought that the torments of hell would only be purgatorial, and therefore only of limited duration. St. Chrysostom described the miseries of the future of the lost. With the exception of Origen and a few of his followers, there was an outspoken belief in hell by all the Fathers.

When we turn to the Sacred Scriptures, we certainly discover the recognition of hell in those writings. Unhappily, in our English Bible the word "hell" is made the equivalent of four other words—Sheol, Gehenna, Tartarus and Hades. It is going over ground very familiar to many to say that "Sheol," the Hebrew word in the Old Testament, usually refers, in an indefinite way, to the grave or the place or condition of the dead. "Hades," the Greek word in the New Testament, has a similar meaning, with perhaps a clearer recognition of continuing life under new conditions. It is the word "Gehenna," also translated hell, upon which so much depends. The name "Gehenna" was taken from

the Hebrew word by which the valley of Hinnom was known. That was the valley near Jerusalem where the great sanitary fires, kept up day and night, consumed the refuse of the city and the bodies of unclean beasts, and sometimes the bodies of criminals. From being the name of a locality near the city, the word was adopted to refer to that place or condition in the unseen world where punishment would be meted out to the impenitent. And so we find the word used in such passages as St. Matthew v., 22, "shall be in danger of the Gehenna of fire;" St. Matthew v., 29, "and not that thy whole body shall be cast into Gehenna;" St. Mark ix., 43, "into Gehenna, into the fire that shall never be quenched;" St. Matthew x., 28, "Fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in Gehenna."

We are not seeking for explanations now, nor are we considering the nature of future punishment nor the character of those who are to be punished hereafter. We are simply trying to establish the fact that there is an unbroken chain of testimony to the belief in the existence of hell down to a comparatively recent time. That fact is surely well established. As a fact it cannot be contradicted. Even Origen, under whose arms every heretic seeks refuge now, believed in hell. But he thought it was not to be eternal. He looked for a final restoration. Origen is never to be cited as denying future retribution, but as only disbelieving in the eternity of torment.

The belief in hell as a place or condition of punishment, with varying explanations as to the nature and continuance of that punishment, has been the belief of Christian people from the beginning of Christianity to our own day.

Now, almost suddenly, certainly with remarkable unanimity, men have well nigh ceased to talk about it. Whereas they once said much about it, now they say but little; some, indeed, nothing at all. It has ceased to be urged as a motive for good living in this life, and men are not told to prepare themselves here to avoid it there in the future. In other words, there has been, if not an actual denial of hell, a very thorough change of emphasis.

What has become of hell? Here is surely a very notable change in theology at the close of the nineteenth century. How did it come about? It is claimed by some friends of the late Henry Ward Beecher that he did more than any other man in this country to change the style of thinking of many preachers

and of many laymen who admired him. If he did not begin the change, he certainly helped on the revulsion from the old doctrines which had been preached, and he dealt some very effective blows at the narrow theology which had been accepted by many as orthodoxy.

The movement, however, for the dissolution of hell began much earlier in this country. The Universalist body came into existence here as early as 1770, as the antagonists of the intense views which were held by the old Calvinists. Universalism has gradually pervaded the country, and has done much to tincture the thought of the religious world. Crude and ignorant as were many of the efforts of the first Universalists, they directed their blows at one point, and they made their impression.

Perhaps, however, nothing has had so widespread an influence in this direction over intelligent minds in America as Canon Farrar's book on "Eternal Hope." It found a sympathetic audience prepared for it in different parts of the land, and in different grades of society, and the views expressed in it were very readily adopted. It was in vain that replies were made, and that Dr. Pusey issued his book entitled, "What Is of Faith?" Evidently, many in the religious world wanted to get rid of hell.

A very curious compromise was attempted by some who could not quite accept Farrar and retain their old orthodoxy. The compromise is in the suggestion of a second probation. That is, if one has not had a fair and full chance to know the truth here, he will have a second chance in the other world.

Believers in a second probation retained their belief in a place of punishment. One antagonist of this view of a probation after death says that to him it seems to be groping for "a new probation, not for the culprit but for the Judge, as if they were apprehensive that, according to their scheme, He would not do the exactly right and infinitely kind and merciful thing the first time." They would give Him a chance to do better later on.

Now, although this is a "smart" way of replying to views of another side, it does not by any means sweep away the foundations on which some build up a belief that the future (before the final judgment) brings not only a growth in goodness for some, but a growth towards goodness for others.

It is very curious how Purgatory, formerly condemned as one of the errors of Romanism, is now adopted in other forms by the

ultra Protestant. Substitute such an expression as "The soul will be trained by the bitterness of experience, past and present, warned by judgments yet to be fulfilled, in clearer light beholding things in better perspective"—substitute this sentence for "Purgatory," and do you not have the same thing? Purgatory may carry with it gross materialistic conceptions of purifying fires, but the essential thought is the same as that contained in the expressed hope that somehow, when men in another world see what sin is, and how it harms them and dishonors God, they will want to have it purged and done away, and so will welcome the purifying pains. But even if we adopt this view of reparation in a future life, we do not get rid of retribution. Nor do we by such a view necessarily get rid of eternal punishment. May there not be some incorrigible ones left over after the last chance of reparation is offered? And if there are any, then we are back again to the old thought of an eternal rebellion, and hence an eternal penalty.

The usual plan, however, for obliterating hell has been to explain away the language in which the doctrine of eternal suffering is supposed to be set forth. There can be no doubt that figurative language is used. It has been simply impossible to set forth the truths of religion without the use of figurative language. Happiness is described under the figure of living in a beautiful city, the City of God. The opposite of the happiness of heaven is the misery of hell. To express this, fire is used as the dominant figure. Fire is a symbol of painfulness, hence of punishment. Then, to render fire more horrible, another destructive agent is added—the suffocating fumes of brimstone; and, to express the acme of punishment, we have the figure of fire and brimstone, and we are told of the lake of fire and brimstone where the smoke of torment continually ascends. When such expressions are used, are we dealing with material facts? Is there a city whose streets are paved with gold and whose gates are of pearl? Is there a lake whose waves are liquid fire? The language is figurative. If figurative in one case, it is figurative in both.

But the figurative language of Scripture has been added to by the efforts of men who have tried to deter their fellow-men from vice by elaborating the horrors of hell. So we have been told of red-hot gridirons, attended by shrieking demons who have kept the gridirons well filled with broiling victims. We have heard of huge cauldrons full of boiling lead and brimstone, to be poured

over new comers as the ceremony of welcoming them to the society of the lost. We have heard of a pestilential atmosphere laden with concentrated diseases, and men driven by demons to breathe this disease-laden air. We have heard of horned and cloven-footed demons, goading their victims around circles, up and down steep heights, onward and onward, simply for the gratification of their hatred and to add to the sorrows of the lost. We have been told of the great chorus of dreadful shrieks that issued from prisons into which special victims have been driven for special enormities.

What ingenuity men have used to describe the life lived by men in hell! As an illustration of how the materialistic views of hell were kept before the people some centuries ago, think of that strange fresco in an old parish church in England. It is a sample of many like adornments which were once common. Over the chancel arch, where it is continually in sight, is a picture representing the doom of the lost. Some very agile demons with pitchforks are shoving poor wretches, men and women, down the throat of an awful monster. The doomed victims do not seem to like it, but the monster does. His appetite is insatiable and he has room for them all in his capacious maw. A nice thing to look at every Sunday! Weather stains mercifully obliterated the worst of it after a while and would have got rid of it all, but along came the restorer, the ecclesiologist, and he brought it back in all its hideousness.

Figurative language has been taken literally, translated into the grossest materialism, and then added to until its very extravagance suggested revolt. But when the revolt came, those who would get rid of the materialistic views of hell have so completely explained away all the figurative language in which reference is made to hell in the Scriptures that nothing is left. Or, to state it in other words, because they objected to the views held, they have tried to deny the reality back of even the figurative terms in which that reality was set forth.

Another effort has been made to relieve some of the awfulness associated with the idea of hell by making explanations of the words "eternal," "everlasting," and whatever seems to imply the changeless condition of the sufferings of the lost. One of the most ingenious is that which requires us to observe that "eternal" is not always the attribute but the result. Thus "eternal redemption"

means a redemption eternal in its results. The act of redemption was accomplished on the Cross in a day; the results are eternal. Sodom and Gomorrah are spoken of as the prey of eternal fire, yet the fire does not continue. It is the result of the fire which is spoken of.

Again, much is said of eternity as relating to this age, this aeon, and it has the idea of completing a circle; but there may be, according to some who hold this view, other circles beyond. This is an aeon, and eternity has reference to this period over which the gleam of revelation is thrown. There may be aeons and eternities and eternities beyond.

Then the philosophers come along and tell us that we know nothing at all of time when we get beyond the present material facts. Time is the succession of events. When we get out of the region of material things there is no time. And here comes that old monastic story to illustrate what the philosophers mean. The monk, delighted with the singing of the birds one summer morning, roused himself upon thinking he had lost a few moments in an unaccustomed enjoyment, and discovered that he had been listening a thousand years. And so the philosopher says that such expressions as "everlasting," "eternal," are to be regarded as the blue haze which ends our view as we look over the horizon. Everything shades off into this vaporous nothing and ends there; that is, so far as we know. We are carried thus far, and then we are told that that is the end of time.

One of the most ingenious and earnest efforts in the way of explanation of what is involved in the doctrine of hell is called "conditional immortality." The leading idea is that all men are capable of survival in their spiritual nature, but that not all will survive eternally. Some may cease to be, after the death of the body; others may live after death and be punished for a while, but they are finally resolved into nothingness. Men who do not possess the sanctifying, renewing, immortal Spirit must perish, either at death or some time after death. According to this view, immortality is a special gift to those who are united to Christ by faith. All those souls not brought into union with Him lose their power, and eventually lose all conscious individuality. That is, they cease to be.

The doctrine of conditional immortality makes it necessary to deny the natural immortality of the human soul. This is a most

important point; for, if the soul may cease to be, then eternal death means a dissolution which continues eternally. It is boldly declared by those who hold this view that the Scriptures speak nowhere of immortality apart from Christ; that there is no permanent life except for the believer.

There are many things connected with this doctrine of conditional immortality which would make almost any one wish he could accept it.

These various theories—denials, explanations and the like—indicate a most unsettled condition of Christian eschatology at the close of this nineteenth century. There is no agreement among Christian people on these points; but, on the contrary, there is great divergence of view, as is very evident in sermons and newspapers, in trials for heresy and in the discussions of ordinary people. It is most seen in the uncertain sounds which proceed from the pulpit, and in the almost entire cessation of the appeal to fear. Appeals to fear now! How seldom are men warned of the judgment to come! Hell has lost its terrors. What has become of hell?

The appeals to fear have well nigh ceased, and yet there is no fact which we are so compelled to see as the fact of retribution. The law of retribution works in our present life. We become aware of it in our earliest infancy, and we never become developed in character until we have learned to fear that which is evil and to shun the consequences of sin. There is a sense of righteousness in all men, and all men know that unrighteousness brings punishment. It is fair to assume that what holds good in the present life, that what is a part of man's very structure here, will continue hereafter. We may give up entirely the notion of a material hell, but we cannot give up the doctrine of retribution. Suffering must follow sin, and therefore to appeal to fear is not only legitimate, but it is in accordance with the structure of man's nature. Let us grant that the descriptions of hell are figurative. Let us admit that men have blundered in accepting as literal what was intended to be figurative. Let us grant that there is no material lake of torment. Yet, after all, is there not something back of the imagery? Is there not something real—so real that men may well strive to escape it? Can it be well with him who passes hence in his sins?

If we are asked for reasons for believing in future retribution,

we need not dwell upon the thought of Divine sovereignty showing its detestation of sin by punishment. That view has been brought out with frightful distinctness in Puritan theology. Rather let us call attention to the fact which forces itself upon the notice of even the least thinking of men. It is this: *Men are condemned by themselves.* They must recognize at some period that they prepared themselves for their own place and for their own condition. A rather grotesque illustration of this point is suggested by a once popular preacher. It is the story of a man who got into the wrong boat. He was a prize fighter, and, rushing in a hurry to embark on an excursion boat, got into one filled with a company of enthusiastic Methodist people bound for a camp meeting. When the boat started he found out his mistake, and offered the captain all the money he had if he would land him somewhere. He was out of place. His character did not accord with that around him. He was a most unhappy man.

Feeble as the illustration is, it suggests that each man is making his own future along the lines of his own character. Now if this be so, it is perfectly legitimate to appeal to fear. There is, however, such a tone of uncertainty about this matter of retribution that people almost gain the impression that religious teachers are trifling with them. The dread of speaking out boldly causes many a sermon to lose its point. The preacher seems afraid to say what he believes, or appears to be in great doubt whether, after all, it makes any difference how people live. Some lay people have great reluctance to hearing anything about hell or retribution of any kind. It is a distasteful topic. Awhile ago a clergyman was requested to resign his parish because of a difference between his vestrymen and himself upon this subject. He warned his hearers in some sermons that unrepented sin must be punished in another world. His vestrymen informed him that they did not believe in hell any longer, and they seemed to think they had abolished it by ceasing to believe in it. But, however distasteful it is to men, as there is such a thing as retribution it must be set forth. There is no need of falling into the error of those who delighted in describing the doom of the lost; nor into the error of others who mistake what is figurative for what is literal. There is no need of allowing the imagination to run riot over the mysteries of the future. In a straightforward fashion, they who believe in retribution must declare the difference between the righteous and the wicked.

The pulpit is losing some of its power because it so seldom appeals to healthy fear. It has been taken for granted that men could always be reached by appeals to their better nature. The fact has been overlooked that the better nature is often hidden from sight by the encrustation of worldliness and sin. The consciences of men must be aroused, and the most effectual quickening of conscience is through the dread of the judgment to come.

It is not for any of us to explain the thousand difficulties that spring up just as soon as we think of the separation of men by character in the world now unseen. It is not well to discuss them in the pulpit, for we have so little to help us in the formation of opinions. The contention is that, as there is future retribution, so men must be warned against it now, and that an appeal must be made again and again to the motive of fear.

It is this failure to appeal to fear which accounts in part for the decline of interest in personal religion by so many. It is the seeming willingness of so many Christian people to give up all reference to retribution that is making it difficult for some to know what course to pursue. We may talk as we will about the evanescent nature of fear, and we may talk about its being an inferior motive, but in all other things in life it is appealed to. Take it out of life, and chaos comes in ordinary matters. Because it has been taken out of religion—out of the religion of our time—there has been the weakening of the force of religion. If we had perfectly normal beings to deal with—and that is a modern way of saying, if we were all without sin—then might there be no reference to fear, but an appeal to everything high and holy within us. We have to do with beings who are sinful and who must be led up to the higher motives by the exercise of the lower.

What, then, has become of hell? It has not been obliterated. It cannot be obliterated. Retribution exists as an awful fact back of all figurative language. Men in our day have overlooked retribution in seeking to get rid of materialistic notions concerning hell. The time has come to recall the awful fact of retribution. But it must be done discreetly, and always with those exceptions in mind which so greatly modify it. There are allowances to be made when we consider the working out of retribution as it pertains to the future. First of all, it cannot include children in its penalty, inasmuch as not inherited sin but wilful sin is punished, and children are irresponsible. And here we read one of the

reasons why there has been such revolt against the doctrine of retribution. It has been taught that men are to be condemned for original sin. One of the thirty-nine articles of the Anglican and American Churches has a clause which has often been misunderstood in favor of such teaching. "It deserveth God's wrath and damnation." What? Not the being who has come into this inheritance of sin, but original sin itself. Certainly, God hates sin. But there came One in our nature who was without sin. He came to be the Lamb without spot, who, by the sacrifice of Himself once made, should take away the sins of the world.

Here, then, on one hand, is a universal fact, the infection of sin in every human being; and sin deserves God's wrath and damnation. On the other hand, is another fact as universal, that Christ has tasted death for every man; that He died that He might pay the penalty for every man. Does not one fact overbalance the other? If so, there can be no wrath or damnation now for the infection of our nature. Punishable sin is the conscious violation of law.

Then, in the next place, in thinking of future retribution we must always think of the large number of people who are as irresponsible as the veriest infants. They may have intelligence enough for the purposes of daily life, but no more. The religious nature, existing somewhere in every human being, finds but imperfect modes of manifestation, or is altogether hidden. We are not speaking of idiots or of the insane, but of many people who, while belonging to neither of these classes, are no more responsible than children are. We cannot think of their being consigned to penalty in the other world.

Then, as we think of future retribution, we come to the great bulk of those who have never had the opportunity to hear the Gospel—the vast multitude of the heathen. Are they all condemned for the infection of their nature, if Christ died for them? Are they all condemned for rejecting a Gospel of which they have never heard? What of the heathen, then, in the life to come? We can know very little about their future condition, except that they will be judged righteously according to a standard which they themselves must admit to be just.

Part of the perplexity with reference to the heathen arises from two errors—first, thinking of them as all equally condemned to perdition, and then thinking of eternal happiness as alike for

all the saved. Since the sacrifice of Christ, the heathen stand as all other men. They come within the merits of that sacrifice, although they are unconscious of the fact. If they are condemned, it will not be because of original sin, but because they have not lived up to their own laws.

When a correct view is taken of responsibility—responsibility according to knowledge—it relieves the doctrine of retribution considerably, inasmuch as it narrows down the number of the lost to those who consciously and wilfully reject the offer of salvation.

When, besides all this, we take a correct view of future bliss and of future woe, we find still more relief. It cannot be that all the redeemed in the future will be equally happy, and that all the lost will be equally wretched; for there are varying degrees of capacity. There must be an immeasurable distance, for example, between the saintly martyr, whose whole life was a conflict and whose death came as a happy release—an immeasurable distance between his experiences in the eternal kingdom and those of a little child, whose coming into life and whose departure hence were on the same day. There must be infinite grades of happiness there, as there must be vast differences between those who are driven into outer darkness.

And what of those who are driven from the presence of the Lord? What are their experiences? How long does their expulsion last? Is it forever and forever? Or is there some limit? If they learn obedience through their sufferings, will their sufferings end? And is there in some far-off future some final restoration, so that the last vestige of rebellion shall be removed?

What answers shall be given to these questions? No man can answer them, except to express the hope that somehow the justice of God may be satisfied, and the sinner's rebellion cease. But we know nothing clearly upon these points. We do know that there is retribution for sin—for sin unrepented of and unforgiven. Whether that retribution continue for one year, or for a thousand years, or for eternity, it is not material to decide. He who dies in sin passes on to be judged for the deeds done in the body. Having rejected the offers of mercy here, he must meet penalty there. The man who dies impenitent and unforgiven finds his retribution.

Judgment, like the gift of life, is immediate. It is not to be looked for only in the future. It is now. Future judgment is

no arbitrary act. It is not something which springs from laws to be set in motion hereafter. It is the working out of laws under which we are now living. If we sin wilfully now, we must suffer for it. If we pass hence with a load of unrepented and unforgiven sin, judgment must surely follow us wherever we go. But it is not a new judgment; only a continuation of a judgment begun here; something inseparable from sin. Why should we fear to speak of a judgment to come when we know that a judgment has already come? True, the present judgment is not in every instance that which brings bitter anguish, but it is just as real as if men groaned in agony. It is a separation from goodness; a loss of spiritual power; a falling below the ideal. When men's eyes are opened, they may see that the loss of what they might have been, and their degradation through sin, is indeed the visitation of penalty. Judgment consists quite largely in deprivation. Such a judgment has begun here, and it points to the awful issues of the future, when the day of earthly probation shall have ended.

GEORGE WOLFE SHINN.

CHARTER NEEDS OF A GREAT CITY.

BY BIRD S. COLER, COMPTROLLER OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.

Two years of experiment with the charter of Greater New York disclosed imperfections in the original work sufficient to justify the appointment of a commission to prepare amendments; and the revision to be made, it is expected, will in the end amount to a complete reconstruction of the organic law of the consolidated city. The charter that is to be amended, or repealed by the enactment of a new one, is the work of able and experienced men, who were united in a determination to provide for the enlarged municipality which it brought into existence the best local government that could be devised. That they failed of complete success does not detract from their ability or integrity.

A perfect charter for a great city has not yet been drawn, and in America we have not passed beyond the stage of experiment in the proper government of our larger municipalities. Much of the time of the Legislatures of a majority of the States has in recent years been occupied in the work of making and amending city charters. In many cases, notably New York, this is merely evidence of meddlesome political activity; but, on the whole, we are making progress, and intelligent public opinion has been aroused to the fact that new conditions must be met, new problems solved, and that old methods must yield to the knowledge gained by practical, and often expensive, experience. Charters and charter laws must be kept abreast of the times, must be made to conform to modern and progressive conditions in business, financial and industrial affairs, or the development of cities will be greatly retarded.

Without hesitation or fear of contradiction, I class brevity and simplicity as the chief essentials of good charters for our greater cities. Too many laws and too little public and political

honesty are directly responsible for most of the bad government that has damaged and disgraced American cities. The charter, or permit from a State government to the people of urban communities to form themselves into a corporation to take, hold, develop and operate public utilities and conduct the public business for the benefit of all citizens, should be so carefully drawn that no essential section would be susceptible of conflicting interpretations; and every right and power conveyed by the act should be stated so clearly that doubt or misunderstanding as to local authority would be impossible. Brevity and simplicity should be the rule in every section, but the duties, powers and responsibilities of all officers should be clearly defined.

In theory, the chief purpose of a city charter is to enable the citizens of a particular community to manage their public affairs, conduct their corporate business and develop their resources and public utilities in their own way, free from unnecessary restrictions or harmful interruptions by the higher power of State government. This theory is not yet a reality in any great city in the United States; and, until it is, we shall not have perfect municipal government. To-day, the greatest charter need of American cities is home rule in fact rather than theory. Two governments cannot exist in a municipality without conflict. When the powers and duties of local officers have been fixed, these officers should be permitted to exercise discretion in the management of the purely business affairs of a city, the remedy of prompt removal by frequent elections remaining always in the hands of the people.

City government does not imply law-making in the general sense of the term, the duties of the corporation being confined to the protection of life and property, the preservation of the public health, the promotion of education and of public comfort. All other functions of municipal administration are limited to the management of the public business, which may be classed under the two general heads of taxation and expenditure. It is apparent, therefore, that when a State has created the machinery for city government constant tinkering with it is certain to cause perpetual confusion. The power to regulate the affairs of a municipality that is vested in local officers should not be exercised by the State, except under unusual conditions or in extraordinary circumstances. Charters must be amended from time to time, but the custom of State Legislatures making special laws for private or corporate

interests from year to year, directing the operation of departments and creating irresponsible commissions to usurp the powers of city officers, will in the end nullify every effort to establish intelligent and economical municipal government.

Many grave problems are involved in the proper management of the affairs of great cities, and in recent years there has been much study of the general subject. The intelligent development of the resources and utilities that are the common property of the people is now recognized as a matter of more importance than changes in the routine of taxation and expenditure. Municipal ownership of public utilities has been accepted as a correct principle; but the possibilities of the system cannot be realized without charter powers that conform to modern conditions. The old plan of incorporating in every city charter certain arbitrary financial restrictions, which are in most cases supplemented by constitutional safeguards, was an error on the side of caution to begin with, and to-day the system is as much out of date as the stage coach and the horse car.

Legislatures have too often attempted to make one general plan of municipal government fit every city in a State, without regard to the geographical or industrial conditions of the cities. A charter that might be well nigh perfect for an interior town of limited population might, on the other hand, prove to be a crushing legal incubus upon a seaboard city or a great metropolis. With few exceptions, State constitutions limit the borrowing capacity of cities to a fixed proportion of the assessed value of taxable property, and no classification or exception of obligations is made. Under this system the public property, no matter how valuable, is not available as an asset, nor is it negotiable as security for a loan. The property owned by the city of New York is worth, roughly estimated, \$500,000,000; yet, under constitutional and charter provisions, the municipality cannot borrow a cent upon this security, the limit of indebtedness being fixed at ten per cent. of the assessed value of taxable real estate. The city cannot tax its own property, and it is therefore forced into the unbusiness-like and apparently contradictory position of growing richer and poorer at the same time. Every time the municipality acquires real estate for any purpose, its borrowing capacity is reduced by an amount equal to ten per cent. of the assessed value of the land acquired, its income from taxation is reduced, and the property,

no matter how valuable it may be, at once becomes worthless as an available asset. No private business could long exist under such a system of restriction.

To continue with New York as an illustration of the charter needs of great cities, nearly one-fourth of the gross funded debt of the city was incurred for the development of two great public utilities, water works and docks, both of which are profitable investments. The revenue derived from the water-front property that has been improved by the city is large enough to meet the interest on the bonds issued to pay for the work, and to provide a sinking fund that will retire the securities as they fall due. This will leave the city in possession of a most valuable property free of debt and yielding a large net revenue that may then be applied to the reduction of taxation. But, under existing constitutional and charter restrictions, every dollar of debt incurred to develop this paying property is a charge against the borrowing capacity of the city and, therefore, a check upon other public improvements. Substantially the same condition of facts exists in the Department of Water Supply, the receipts from the sale of water being more than enough to pay interest on the bonds issued to build the plant. The financial ability of the city to carry on general public work is restricted by the issue of bonds for the purpose of developing into paying properties two public utilities. In the case of these two properties, the taxpayers are merely sureties for the payment of the bonds. They pay neither principal nor interest, because the property improved earns both; but for twenty years the borrowing capacity of the city is restricted by obligations that are mere formalities.

For the building of the underground rapid-transit railroad the city is amply secured against interest and principal of the bonds issued, and at the end of fifty years it will own the property free of cost to the taxpayers; but for all that period the sum of \$35,000,000 must stand charged against the borrowing capacity, or the available assets of the corporation. When the bonds have been retired and the road is the unencumbered property of the city, its only available value as an asset will be the net revenue that may be earned. If the property should possess the market value of \$100,000,000, under existing restrictions the municipality could not in any way utilize it as a pledge for loans to develop other public utilities.

The original purpose of these extraordinary safeguards was, doubtless, a wise and necessary one, because they would unquestionably prevent a city from rushing into bankruptcy; but, for a great and progressive municipality that would conduct its affairs according to tried methods of business, the system is a huge stumbling block in the path of material progress. If the people of the city of New York should vote unanimously to extend municipal ownership to all public or semi-public utilities, a new system of finance would have to be devised before the mandate could be obeyed. Should the municipality acquire by purchase street railroads and lighting plants to the value of \$300,000,000, that amount of property would be withdrawn from taxation and the borrowing capacity of the city would be reduced by \$30,000,000. If bonds could be legally issued for the amount of property mentioned, it is doubtful if the investment would ever earn enough to pay interest on the loan and replace the loss in taxes.

The time is not far distant when the charters of all the larger cities of the United States will be amended or entirely reconstructed, to accord with advanced knowledge of municipal government. This work provides a broad field for the exercise of political wisdom. The new charters must be adapted to the special needs of cities, and not constructed on a general plan in which unnecessary financial restrictions will hamper development. Limitations of borrowing capacity must be retained and the credit of every municipality amply safeguarded in the fundamental law; but a plan must be devised to separate, in the debt account, profitable investments from obligations incurred for current expenses and miscellaneous improvements. Municipal ownership of public utilities must remain a mere academic principle or sound political theory, if cities are not permitted to develop public property in a businesslike way. A debt incurred to convert public property into a paying investment is never a burden upon taxpayers, and that fact must be recognized in the making of new charters.

Base a city charter upon a sound financial system, and the work of providing for good government is half done. The feature next in importance is proper recognition of the fact that, in the conduct of municipal business, there must be organization and discipline, and that full responsibility must be the penalty of power. There is no reason to fear centralization in city government; and, without a responsible head to plan and direct, the

public business will fall into confusion and neglect. A Mayor should have enough power over subordinates to justify the city in holding him to full responsibility for their acts. A better method of compelling the appointment of good men has not been devised.

The chief officers of a city, those in control of large departments, ought to be elected by the people for short terms with the privilege of re-election. The appropriation of money for current expenses, the authorization of bonds and the approval of plans and contracts for large expenditures should never rest in a Board, Commission or Committee controlled by appointed officers. The chief financial officer, if responsible for payments and expenditures, should have veto power over them, and there should be no board or divided authority at the head of any department.

The complete realization of home rule for cities is supposed to include a legislative branch of government, and Aldermen and Councilmen have existed long enough to become a popular tradition. That a nominal legislative body can serve any useful purpose in a correct system of municipal administration is an open question, with good argument on either side; but it is, unfortunately, a matter of history that the record of such bodies in recent years has done more than anything else to discredit their official existence. With few exceptions, the system of government that has prevailed in American cities has relegated the law-making or ordinance-making branch to a position of minor importance. As a rule, such bodies have had no control of expenditures; and where they have had authority over public property and franchises they have too often made the rights of the people a means to corrupt personal gain, thereby discrediting the system which is responsible for their existence. There have been various experiments with so-called Municipal Assemblies, and the results have in no case been satisfactory. To abolish the representative branch of city government outright would involve a general re-distribution of duties, powers and responsibilities among other departments; but the result of the present system is, in nearly every case, the only plausible excuse for constant State interference in local affairs.

Municipal Legislatures do not legislate, and the statement of that fact briefly sums up the story of their failures. One corrupt Board of Aldermen will discredit the system for a generation, but there are many minor details in the management of business

affairs of a municipality that may be entrusted to an elective Assembly, under proper charter provisions and restrictions. Such bodies must have more power or less, and the results of recent experiments indicate that in future they should be restricted to routine matters and details that cannot affect the general system of administration. If their powers are increased, the change should carry with it pay and the possibility of civic distinction that would induce the best citizens to seek the office of Alderman or Councilman. In any event, the charters of cities should so clearly define the powers and duties of the legislative branch of government that corruption and obstruction would be rendered impossible.

Other imperative charter needs of great cities are improved systems of taxation and the elimination of complicated laws and ordinances—in other words, brevity and simplicity. To-day, every head of a department in New York, and possibly in other large cities, violates the law and commits a misdemeanor at least once a week, not because such officers are ignorant or corrupt, but for the reason that charter provisions are incompatible with practical business methods of administration. There are too many laws; and far too often the laws are not understood until interpreted by the highest court of a State after vexatious and expensive litigation.

A charter that will admit of honest, intelligent and progressive city government must decree, clearly and positively, the duties and powers of every officer to be elected or appointed. Then it should prohibit, absolutely, interference with purely local affairs by a State Legislature. It should not admit the possibility of a private or corporate interest going beyond the local authorities for special privileges or exemptions.

BIRD S. COLER.

CECIL RHODES'S FUTURE.

BY PRINCESS CATHERINE RADZIWIŁŁ.

In the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW for last March appeared an article headed "The Responsibility of Cecil Rhodes," and signed "A British Officer." This signature might have been avoided with advantage, unless it was used as a further proof of the incapacity of certain British officers, who, whilst absolutely ignorant of the various details of the South African question, seem to take a certain amount of pride in parading their want of knowledge, and opposing it to the experience of people who, having lived in the country all their lives, know its roads and its kopjes, as well as the character of its inhabitants and the intricacies of its politics.

Mr. Rhodes has just left England; he left it under a sort of a cloud, and it is the fashion just now to abuse him and his conduct during the war. It was the military authorities (previous to Lord Roberts's arrival in South Africa) who started this attack, in the hope of thus screening their own mistakes. But an attack, if it is to be successful, must be substantiated by some kind of facts, or else it misses its aim and becomes a libel.

Of such a nature is the article the responsibility of which is assumed by "a British Officer." In the first place, it accuses Mr. Rhodes of having deliberately and wilfully misled the British nation by his solemn assurance that there would be no war. But, even admitting that this were true, was Mr. Rhodes the only source of information which the British nation had? More than that, how could the assurances of a private individual affect the decision of the nation? It was not his place to do anything but express his ideas and conviction, and they were based on his confidence in the strength of the British army. There were other people who knew the great extent of the armaments of the Boers,

or, at least, who ought to have known it, and whose business it was to know it. Mr. Rhodes was neither the High Commissioner nor an Intelligence Officer; he was the head of one of the largest financial concerns in the world, and it was his duty not to create a panic amongst his shareholders. When he said he thought there would be no war, he was not speaking to the Government; in fact, he had no authority to speak to the Government, who, we have for it Mr. Chamberlain's own words, had kept systematically aloof from him since the Jameson raid and never consulted him in anything concerning South Africa. How can one, in face of such facts, say that it was the words of Mr. Rhodes which misled the nation! The nation, I repeat it again, had other sources of information, besides Mr. Rhodes's words, on which to base its judgments and opinions. It had responsible people in South Africa, whose duty it was to warn it of what was going on in the Transvaal. Why does the British Officer, who treats Mr. Rhodes as if he were the only authority in South Africa, not speak of the intelligence officers, who, under false names, and in very badly made clothes, bought in Cape Town, went up to the Transvaal in the firm conviction that the Boers would not know them under their disguises, and came back, after having seen just what the Boers chose to show them, imbued with the conviction that the war would be a simple walkover? Why does he forget that Sir Alfred Milner refused to listen to those who told him that the Transvaal Government was arming, and was not even aware of the amount of ammunition imported by them through the Cape Colony until his attention was called to it by the Progressive party, of which Mr. Rhodes is not the official but the real leader? Mr. Rhodes could not mislead the Government, because he had neither the authority nor the right to speak to the Government. If he had had such a right as is asserted by his accusers, there would not have been the necessity of having either a High Commissioner or an Intelligence Department in the Colony.

As for the argument that the Boers could not have declared war earlier, on account of the impossibility of their moving in their country during the winter months, it only shows that the writer has never been in that country, where fresh grass grows after each rainfall all through the winter, if not abundantly, at least in sufficient quantity to feed the hardened and long-suffering Boer ponies.

The second charge that the British Officer brings against Mr. Rhodes is that he interfered disastrously with the general conduct of the war. This is a very grave charge to bring against a man, and I wonder how it can be made in such a frivolous way. Mr. Rhodes went to Kimberley, not for reasons "at present unknown," but because not only his own but especially his shareholders' interests lay in Kimberley, because he was responsible to these shareholders, because it was only due to his energy and that of the other directors of De Beers that the town was able to defend itself. The correspondence between the Mayor of Kimberley and Mr. Schreiner, recently published, proves with what obstinacy the Cape Government refused to help the Diamond City, or even to recognize that it was in danger. It was De Beers who armed the town, who laid in provisions and ammunition. It was Mr. Rhodes who raised a mounted corps, who helped Colonel Harris, another director of De Beers, to organize his volunteers; it was Mr. Rhodes who opened soup kitchens, who helped with his purse the poor who could not find work, and with his words of encouragement those who were employed in the defense of the place. It was Mr. Rhodes who, later on, when the shells of the 100-pounder gun worked destruction in the town, opened his mines to the women and children who had not been able to get away before the beginning of the siege. Without Mr. Rhodes, Kimberley would have fallen, if only because it would not have been provided with sufficient ammunition or food. And it is this man who is accused of having disastrously interfered with the conduct of the war! But Mr. Rhodes has had nothing to do with the conduct of the war beyond defending his own property and that of his shareholders, or expressing his opinion as to Colonel Kekewich's peculiarities. Besides, it does not argue in favor of General Buller's independence or love for his country to affirm, as a British Officer does, that he abandoned the "only sound plan of campaign" at Mr. Rhodes's bidding. It gives to the latter an importance far greater than he admits himself to have, and to the former a want of firmness and judgment not only unworthy of, but even dangerous in, a Commander in Chief.

The fact is that the military authorities have one aim only, that of screening the mistakes of their subordinates. They bring monstrous charges against Mr. Rhodes in order to prevent the public from judging their own errors. It is to be hoped that the

public will not base its opinion on such one-sided articles as that which emanates from a "British Officer," but will look further ahead, and ask why Colonel Kekewich did not communicate to the population of Kimberley Cronje's offer to let the women and children go out of the town; why again, later on, he launched against Mr. Rhodes the accusation of having wished to surrender—an accusation which, when asked to do so, he could substantiate only by saying that, as Mr. Rhodes had called together a meeting of the civil defenders of the town, he (Colonel Kekewich) had concluded it was to propose to them to surrender to the Boers.

Mr. Rhodes has always had enemies. He would not be the great man he is if it were not so, and indeed some of them but add to his fame. However, one can be a man's enemy and yet prove just to him; it is justice which the friends of Mr. Rhodes claim for him, and in doing so they serve the interests of their country, because England has got nothing greater in South Africa than the "Colossus," as he is familiarly called; and, in defending him, she defends her own interests in the land of the Southern Cross.

It is all very well now for the Jingoës to scream over the prey they have not yet got, to vow vengeance and destruction against the Boers, and to hurl stones at Mr. Rhodes. It is all very well for earnest people who look at the war with all the sentimentality inherent in John Bull, and the narrow-mindedness of Non-conformist consciences, to preach magnanimity and indulgence. But those who have not been influenced by Jingoism, or who know that religion has got nothing to do with politics, are very well aware that, when matters come to a settlement, that settlement must be founded on strict imperial lines, without either sentimental magnanimity or harsh measures of retaliation such as some Colonials clamor for. Firmness and the pursuit of a line of policy tending to affirm England's supremacy over the whole of South Africa is the aim the Government ought to have in view and the principle from which it ought never to swerve, or else the present trouble will begin over again in ten years, and England cannot afford to incur such a risk. In this task of pacifying the country and at the same time imbuing the Dutch population with the conviction that England's supremacy must never be disputed again, the Government have not got a more powerful auxiliary than Mr. Rhodes, who was the first to start the imperial idea in

South Africa, who gave the Empire a kingdom, and in destroying whom one would destroy English prestige, which, whatever his enemies may say, is embodied in him. Governors come and go; the claims of the mother country, though recognized, are often not admitted; and, rightly or wrongly, since Majuba a strong feeling of distrust against the Government at home exists amongst a certain class of Colonials. Mr. Rhodes alone is always there. It is he who changed the gloomy wilderness of the past into a settled country, who opened it to the life of people and, it may be said, created South Africa. He worked these mines over the possession of two nations which are fighting now; he joined the country to the civilized world by means of railways and telegraphs; he felled forests, drained swamps, built factories, founded villages and settlements, brought in colonists, put down robbers, defended settlers against Matabele or Basuto raids, maintained the peace necessary for the welfare of the vast territory he had conquered, and introduced the rule of law and justice into it. It is through him that South Africa has lived, grown and flourished; and whatever some people in England may say or do, they will never wipe out the memory of these great deeds, they will never succeed in effacing that man's name from the annals of the land which he has brought before the notice of the world and given to his own country. It is very easy for a "British Officer" to say, or rather to insinuate, that he put the safety of Kimberley before everything else; but Kimberley, for Mr. Rhodes, represented the thousands, aye, the millions, of people who had believed in him and his genius; who had trusted him with their fortunes, and whom he felt called upon to protect and to defend, because he knew nobody else would do it. Whatever one may say of him, one cannot accuse Mr. Rhodes of not having realized what the fall of Kimberley or the collapse of De Beers would have meant to the whole of the civilized world; the ruin it would have involved, the hearts it would have broken, the lives it would have destroyed; and it is no wonder that he refused to assume this stupendous responsibility and preferred to run the risk of offending Colonel Kekewich.

I have spoken of the immense position Mr. Rhodes has made for himself in South Africa. I will now go further and say that, in spite of the animosity displayed by the Bond against him, he is still the favorite of a certain class of peaceful Dutch farmers,

who have kept a lurking sort of tenderness for him that they dare not show openly, but which they cherish in their hearts, just as they hide his photographs in a secret recess of their drawers. Farmers of this class, who are outwardly under the control but inwardly independent of the Bond, know very well that Mr. Rhodes is *their best friend*, and that he will always help them, because in helping them he will work for the good of the country. The one great mistake which is always made in South African affairs is the failure to differentiate between the Bond, who will never accept English rule or supremacy, and the reasonable part of the Dutch population, who only want to live peacefully, and who deplore the race hatred as much as we do. They see the situation as it really is, not with the eyes of the Jingoës of their party. The latter insist that the present war has been brought about by English desire for the possession of the Transvaal gold fields. They are absolutely wrong in this pretense, as well as when they imagine that the securing of funds for needy British citizens, by acts of Parliament and secret service grants, with substantial personal bonuses, is the final ambition of Mr. Rhodes. Absurd as they are, those opinions are professed by the rank and file of the Bond party, though not shared by a considerable part of the Dutch population—a fact which alone would be sufficient to prove that the words Dutch and Bond are not synonymous.

To explain fully Mr. Rhodes's power in South Africa, it would be necessary to look back on the growth of the Imperial policy as applied to the Transvaal, but that would lead us too far. It is sufficient to say that he undoubtedly contributed to its expansion by developing Rhodesia, running a telegraph wire from the Cape to Cairo, negotiating a railway, and tracing a thin red line almost unbroken from North to South of Africa. It was then that he became the idol of Imperial England, which has proved itself now so ungrateful to him; and it was then that Mr. Chamberlain began to watch his flowing tide, whilst at the same time giving his attention to the Transvaal policy. The external relations of the Transvaal were controlled by England, which was responsible for its security from attack; but the disquieting symptom in the general situation was that Krüger required an extensive police force—extensive, inasmuch as his internal policy was irritating to people unaccustomed to oppression. The undercurrents of communication with Germany which have played such an impor-

tant part in Transvaal politics were taken as one with Germany's recent history and her colonial ambitions in Africa. Krüger's armaments were known to be immensely in excess of his internal requirements, and his burghers, who must not be confused with the Cape Dutch, openly talked of war with England at the favorable moment. The taxation was enormous, and the revenues were materially devoted to arming and intrigue. Any British Governor or Consul who, years ago, failed to read the writing on the wall must have been diplomatically insane. The chief difficulty of the Imperial Cabinet was to convince the nation of their danger, and one of the reasons why the Bond so bitterly hate Mr. Rhodes, and why England ought to support him, is that he saw that, under the profession of great loyalty, the aim of the Afrikaner policy was to disguise its real ambition. This policy was largely successful, played as it was for all it was worth through the medium of Mr. Labouchere, Dr. Clark, and even Mr. John Morley. A curious illustration of this fact is the following incident which was related to me by a member of the Cape Legislative Assembly. He was talking to a rich farmer, a member of the Bond, in one of the districts where most of the inhabitants have joined the Boers. The farmer was repeatedly affirming the loyalty of the Afrikaners in general and himself in particular to the English Crown, when suddenly as the conversation drifted on to the battle of Spytfontein, which had just been fought, he confidentially remarked: "There is just one point I am a little uneasy about; I am afraid the Boers have not enough cannons!"

Such men hate Mr. Rhodes, not because he betrayed them, as they say, when he raided Krüger, but because he is a great Englishman and a still greater Imperialist; and public opinion in England ought never in judging him to lose sight of this fact. But, curious to say, at the same time this Imperialism, which is well known and everywhere accepted in South Africa, gives Mr. Rhodes a certain popularity amongst the Dutch whose social policy and hatred of the English are incongruous. While professing their hatred of England, they hail with delight the marriage of one of their daughters to an Englishman, boast of the connection, and tell you with a feeling of pride, when they can do so, "This is my daughter; she is married to an Englishman"; and there seems to be something omitted when they say so, such as: "And there is therefore nothing for you to despise, inasmuch

as she is your national equal." It has always seemed to me (of course, I may be mistaken) that the principal reasons of the race hatred are: (1) the English look down on the Dutch, who in turn hate them for doing so; so much is this the case that, while it is among the Dutch themselves a half compliment to remind a man that he is an Englishman, it is a half insult to tell another that he is a Dutchman; (2) the English opinion of the native; this was the originating cause of the Transvaal and Free State Republics, and without it there would be no war to-day; (3) the religious gulf between the two races. The language question is probably another factor, but I do not think it is a material one. The position of nominal subordination to England accounts for a peculiar feature of this hatred, in that it is directed against the English as a nation and not as individuals. This explains why Mr. Rhodes is still popular amongst some Dutch, just as it explains why, although these Dutch are hostile to Great Britain, they would yet fight with her against a European nation that would try to assume a footing in South Africa. I am sure that, if only Mr. Rhodes were allowed a free hand, one of the chief results of the war would be the early disappearance of race hatred. It is not lightly that I make this statement, and I was certainly of the opposite opinion six months ago, but I have since convinced myself that I was wrong. The Dutchman of South Africa, and in this word I also include the Transvaal Boer, will always submit when he once fully recognizes the superior strength of his master. When convinced of it, the Boers will accept the inevitable, and, in making the best of it, probably discover all the advantages to be derived in time from the new conditions in which they find themselves placed. It is for this reason that I firmly believe that a really Imperial settlement, such as the one Mr. Rhodes came over to England to advocate and urge on the Government, would mean a consolidated and highly prosperous South Africa.

What would his rôle be in case this dream of his, a united South Africa under the British flag, came to be realized, which we must all hope will happen soon? It is difficult to foresee. The man is so great that if God granted to him that fulfilment of his hopes, possibilities would be opened to him which his own energy and tact alone would limit. The English would bow down to him, as to the man who first brought under their notice this new accession of power for their country, and the Afrikaners would

give way to the secret leaning they have always had toward him. His chief difficulties would be the existence of the Jingoos of both the South African League and the Bond, and one of his greatest problems would be to win back the moderate Dutch to true allegiance to the English Crown. It would not be so difficult as it at first seems. The Boers love an idol. Remove Mr. Hofmeyr's influence by proving to them that he had not their interests so much at heart as they imagined, destroy the glamour of the Transvaal, and what is left but Mr. Rhodes, the only real power in South Africa, the only man whose personal influence over his fellow creatures will withstand any kind of attack? Men like the Schreiners, Moltenos, Merrimans, and all the present Bond leaders, are but tinsel statesmen to the Afrikanders. They are of themselves. But Rhodes, the Imperialist, the man in whom thousands of people in England as well as over the whole world believe is the magician they will yet follow, and statesmen in England ought not to overlook this fact nor intrench themselves behind the Raid to condemn a man whose help they cannot afford to lose in the settlement of affairs in South Africa.

Apart from these considerations, Mr. Rhodes has got another important asset in his favor; that is, the present position in which the Bond is placed. It can only exist as a paramount factor in the Cape Parliament, and cannot afford to play a losing game. Once its power is broken its end is not far distant. Mr. Hofmeyr has built its organization on almost personal lines; he has no possible successor amongst the men of his party, and several of its rank and file have been only elected by very narrow majorities, which may easily dwindle into minorities if too many rebels are disfranchised, as undoubtedly will be the case after the war is over. For the present they have the upper hand, and they try to keep it in stirring up public opinion against Mr. Rhodes by saying that he is the creator of the present race hatred of the English which prevails amongst them; but that is only an excuse, as the feeling existed long before Mr. Rhodes was born. It founded the Transvaal sixty years ago, and it has caused the present trouble.

The reason of the Bond's animosity against Mr. Rhodes is that they thought they had converted him to their way of thinking; and they have never been able to forgive him for having left them in that belief, and omitted to take them into his confi-

dence at the time of the Jameson raid. But years go on, and in time when Mr. Hofmeyr will have been removed from the sphere of African politics, which must necessarily occur, the Bond itself, if it still exists, will look with more lenient eyes on the "Colossus" and not hold back to the bitter end, as it now says it will do.

The Dutch both in the Cape Colony and in the Transvaal, coming more and more in contact with the English, will naturally turn to Mr. Rhodes for at least material, if not political, support. He has so identified himself with South Africa that no one living in it will ever dream of turning in its needs toward any one else. Governors only represent a distant authority; besides, they are changed. Mr. Rhodes is always there, and, as all are aware, never fails to redress, if he can do so, the wrongs of those who come to him in their need.

As for the Bond, it is doomed to languish and disappear. It is more than probable that the Cape Progressives will win the next election by a small majority. Mr. Rhodes will then be obliged, whether he likes it or not, and whether the Government at home likes it or not, to assume the Premiership. And public opinion in England ought not to forget this, or to attack in such an unjustifiable way as the "British Officer" of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW does, a man who, very soon, perhaps, will become a responsible Minister of the Crown, and the representative of Imperialism in South Africa—the representative of an intelligent Imperialism, an Imperialism backed and supported by all the different parties in the country, an Imperialism which shall give itself the task of peacefully absorbing the Dutch into the English element, inducing the former to work in conjunction with the latter for the establishment of a new policy on purely Imperial lines. And one must not object that this would be impossible on account of the Jameson raid. The last word has not yet been spoken with regard to the raid, and perhaps time will show that Mr. Rhodes was in this sad business just as generous as he was imprudent, just as ready as he ever is, when he thinks it necessary for his country's welfare, to sacrifice his person in order to screen its prestige—even when that prestige is embodied in the person of Mr. Chamberlain, who is always as willing to disavow anything or anybody he believes to be compromising to himself, as he is forgetful of services rendered to him in the past.

When once the Progressive party has succeeded in command-

ing a majority, be it ever so small, in both Houses of the Cape Parliament, this majority is bound to increase steadily. It will include financial intelligence, the key to the outer world. The Bond will never be able to withstand this long, especially once they have lost their secret service funds, the absence of which will help more than anything else to bring to reason the Dutch farmer, who, after all, is not more disinterested than the rest of the world, and he will not grudge any longer his support to the power under whose rule he sees his way to prosperity. Once a group of these Dutch go over to the English side, and recognize the advantages of Imperialism, the spell of the Bond will be broken, the more easily because one of the greatest factors in Cape politics, which, strange to say, has been much overlooked, will have disappeared, too. I mean President Krüger, who up to now has dragooned the Bond (and this for years has meant the Government). Krüger hated the British, and persecuted Mr. Rhodes openly; he required his followers to do likewise, which they did without hesitating, and they have shown themselves as disloyal to Imperialism as it has been judicious for them to be. Their loyalty was in the interest of rebellion, and that was all Krüger expected of them, until the fateful day when he was ready and England was not. But once his influence is removed, nothing will be left for the Afrikander but to accept the situation, and recognize Mr. Rhodes in his true light, that of the greatest Imperialist of his time, and they will naturally expect him to help them in their difficulties. He will be, and he is, the only man in South Africa capable of enforcing a reasonable settlement, in which the rights of every private individual will be respected, but at the same time where there will be no maudlin attempt to patch up peace and buy loyalty by Imperial concessions. One must have a clean slate, clean to the best interests of Imperialism. In a country like South Africa, with only a million whites, there is no need for five cantankerous states; there has been already too much of home rule and race hatred; the sections must be politically united.

People in England make the great mistake of judging the situation from a general point of view; they have but one great interest at heart, namely, the settlement of the question according to their ideas. They ignore Cape politics, and they will not admit that these politics are also a factor which must not be disregarded.

In the Cape Colony, and especially in Natal, they make precisely the same mistake, though, from the opposite point of view, and they will insist on the settlement being made according to their own local opinions. This unexpressed but very real conflict is bound to have an influence on the course of events, and an unfavorable one, too. It is to be hoped that the Government will show itself wiser than either its friends or its foes, and, whilst giving satisfaction to the just claims of loyal colonists, will try also not to overlook the political side of the question at the Cape, or the men who are bound up with it, and in whose hands the fate of the country will have to be left, more or less, in the future.

When I said "the men," I ought to have said "the man." Mr. Rhodes is the only one who can in assuming power really wield it, independently of political parties, or of ministers with whom he may be obliged to associate and work. The English public must not mistake on that point; the English Government must not think, as I believe it is led to do, that the prestige of Mr. Rhodes is as much shaken in South Africa as it is in London, where he was only made much of whilst people hoped to make money through him and did so. The inhabitants of South Africa know what they owe to the Colossus. They are well aware that his generosity has always helped those who applied to it, that his ambitions have never been for himself, that his work was always entered into for the good of his country or the benefits of civilization in general. They know that it is to his big mind alone that is due the great idea and principle of an Imperial Government gathering round it and under its rule the whole of South Africa, uniting its two white races, protecting its black and colored ones, and giving to this great Dark Continent the benefit of its justice and its laws, the shield of its flag and the respect of the world, which, while it envies and bitterly attacks England and its politics, yet bows before its power and might.

The time for writing in detail the history of the siege of Kimberley has not yet come. Besides, it would not do to touch upon certain incidents of it. But whoever has been there and gone through these weary months of anxiety, distress and privations of all kinds, whoever has been locked up in the Diamond City, far away from all he or she loved and cared for in this world, bears witness to Mr. Rhodes's admirable conduct during that interminable siege, to his kindness and thoughtfulness for others. His

presence there sustained the courage of all the inhabitants, who felt themselves safe whilst he was sharing their dangers, caring for their sick and wounded, always ready to do all he could for the welfare of his beloved Kimberley. He found work for the natives locked up in the compounds; he manufactured shells; his own resources, as well as those of De Beers, were devoted to the benefit of the besieged town, and in comparison with those services, what are the few small quarrels he may or may not have had with Colonel Kekewich?

I quite understand that the military authorities did not agree with Mr. Rhodes, whose vast mind could not grasp all the red tape which up to now has been paramount in all the war operations. They would not forgive the Colossus his independence, the iron will with which he swept away every obstacle which came in his path. But, at the same time, this dislike ought not to have taken the form of attacks such as that in the *NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW*. They do not argue well, either for their authors or for those who inspired them. I will say more—they overreach themselves, and, instead of harming Mr. Rhodes, simply destroy the prestige of those in whose hands the supreme command of the army lay, and whose paramount duty was to exercise that command, and not to allow a private individual to interfere with “the only sound plan of campaign,” if the abandonment of Kimberley to its fate meant such a thing.

The “British Officer” speaks of the responsibilities of Cecil Rhodes. He may be sure of one thing, and that is, that whatever these responsibilities are, there is not a single one the Colossus will refuse to assume, or will not accept with the same courage with which he submitted to all the consequences of the Jameson raid. He will be, and he ought to be, proud of having had the foresight to prepare Kimberley in time for the eventual possibility of a siege. He ought to be proud of having helped to defend this “greatest commercial asset in the world, Her Majesty’s flag,” as he said himself. And he ought especially to be proud of having won the affection, respect and gratitude of those amongst whom he came to take his place when danger threatened them, and whose anxieties and privations he shared. This affection, respect and gratitude will follow him wherever he goes, and help him to win further laurels in South Africa, in that country to which he belongs, if not by birth, at least by the work of his whole life.

A great future awaits him there, greater than the one Mr. Chamberlain has marked out for himself, and obstinately denied to his friend of by-gone days, perhaps his accomplice in far-fetched and far-seeking schemes. When this war is over, when commercial peace and prosperity are restored to South Africa, when the political life of the country begins again, the world will see that it will fall to Mr. Rhodes to direct the destinies of the new Empire over which Queen Victoria will preside. He will again, by the very force of circumstances, become the leading and paramount power in it; his genius will urge him on to it; the thousands of people who believe now, and will later on believe in him, will carry him to the zenith of political influence. All the small, petty souls who are so glad, at this present juncture, to attack and slander a greatness they cannot even realize—these envious, jealous people will have long been forgotten, whereas Cecil Rhodes's name will force itself to the notice of the entire civilized world, just as much as his railway will attract that of the world of commerce. His great idea, the development and expansion of the North, will make its way as quickly as the engine which will carry, through the wildernesses of Africa to the shores of the Mediterranean, the fame of the man whose ambitions for his country surpassed in immensity the new kingdom he had given her. People will then remember that this giant amongst men was also as kind-hearted as he was colossal, as full of courage as he was of faith in the mission he knew and felt the Almighty had given to him to fulfil. England will then hail him as one of her greatest heroes; South Africa will be proud of him as one of the greatest statesmen the world has produced; foreign nations will submit to his genius, sovereigns will recognize it, and when for the first time he shall travel over that railway which he called into existence, and look back on the past years so full of trouble and anxiety, so embittered by the suspicions, enmity and distrust of his many foes, so saddened by the defection and treachery of his so-called friends, he will then only perhaps realize his own greatness, and feel proud of having won at last the hard battle he had to fight against a prejudiced mob that ever was, and ever will be, an illustration of the untruth of the old Latin saying, "*Vox populi vox Dei*," because it only worships success, and, like most women, wants to see strength in the hands of those who govern it.

CATHERINE RADZIWILL.

BRITISH AND RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY.

BY A DIPLOMAT.

THE mad rush of the European Powers for new territories and markets in Africa and Asia is the dominant feature of their external activity in the latter half of our century. In Africa, Great Britain, favored by a start of nearly a hundred years and a matchless capacity for colonial enterprise, has kept ahead of every other nation. To-day the Boers are checking her plans, but as success in her present struggle is a question of life or death to her, we must be prepared to see her eventually win and carry out her scheme of a transcontinental empire or entirely collapse. To state the problem in this way is to solve it. In giving satisfaction to her highest commercial and military ambitions, the monumental creation she has undertaken will allow her to disregard the parallel exertions of competitors, even if crowned with a practical success equal to her own, the possibility of which is more than doubtful. In Asia, Great Britain has developed a career of conquest even more brilliant, distinguished from her achievements in Africa by political and military difficulties, the overcoming of which has been a triumph of the Anglo-Saxon genius worthy of our highest admiration, and by a wealth of gorgeous episode which appeals to the imagination like the chapters of a romance. But in Asia the establishments of England, her possessions and commercial interests, have encountered, within the last twenty years, dangers and obstacles more serious than those with which she is beset in Africa.

It were idle to deny that the feeling of confidence, crossed by temporary annoyance only, experienced by Great Britain in meditating on her destiny in Africa, must make way for one of preoccupation and uneasiness when she considers her position in Asia. English military and commercial circles, the former represented by the

highest authorities, like Lord Wolseley and Lord Roberts, have joined in sounding a note of alarm and in reasoning with the too numerous class of stubborn Englishmen who, in the blindness of their pride and ignorance, are confident that Great Britain will, somehow, always rise superior to the occasion, as she has so far done, and who will not admit the necessity for any change in her institutions and methods. The cause of this disturbance among thinking and observant Englishmen is the enormous place Russia has occupied, within the space of a hundred years, as a political factor in the world. No event in modern history is comparable in importance to the internal and external development of Russia and its expansion in every direction. No other country, not even Germany, has more reason than Great Britain to view with apprehension this mighty phenomenon. The direct contact which the Muscovite advance in Asia has established between Anglo-Saxon dominion and the great Slav Empire must deeply influence the destiny of the British people and the fate of the world.

The prediction of Napoleon, "*L'Europe sera républicaine ou Cosaque*," seems to be gaining plausibility, even in an extended sense, for the march of modern events may very well be interpreted to mean that the political problem of the world is getting gradually reduced to three or four, or at the outside five, factors—Great Britain, Russia, the United States, possibly Germany, and, if the yellow race awakens from its torpor in time, China. The force which would bring about this situation is that of the numerical strength of States. In this direction the possibilities of the three first named Powers are infinite, but those of Germany, although good as far as actual increase of population is concerned, are threatened by emigration and denationalization. The advantages of civilization cannot fail to acquire uniformity and international balance through a continuous process of endosmosis and exosmosis and owing to the universal character of science and arts. It does not seem unreasonable to say, then, that numbers will govern the world and determine the future grouping of humanity. The principle of nationalities, which is the only obstacle in the way of a simplification of the present political divisions of the world, is one whose career, although successful in the southeast of Europe, does not warrant the expectation of a failure of the policy of expansion through the absorption of inferior or weak races which suggests itself to-day to the great Powers.

Who is the optimistic politician who can predict anything but extinction to Holland, Belgium, Denmark and Norway and Sweden? And having foreseen this reduction of European factors, why should he stop at that point and go no further? Supposing, then, that the rollers of American, British, German, Russian and Chinese supremacy have crushed political and ethnical distinctions into five uniform masses, there are but two alternatives left: eternal peace on the basis of a federation of these five masses, or, what seems less probable, a further process of simplification, and again eternal peace on the basis of a fusion of the five into one government—Muscovite, in all likelihood, for her youth and strong rule are chances in favor of the survival of Russia? Universal federation will mean universal brotherhood in a restricted sense; universal fusion will mean universal brotherhood in an absolute sense; and what is considered as the highest dream of humanity will have been realized at the expense of principles which, with more than usual inconsistency, we cherish to-day to the point of staking our lives for them, although they mean, in the form of patriotism and national competitions, the prolongation of universal strife and hatred.

But, abandoning the deceptive mirages of speculation and going back to sober realities, I repeat that the meeting in Asia of Great Britain and Russia is fraught with tremendous consequences. It is the clashing of two great dreams, two plans for what is Caesarism on a gigantic scale. What are the conditions of the struggle?

After centuries of insular isolation, determining a peculiar orientation of ideas and a special cast of institutions, England has suddenly dropped into the condition of a continental Power. In running up against Russia in the neighborhood of India, practically on the frontier of India, in colliding with Russia in China and Persia, she does not come into contact with a detached portion of the Russian Power, represented by a colony or an isolated group of interests, but with the whole mass of the Russian Empire, which, having enjoyed the privilege of expanding continuously, forms one uninterrupted stretch of territory. Thus, England's superiority as a naval power, so decisive in her relations to Germany and France, who are both vulnerable to her attacks on their colonies, is of no avail against Russia, who, on the contrary, confronts her British rival with overwhelming military re-

sources and superior facilities of communication. In this way Russia is the mistress of the situation in the East. To this cause is principally due the eclipse of British influence in Turkey, China and Persia. In the great crisis which the new conditions of international life have created for England, she has been at a material disadvantage, which she is loath to meet with any change in her institutions; and yet she has lamentably failed in diplomacy, the only weapon left to her for securing compensation and balancing the chances of the struggle. It is a fact that, on every occasion, British statesmanship and diplomacy have been outwitted by Slav astuteness, which has secured a further advantage to Russia in the East.

It will be interesting to compare Russian with British diplomacy, to bring to light their respective methods, their merits and modes of action.

That part of statesmanship called diplomacy is the art employed by governments in their dealings with one another, or against one another, to obtain the most for the least, to secure, over and above such conditions as are guaranteed by natural law or by treaties or by the possession of superior power, advantages which may be won by resourcefulness in bargaining and skill in finesse, reinforced by unscrupulousness when necessary. This is not the official definition, I know, but the sole or even principal object of diplomacy is not, as some maintain, the defense of the members of a State in their rights and interests. This task is the routine and drudgery of diplomacy. It is performed mechanically, as it were, and without serious hitches, under the tutelar wing of international law—unless, indeed, one party is very inferior to the other in civilization, in which case the restraints of right and law are conveniently ignored. In its vital and essential aspects, what I must be pardoned for calling its higher flights, diplomacy is still to-day, as it has been from the time of its origin during the struggle of the Italian republics with the transalpine Powers down to Talleyrand and Bismarck, the art of deceiving and overreaching. If, as has been asserted, the American Commonwealth enjoys the privilege of possessing a diplomacy which has never stooped to the tortuous ways employed by others, it is not, as is implied, because the exercise of the craft can be, if its adepts be so minded or educated, directed solely by principles of directness, frankness and tact. It is because, until lately,

the United States has not been implicated in international politics, and its action abroad has been limited to the consideration of its commercial or social interests, whose defense is a task which can be performed in the light of day. By inaugurating an imperial policy and annexing the Philippines, the United States has plunged into the field of international rivalry and will soon feel the necessity of adopting the occult weapons of other Powers.

Diplomacy may achieve its ends, if they are frank and honest, through the instrumentality of a man like Franklin, who was guided throughout his foreign career by truth and common sense. Many a diplomatist reaches a venerable age in his profession without having practised it otherwise than in the form of learned discussions with Secretaries of State and references to texts and jurisprudence or appearances at stately balls and dinners. But even these must admit that, at least potentially, every diplomatist contains an agent committed to cunning and unscrupulousness, whose calling must find him ready to accomplish, when national interest claims it from him, acts which in private life would be considered immoral or criminal. If it were necessary to adduce proofs in support of the view given here of diplomacy, the disposal of secret funds, sometimes enormous, by most diplomatic agents, and the scandals connected with the activity of military attachés in different capitals, could be quoted as conclusive ones. Politics are governed by a special code of ethics—that which is contained in the maxim, “the end justifies the means;” and, although nations keep up the comedy of virtuous pretenses, they subscribe to acts of injustice or fraud performed in their behalf and secretly condone them. It is quite as much as humanity can do to create in its midst a sincere feeling of reprobation against private villainy. This is not stated as an apology for vice, but to show that the ethics of humanity, like everything else in the world, are a relative and conventional quantity, and that we will always find our infirm nature ready to seek relief from the restraints of conscience in the reservation of spheres of action where our primitive instincts can have full play. With nations it is the field of politics; with individuals it is the field of love. If, for instance, the strewing of a battlefield with thousands of human corpses in the name of national interest is a meritorious and even glorious action, while, on the contrary, the wilful destruction of one man by another in the name of private interest is condemned and

punished as a crime, why should the practices of diplomacy entail reprobation and odium, though the same practices in private life be destructive of reputation?

Diplomacy is essentially a game of observation and cleverness; one in which patience and caution alternate with boldness and promptness of action; in which intelligent management neutralizes the disadvantages of a naturally unfavorable situation, or even snatches victory out of the conditions of defeat; in other words, it is a game of poker, but poker in which peeping and other questionable devices are liberally practised. It follows that success in diplomatic enterprises depends mainly on agility and suppleness of thought, on elasticity of political conscience, on the powers of adaptability and assimilation, and not on any of the transcendent qualities of mind and character, which are too unwieldy and heavy to be of much use on the quicksands of international politics, where, indeed, they are likely to do more harm than good unless allied with great address. They will provoke admiration and esteem, but they will seldom lead to practical success.

Among the qualities indispensable to a good diplomatist, the most important are knowledge of human nature and skill in putting that knowledge to account. Psychology is the source of inspiration of diplomacy. An intelligent and, when occasion demands, unscrupulous use of the insight psychology gives into the workings of the brain and soul, is the triumph of diplomacy. Personal attractions and social accomplishments are among its most powerful adjuncts.

The golden age of diplomacy was in the time of absolute monarchs or ministers, when the action of States depended not on definitely fixed conceptions of national interest, but on the ideas and passions of one man; when kings were governed by fair favorites, and these in turn by lieutenants of the body guard; when a witty word or timely compliment turned the political scales, and when golden weights restored them to their former balance. To-day, the opportunities of diplomacy have considerably decreased. Scientific conceptions of the nature of the State have, in most cases, transferred its centre of gravity from the sovereign to the nation. Closely defined and rationally elaborated commercial and political ideals have taken the place of the fumbling, empirical and dishonest methods of the past. The mutual relations of most of the modern States are governed by fixed

rules, which act, as it were, automatically and leave little room for the display of diplomatic talent. International negotiations are reduced to-day, in American and European capitals, to the solution of mathematical equations from which personal factors are nearly entirely eliminated, and in which hard facts and figures provided by statistics are opposed to one another by men responsible to public opinion, so that the possibility of one party's gaining a marked advantage over the other is very small indeed. Mutual concessions, "give and take," are the principles on which they are conducted. The discussions are carried on with the help of specialists, commercial, technical and military, so that often only a nominal direction is left to the diplomatic agent.

But, although in America and Europe the possibilities of diplomacy have narrowed down to the maintenance of mutual good will between nations, or the conclusion or prevention of alliances by appeals made to reason, national interest or national feeling, in Asia a wide field of action exists for the higher arts of the craft. There, European Governments meet the native authorities and one another on the ground of stealth, duplicity, treachery and corruption. There, local conditions of weakness and putrefaction foster unclean ambitions in the foreign breast, and have established between the European Powers a deadly rivalry which has recourse to every means suggested by unscrupulousness. In a general way, the greater the corruption in a country, the weaker and more degraded the character of its people, the greater is the sway of diplomacy. Secrecy and the prohibition of discussion relating to public affairs, such as exists in autocratic countries, provide it with additional chances. Turkey, China, Persia and all the other countries which make up the East, represent, with the exception of reformed Japan, the promised land of the diplomatist. There, humanity offers the Mephisto, disguised in embroidered uniform and cocked hat, an unusually abundant crop of weaknesses and vices to trade on. The diplomatist develops into perfection and dominates most in the midst of ignorance, degradation and corruption.

The knowledge of the inner workings of diplomacy and of the qualities it exacts from its adepts, as shown above, will help to explain the superiority of the Russian over the Briton in this particular branch of political activity.

A citizen of Great Britain is brought up as a boy in an at-

mosphere of intense physical culture, which is the best preservative against mean instincts. It gives rise among the young, through the early opposition of characters and ambitions under sound pedagogic tuition, to a code of moral precepts of which manliness, with all its component attributes of truthfulness, fairness, personal dignity and pride, is the most prominent. As a grown-up man, he lives in an atmosphere of political liberty, administrative legality and honesty, and varied opportunity for success in life, which leaves no room for the exercise of any of those human impulses which entail a diminution of self-respect or an attempt on the weaknesses of others. These conditions of life stamp the minds and hearts of the British with an indelible mark of uprightness and a conception of duty to self and one another based on a high appreciation of humanity. As a consequence, they are unbending, unobservant, slow to read the character of others. They are loath to admit evil, and superior to the utilization of the opportunities which the accidental revelation of human frailty may offer them. Their nature is simple and their organization muscular, not nervous. Sport is their god. Science, art, love, do not play in their existence the same rôle as in that of other races. In an absolute sense, it is difficult to deny that they achieve morally and socially a very high, perhaps the highest, type of humanity; but in the exercise of diplomacy their qualities turn to their disadvantage. Land an Englishman on the diplomatic stage, and, nine times in ten, he is bound to play his part poorly, though animated by the greatest good will. I say "animated by good will" because, like every other country, indeed more than any other country, Great Britain, notwithstanding the individual character of her citizens, entertains and carries out a policy of covetousness leading to the spoliation of others.

Owing to a process of self-deception rarely practised by Englishmen in private life, but for which their intense and blind patriotism is a frequent occasion, this policy is approved of readily by the community on the plea of the civilizing mission of Great Britain. The agent entrusted with its application gives it his whole heart and soul, and even condescends to dabble in the black art of diplomacy for its furtherance; but in this work he is handicapped by constitutional stiffness of mind and character. It is easier for him to be brutal and cruel than to be mean, cunning and false. His nature is to hew his way through difficulties, and not

to slip past them or dig his way under them. His natural distaste for trickery appears in the clumsiness with which he resorts to it. When he has struck a bargain for the purchase of a conscience, he carries out the terms with a bad grace expressive of high contempt for the degraded object of his designs, and he destroys in that way half of the effect of seduction. The maintenance of British rule in India is supposed to be a masterpiece of human skill, and, indeed, the machinery of government England has established there works admirably to-day. But it is founded more on principles of force and administrative efficiency than on principles of policy. By her contempt for the natives expressed in acts of brutality and impatience, by her inability to enter into their prejudices and to flatter their weaknesses, by her arrogant assumption of superiority of race upon every occasion, she destroys the effects of an otherwise beneficent, and in some ways skilful, rule, and keeps up a ferment of hatred among all classes, which has once already brought the Indian Empire within an inch of destruction, and justifies the opinion that another outbreak is possible and may be fraught with more terrible consequences. If it be true that this attitude forms deliberately part of her policy, as being a dangerous but the only means of dealing successfully with Orientals, how is it that Russia maintains her authority in Asia more firmly, to all appearances, by acting on opposite lines? All the successes of Great Britain are due to the unique advantages of her geographical position, to brutal force and timely luck intervening, in the shape of an unexpected combination of events, to maintain her threatened fortunes, none to foresight, sagacity or a deeply meditated plan of action. She has always dropped into situations unawares, turning them, "*après coup*" to account, thanks to her massive doggedness and pluck, but feeling rather surprised at the favorable turn of events. Her African policy alone in its last phase is the result of a well-defined conception of the future, but then what blindness, what carelessness and unpreparedness in the execution!

With his education and disposition, an Englishman is rarely a success socially except among his congeners. He is wanting in the art of conversation, graceful manners and flattery, what the French sum up in the expressions "*entregent*" and "*savoir-vivre*." When he appeals to womankind, it is as a fine physical specimen of humanity, tall, muscular, sporty, and on his cheeks the color

of the beef on which he is fed, deepened by exposure to the sun—an enviable form of attraction, assuredly, and one which is enhanced by the special charm emanating from its combination with the very awkwardness of the individual. But, as it takes two to quarrel, it takes two to get on, and the average Englishman is muscle-plated against the seduction of woman, as such. He is distant, cold and haughty, and disliked in proportion, and, it must be added, secretly respected in proportion. Consequently, if by any chance he combines foreign blandishments with his manly insular accomplishments and condescends to meet non-British humanity on terms of equality, he becomes the rage, for then he realizes a type which is full of novelty, and he appeals to that unlovely disposition of man to prize secretly, as a favor, any departure from frigidity on the part of the reserved and indifferent.

Several instances, taken from recent history, will show the clumsiness of English diplomacy. In the Armenian question—one in which humane purpose was allowed to have claims on the attention of the British Government to the extent of becoming the spring of intense official action—an initial mistake, according to the politician—Lord Rosebery and, after him, Lord Salisbury adopted methods whose failure any but an English statesman could have foreseen. It was they who, entertaining an object estimable in itself, but blemished by the introduction of feelings of spite and vengeance against Turkey for past grievances, pandered to hysterical agitation and transformed what was, no doubt, a harrowing episode of suffering, though such as exists in many countries, into an appalling tragedy, thus wrecking the existence of the people they were championing, who better advised might have steered out of their difficulties, and utterly ruining the prestige of the English name in the East—nay, holding it up to the anathemas of their very *protégés*. Continuing a policy of empty threats and intimidation, practised since the eighties, in place of the tactics formerly pursued at Constantinople, indulging on every occasion in a wanton display of contempt and provocation, for which Sir Philip Curry was an admirably chosen instrument as Ambassador at Constantinople, the English played with amazing naïveté into the hands of the Russians, and finally found themselves obliged to beat an ignominious retreat. It will take some time for the Irishman who acts to-day as British Ambassador at Constantinople, with a mission to inaugurate a more sensible

policy, to repair the effect of the blunders dictated to his predecessor by the Foreign Office.

In China and Persia, the decline of British supremacy and the corresponding increase of Russian influence—for it is always England or Russia in those parts—speak as eloquently of the inefficiency of Her Gracious Majesty's diplomacy.

The success of British exertions to achieve popularity in the United States, or rather to improve what was a desperate situation, is due more to accident than superior art. Without the Spanish war and the opportunity it afforded to England to render the States an immense service, we would probably still be witnessing, on this side of the Atlantic, the state of mind which resulted in the famous message of President Cleveland in the matter of the Venezuelan frontier. The brutal temper of British statesmanship broke out on the occasion of this war, as on so many others. The United States had to be gained over to Great Britain; therefore, it was natural and fit for her, apart from moral considerations, to proclaim her sympathy with the champions of Cuban independence. But in the name of what necessity, unless it be that of satisfying an irresistible inclination for blundering, did Lord Salisbury insult Spain by publicly ranking her with the degenerate and dying Powers, however true this might be in reality? Would it not have been better to have left those words unsaid than to say them, and then try to make amends by declaring, as Lord Salisbury did in a recent speech, that Spain, with industry and perseverance, had still a happy future before her?

I pass now to the Russian diplomacy. The Russian is differently equipped for the exercise of diplomatic duties. As a member of the Slav race, he is endowed with a natural flexibility of character which is wonderful and enables him to adapt himself to any circumstances. At school, his education is not as healthy, either morally or physically, as that of the Englishman, and it is more directed toward the improvement of the mind than of the body and soul. At home, he is familiarized with a state of society whose principal traits are subserviency to political power, mental and moral restraint in the wrong sense, and a complete dependency on official patronage for success in life. As a result, the Russian enters the competition of life restricted to the fields of functionalism and militarism, naturally prepared for and educated to artfulness. These defects carry along with them their qualities. He

possesses all the external graces which the Englishman lacks, or he can adorn himself with them at will, which is the same thing for practical purposes. He shines in society with all the advantages derived from wit, versatility of manner and mind, the desire and the talent to please. Superior to the Frenchman, who is shallow, blinded by offensive conceit and always on personal exhibition for the sake of *gloriolo*, he is armed with deep purpose, tact and penetration. Thus, he has in his make the elements of the diplomatist *par excellence*. His reputation as such is absolutely justified. The Russian diplomatic service is one of the most formidable machines in existence, comparable in many respects to the Jesuit organization. It exhibits the same deeply planned and unswerving purpose, the same discipline, the same merciless elimination of worthless elements, the same spirit of sacrifice, the same resourcefulness. The Russian Government knows exactly what it wants, forms plans for a distant future and carries them out with a steadfastness and tenacity of purpose to be secured only by the conditions of autocracy. From its agents it demands success, and does not care how it is obtained. The practice of Russian diplomatic agents in places where it pays to do so, as in the East and in the Balkan countries and maybe others, is to inquire not only into the political conditions of the State, but also into the workings of Society, written with a capital S. There is no household of importance into which his curiosity does not throw a searching glance. Domestic troubles, the relations of husband to wife, the morality of both, a loss at cards, the amount owing to the butcher—all these items of information and many others are greedily collected, some by the agent himself, the greater part by his subordinates, whose mission it is to be watchful and report everything they see and hear. This information is classified, docketed and combined so as to be turned to account for political purposes at a favorable moment. How far unscrupulousness of method is carried by these arch-diplomatists it is unnecessary to specify. Recent events in China and in the Balkan peninsula are sufficiently eloquent.

The result of such an organization is evident. Russia triumphs everywhere. Her interests in Turkey are as important as those of England, and though she is in a far better position than her rival to carry out threats she has recourse to this means only in the last extremity, always preferring the insinuating and unctuous

methods of diplomacy which spare pride and vanity, the two deepest motives of humanity. It is wonderful to watch her tactics in the East, where she knows that success is a question mainly depending on the art of ingratiating. With admirable skill she lays herself out to win the good graces, not only of persons in actual power, but of any and every individual whom a jerk in the balance of imperial favor may some day invest with important functions—that is to say, everybody. She neglects no one, and is “*aux petits soins*” with every native to whom her caresses and flatteries are all the more delightful because the European world is generally so contemptuous, indifferent or brutal to him. She follows the careers of native officials with jealous attention, recommends and pushes those who show the dispositions that suit her, puts obstacles in the way of the others. Not only does she excel in taking advantage of opportunities, but she is unsurpassable in the art of creating them. In a word, she is masterful in the highest degree and proportionately successful.

This comparison between Great Britain and Russia in the walks of diplomacy has not been undertaken to give expression to a preference for the former or criticism of the latter. Neither is its object to censure the methods of diplomacy or to approve of them. It is simply a statement of facts, meant to serve as a contribution to the comprehension of the political action of States in the busy and complicated struggle which secretly rages between them, until it breaks out into the flames of war.

Before concluding, I should like to correct the impression which may possibly be derived from the foregoing pages as to the personal character of diplomatists. Outsiders should not forget that the diplomatist is a dual personality. He is an official and, as such, a machine, acting according to the laws of movement and not according to those of the human heart and conscience. Details lose their importance in the magnitude of his object, just as the miseries of war are overlooked by a statesman working for the greatness of his country. But he is also a private individual, and, in this capacity, he may be, and generally is, a gentleman and a human being, endowed with sensibilities often sharpened by the necessity of a reaction from the turpitude of official work. Family and social life is to him what a plunge in a clear stream is to the miner after the accomplishment of some grimy task in the bowels of the earth.

A DIPLOMAT.

ANTAGONISM OF ENGLAND AND RUSSIA.

BY DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER.

The fated moment seems at hand when the rivalry of England and Russia will be subjected to the stern arbitrament of war, and when the God of Battles will decide which of the two Imperial competitors is the stronger. Despite the Russian Emperor's desire for peace and the restraining influences exercised in high places, too many critical questions have reached maturity at the same moment to leave much room for hope in the diplomatic appeasement of conflicting interests. The Persian Gulf question in itself might be composed; that relating to Herat might be held over, and Russia's high-handed proceedings at Talien-wan might be tolerated a little longer; but when taken together they constitute an attack on the British position in Asia to which Britons should be mad to show themselves indifferent.

That a conflict between England and Russia in Asia is inevitable has been clear for the last sixty years. The British have done nothing to provoke or justify the aggressive schemes which Russia has long cherished, and which her military men to-day think they can realize, and they have allowed Russia to reach unmolested the Afghan frontier and to absorb northern China. But their forbearance, far from moderating the animosity and hostile schemes of Russia, has served only to inflame them, and to inspire Russian military authorities with the ridiculously mistaken idea that the British Nation is afraid to oppose them. One of these gentlemen has allowed himself to give expression to the opinion that England is in decay and helpless, and he concludes with the following self-satisfied prediction:

"When the Russian avalanche, rolling from the height of the Pamirs, or elsewhere, shall fall on India with an elemental force, all will be over with the British domination in that vast Empire of the Far East. And, as a matter of fact, it may be asked, How will Eng-

land, which has had so much difficulty in overcoming the different insurrections of the badly-armed and half-starved Hindus, attempt to repulse a Russian army of invasion, composed of two or three hundred thousand men—troops of elite—and susceptible of being increased to one million?"

This quotation represents the practically unanimous opinion of Russian officers, who, forgetful of Alma, Inkerman and Sebastopol, infer from a misunderstanding of the causes of the delay in crushing the Boers that "the English army will always be beaten when fighting an European army." These unflattering opinions have passed from the mess-room to the cabinets of the civil departments at St. Petersburg; for it is only on the assumption that the Russian Government has come to the conclusion that it may treat England as a *quantité négligeable* that its late proceedings at Teheran and Moukden can be explained. Something is known by the public as to the concessions extracted from the Shah; but it is currently believed in the best-informed circles that, on the occasion of his approaching visit to Russia, a treaty will be signed placing him in a state of open dependence on that Power. Severe as will be that shock to British equanimity and prestige, I question whether in true importance it will not be surpassed by the imminent and perhaps already accomplished seizure of the northern section of the British-built railway to Moukden.

The preliminary point which it is desirable to make clear is that Russia, in an inexcusable and wanton manner, has at the present time offered Great Britain more than one affront which that nation should be justified in regarding as a challenge. In Persia, where she had the chance of coming to a friendly arrangement with England, she has preferred to act in defiance of the right of England to have a voice in the fate of a kingdom of whose independence England is one of the guarantors by the Treaty of Paris. In Manchuria she has torn up British rights with the same effrontery with which her engineers talk of tearing up the British-built railway, if they have not already done so. There is consequently no room left for hope of an amicable arrangement with Russia. She is bent on injuring Great Britain to the full extent of her power and opportunities, from the Caucasus to Corea. She is preparing for the operations of open war by manœuvres aiming at British humiliation, and at the lowering of British prestige; while her press and politicians are fanning the public animosity toward England to a flame with stories of

the ease and immense recompense that must attend a Russian invasion of India. No one who reads the Russian papers, or studies the several works by Russian officers that have recently appeared on the subject of the invasion of India, can doubt any longer that a hostile collision between England and Russia is inevitable. Nor can there be any uncertainty that, at this very moment, Russia has offered and is offering sufficient justification for a *casus belli*. The practical question alone remains: Shall England pick up the challenge that Russia has thrown in her face?

The reply to that important question can only be given after a more careful consideration of the relative importance of the questions at issue, and of the British interests imperiled. But it must be remembered that war itself, just as much as preparation for war, is a matter of insurance. An avowed and implacable enemy, aiming at England's overthrow, can only be brought to reason by the confession of superior force; and the employment of that force becomes legitimate and even necessary as soon as it is made clear that the other side will develop a strength that may give it in time the moral certitude of success. It seems to me that Anglo-Russian rivalry has reached this stage, and that every year which now passes will strengthen Russia's position and chances of victory, while England's will proportionally diminish. But at this moment there is still time to nip the danger in the bud, and by a vigorous effort to relegate Russia's dreams of Asiatic dominion to the stage they held in the days of the Cossack Irmak and Peter the Great. The Crimean War stopped Russia in the Black Sea for thirty years, and with wiser statesmen would have done more; and a war now would not only save India for another half-century from external attack and avert the dissolution of China, but it would also eliminate a dangerous factor from the complicated and menacing problem raised by Continental hostility to England. It is made clearer every day that the British Empire has become a mark of envy to the rest of Europe, and that that empire can be preserved only by the strong right arm of military power. The special grounds of rivalry and quarrel with Russia would justify England in bringing the question to a clear and speedy issue, from the result of which would flow, in all probability, a simplification of the major problem in England's favor, as well as the immediate relief of British anxieties on the score of India and China.

How great those anxieties are is well known to every one responsible for the defence of India, and for the maintenance of British rights in China. Within the last few months, Russia has taken various steps of a menacing character, while circumstances have obliged Great Britain to remain passive. In the form of "experimental mobilizations," Russia has placed a considerable armed force at several points along the Afghan frontier, from Termez on the Oxus to Kushk in the neighborhood of Herat. If this step stood alone, it would be an unfriendly act; but its significance is greatly increased by the recent acquisition from Bokhara of several districts along the Oxus where Russia is about to establish settlements for colonists and ex-soldiers from Europe. At the Persian end of the frontier she has prepared another unpleasant surprise for us in an arrangement that practically means the cession of the important province of Khorassan by Persia, and that will be published to the world on the occasion of the Shah's European visit. The main object of the Russians in reducing Khorassan to the same level as Bokhara and Manchuria is to obtain possession of the short, direct route for a railway to Meshed. This passes direct from the Russian town of Askabad to Kuchan, whence Meshed is accessible by an easy valley; and between Meshed and Herat lies one of the great high roads of Asia. The acquisition of this shorter and improved route from the Caspian base to Afghanistan will give Russia an immensely increased striking power at Herat. Fortunately, two years at the most favorable estimate will be necessary for the construction of the Kuchan-Meshed line; but the pass between Askabad and Kuchan has been leveled and prepared for the laying of the rails, which could be accomplished in a few weeks. Russia has been long preparing for this move; but, now that it is on the point of being taken, it is doubtful if British authorities have made up their minds as to the best counter-move.

The Russian movements in the region round Herat bring the question of that far-famed fortress into prominence, and with it the whole subject of British Afghan policy. It is quite clear that Russia aims at encircling that place from the north and west, so that at the right moment it will drop into her lap without an effort. But, if General Kuropatkine gets his way, the Russian military party will precipitate events by seizing "the key of India" with the force now collected in the Murghab and Kushk valleys.

At any moment the country may, therefore, receive the startling intelligence that there has been a repetition of the Penjdeh incident, and that Herat has been seized by a *coup de main*, for which one of the border fights that have been frequent along the Maimena-Andkoi frontier will be pleaded as an excuse. In whatever form it may present itself, the Herat problem is almost ripe for solution. Is it to be solved by a tame acquiescence in the cleverness and celerity with which Russia will grasp it, or by a firm and positive notification at St. Petersburg that its seizure will be met by a declaration of war? If the latter step is to be taken with the idea of averting war, not an hour should be lost, for so intoxicated are Russian soldiers with a belief in their own superiority that, despite their Peace Emperor, the Rubicon may at any moment be crossed.

The question of Herat stands by itself, and also as part of the larger question of British Afghan policy. In the former aspect, Great Britain has the right to say to Russia that she cannot allow Herat to be turned into a formidable fortress and base for the invasion of India, and that she will fight Russia wherever she can until Russia evacuates it. England could do that in complete indifference to Afghanistan or to the part its prince and people might play in the struggle. But England need not deprive herself of the advantage which the co-operation of the Afghans will provide in defending their own territory against Russian aggression. The Herat question, then, is only the most prominent part of that relating to Afghanistan, which England is bound by her own repeated declarations to defend against unprovoked aggression. This obligation is, of course, dependent on the readiness and intention of the government of Afghanistan to contribute toward the defence of its own country, for it would not be to England's interests to place a British army where it would be exposed to any risk from the defection or duplicity of the Afghans. The essential point in British policy depends on the wishes and views of the Ameer, with whom it would seem that long ere this a common line of action should have been defined and agreed upon by British statesmen. Nothing of the sort, however, has been done lest it might give umbrage to Russia, the only enemy threatening any danger to either India or Afghanistan; and, in consequence, everything is left undecided and unsettled. The Ameer was more far-seeing than Great Britain. In

1887, he wrote the Indian Government a letter asking them certain important questions as to what he should do in the event of Russia's violating his frontier or raising disturbances among the Turkoman tribes along the borders. He repeated the same inquiries later on, but to neither communication has he ever received a reply! Of course, the ruler of Afghanistan could not be expected to know that the British Empire, with all its extraordinary power and success, has never possessed a consistent and continuous foreign policy. It has flourished on a hap-hazard, hand-to-mouth system, which will no longer answer in an age of keen international rivalry. Neither in Afghanistan nor in any other sphere of her responsibilities can England prudently defer the formation of her plans to the hour of combat. In Afghanistan, since the termination of the labors of the boundary commission, the Indian Government has sat with arms folded, intending thereby to show Russia, on the one hand, what an inoffensive and innocent institution it was, and, on the other, to convince the Ameer that it had no designs on his territory. This negation of policy, like the old "masterly inactivity," leaves everything uncertain till the hour of crisis, when those whom wisdom would have secured for England as friends may be driven into the opposite camp by the precipitancy of her measures and the imperative tone of her demands.

The Ameer has taken Great Britain a little into his confidence through the important political statement published by Sir Acquin Martin. There are many important points in this document, and it shows that the reticent policy of the Indian Government does not command the approval of the astute ruler at Cabul. The Afghan prince betrays no leaning toward Russia, and a very remarkable sympathy with England in South Africa, declaring, with true Oriental hyperbole, that "England's troubles are always my troubles." There is more solid satisfaction in his bold definition of the incompatibility between Russia and Islam. The Mussulmans, he declares, hate her; Russia holds insecurely the Mussulman countries she has conquered; and, above all, "We Afghans prefer death to being enslaved and having our women and children taken by the Russians." There is no doubt that in those sentences the Ameer speaks his true mind. He has one aim—the independence of his country against Russia, in the first place, but also against England, should a blunder of policy lead that country

to threaten it. But he has also an ambition, and that is to head Islam against Russia for the recovery of those Mussulman countries which she has but half conquered. England's policy should, to a large extent, be based on an appreciation of the Ameer's wishes. Unfortunately, his words make it quite clear that the attempt has not even been made to understand them in matters about which he is specially qualified to give sound advice. On the other hand, Great Britain seems to have ruffled his serenity with some useless and therefore silly questions about his armaments; and the Ameer at once came to the conclusion that the British Government was beginning to be suspicious of his loyalty. This is ominous, and no effort should be spared to remove this impression. The Afghan who thinks himself suspected lashes himself into the mood to justify suspicion, and the alienated friend of to-day is apt to become the enemy of to-morrow.

With the Russian knocking at the gates of Herat and Balkh, the time has come to define and agree upon the lines of common action between India and Afghanistan. The defence of Afghanistan cannot be successfully accomplished by the Afghans alone; but if the co-operation of England is to be made valuable for them and safe for herself, it must not be forced on them. What is done must be done with the prior assent and good-will of the Ameer; otherwise Great Britain will find herself in the position of the invader against whom all the Afghans would unite. The views of the Ameer can only be ascertained by personal inter-communication; and, if the Ameer's health will not admit of his visiting Lord Curzon in India, then he should be invited to receive some high British official as a special envoy at Cabul. The points to be agreed upon relate to the defence of Herat, and to its preparation to stand a siege before the commencement of a war; and, after hostilities have begun, to the movement of British troops into and across Afghanistan. But, at the same time, the Ameer should be encouraged in his own ambitious scheme of rousing Mohammedan Asia against the Russians. Such an object would appeal to the sympathy of all the tribes of Afghanistan and of the lands bordering on India, and a movement might be inaugurated among these warriors that would carry their thoughts and efforts in a direction opposite from India. If the Ameer can repeat Timour's exploit by being crowned Emperor of Central Asia at Samarcand, it is not the British policy to hold him back.

But, after all, it is in Manchuria that Russian rivalry has assumed its most menacing and insolent expression. The hold that Russia has laid on Manchuria is that of a conqueror. At the council of the Mongols, she has superseded the Emperor of China. She is only waiting the completion of the Siberian railway to place her Governor-General at Moukden. In Corea, she has made good her foothold, and hopes to oust the Japanese without having recourse to arms. In five years she has accomplished this marvellous success without any one interfering with her, and by making only one concession to all the diplomatic effort and ink expended between Downing Street and Peking. That concession—the recognition of Talien-wan as a free port—has already been nullified by the astute measure sanctioned by the Czar for the creation of a new Russian town to be named Dalny, a name signifying “the remote city.” Dalny is to be constructed so as to envelop Talien-wan, by which arrangement the goods landed in “the free treaty port of Talien-wan” can only reach the interior after paying toll at the Russian Customs barrier of Dalny. This little incident will show the utter hopelessness of any fair or equal arrangement with Russia. She denies, ignores or suppresses the rights of everybody else. The Northern Moukden railway, a British concession worked by British engineers, was a special object of Russian attack a few years ago at Peking, but Sir Claude Macdonald succeeded in upholding the letter of the deed, although only by changing the British concession into a Chinese railway. The other day, however, the Russian engineers engaged on the Russian line passing near Moukden to Port Arthur “discovered” the existence of this line, and resorted to some very high-handed proceedings, of which the British Foreign Office must in due course have been informed. The explanation now given is that this was one of the many Cossack excesses. To all these points of rivalry and contention the imminent revelation of Russia’s acquisitions in Khorassan will bring the climax.

For these reasons, I return to my original point and ask whether the fated moment has not arrived to put an end to the hitherto unchecked aggression of Russia by an appeal to arms, which sooner or later is inevitable. If the struggle must come, why should it not come now, when England is ready, and when the alliance of both Afghanistan and Japan is practically assured to her? Russia, despite all the vauntings of her officers, is not

a really formidable antagonist, as no doubt she will one day be. Her efforts cover too wide a surface, and her considerable army in the Liaoutung peninsula could be destroyed in its isolated position by the power which commanded the sea. The Ameer has detected the insecurity of her position in Central Asia, and, aware of Mussulman hatred, he realizes that the recent Russian butchery at Tashkent has gone far to inflame rather than to crush it. In the Far East, Japan is waiting on England's convenience, watching Russia's proceedings without making any useless protests, and biding her time while she completes the effectiveness of her army and navy. But she cannot go on waiting forever, and some of her statesmen may be led to think that even a bad division with Russia is better than to remain empty-handed as the ally of a torpid and indifferent England. To the loss of opportunities will follow that of allies, if Great Britain shows a tame submission to the affronts that Russia is now offering her throughout Asia.

Now is the moment to bring the rivalry of this determined and relentless enemy to an issue, and to have recourse to the remedy of war as an insurance against an inevitable and manifest danger being allowed to become too difficult and formidable. England is ready and Russia is not. Russia has the itching to clutch India without the power to do so; and if England is firm and resolute, and fights in a proper spirit and not in the silly, hyper-civilized manner she has pursued in South Africa, she can shatter the Asiatic dominion of the Czar to its base, and give the Russians something else to think of than the invasion of India for another hundred years. Of provocation there has been no lack, and fresh *casus belli* will be soon supplied, perhaps before these lines can appear in print. Before summarizing the operations that such a war would necessitate in order to bring it to a successful conclusion, there is one point that requires preliminary consideration, and that is the part which France would take in the struggle.

The relations between England and France are often strained, but there is no implacable rivalry and antipathy between them such as do and must exist between England and Russia. In fact, the distrust of France that has increased of late years among Englishmen is largely due to the apprehension that France had placed herself so completely under the thumb of Russia as to make it certain that she would play Russia's game against England

in Asia. The Dual Alliance, which, in its ostensible form, as a set-off to the Triple Alliance, excited no mistrust and seemed perfectly natural, became a menace to Great Britain when it was seen how subservient France had become to Russia. No one can say how far a responsible French Government will allow itself to be drawn into a quarrel with which, so far as it relates to Persia, the Indian frontier and Manchuria, it has no concern. But it is essentially a question for France herself to decide. Her attitude and what passes for French opinion could not possibly be more hostile to England than it has been since Fashoda, and it would be useless for England to attempt to disarm it. We must be prepared for the worst, the same time that we record the fact that, if France intervenes in an Anglo-Russian conflict, the quarrel will be of her own seeking and making. But the addition of France to Russia should not fill England with dismay. On her side, England would strictly confine the war, so far as France was concerned, to that element on which for two hundred years France has appeared at a disadvantage; and, although the bill might be heavier, the result of a collision between the British fleet and the Franco-Russian navies would not, unless British estimates are very much in error—and no one doubts England's willingness to take the risk—be very different from what it would be in the case of one Power instead of two. Against the heavier expenditure could be set the increased security that would arise from the elimination of two navies instead of one, which would leave Great Britain able to face with greater patience and complacency the growth of that of Germany.

The first phase of the war would be a naval one for the mastery of the seas in the Mediterranean, the Black, the Baltic and the waters of the Far East; while on the Atlantic England would close the French ports from Dunkirk to L'Orient. So far as the struggle would partake of the character of a great naval battle, the scene would be the Mediterranean, where the French have great faith in their fair-weather fleet. In the Far East, the English squadron, now reinforced by a second line-of-battle ship and by the two fine cruisers, the "Powerful" and "Terrible," would even without the powerful aid of the Japanese, sweep the Franco-Russian navies from the seas; and in this case it is exceedingly doubtful whether the relics of those fleets would long find shelter under the guns of Port Arthur. After a certain number of

months, the question of naval superiority would be placed beyond dispute, and that part of the hostile fleets which had escaped destruction would be locked up in a state of impotence in a comparatively limited number of harbors.

During this preliminary period, measures for the effective defence of India in the first place, and for supporting the Ameer in every way he may wish, would also be carried out. Assuming that the British operations on the Indian frontier would for some time be defensive, and that England's real attack on Russia would be made in other directions, it would not be necessary for England to send more than 50,000 troops to India. This would raise the European garrison to 110,000 men, half of whom could be sent to the frontier with 75,000 good native troops and at least 20,000 Imperial Service troops. All these men are now being armed with the magazine rifle, and no doubt the imperfections in the cavalry armament and the artillery will be promptly removed. From the 150,000 troops available, an army of 50,000 could be formed to guard the Khyber, and another of 100,000 for offensive operations from the Pishin Valley in the direction of Candahar and Herat. But in neither direction should the English troops enter Afghanistan without the Ameer's permission and good-will. It is quite possible that that permission would only be given with great reluctance in the case of Cabul, and it would be far better to let the Ameer take his own chance, if he wished it, in dealing single-handed with the Russians on the Oxus rather than to force British assistance upon him. England has, moreover, an admirable defensive position in the Khyber, and she could there await with confidence the attack of any army Russia could bring against her. On the southern frontier, the same passive attitude would not be possible, and the Ameer's assent would have to be obtained for an early advance to Candahar.

But, on the whole, British military plans would, so far as India was concerned, be mainly defensive. Great Britain should be ready to strike, but she should not go much out of her way to simplify for Russia the task of bringing an army of invasion across the five-hundred miles that separate Kushk from Chaman. In other directions, England should strive to inflict a maximum of damage on the enemy. It would go hard with England if Odessa and Batoum escaped ransom or reduction, and the new harbor of Sebastopol might be subjected to a searching test of

its merits. In Port Arthur and the garrison of the Liaoutung peninsula, Russia has given hostages to fortune of far greater value than even Herat. Who believes that that force could escape an English expedition of 50,000 men acting in conjunction with the half-million of soldiers with whom Japan is ready at the given signal to overrun Corea and Manchuria? Taking the available British army at 500,000 men, it would be divided in the following manner: 110,000 in India, 40,000 as a garrison for Egypt, 50,000 for operations in Manchuria, and another 50,000 for the Black Sea. There would remain 250,000 men for the decisive blow in the second year of the war. This should be struck at St. Petersburg itself, and the presence of that force in the Baltic would light such a fire from Finland to Poland as would give even the colossal army of the Czar all the employment of which it is capable. It is no secret that St. Petersburg lies exposed to a well-directed attack, because it would not be difficult to sever its communications with the interior, and Kronstadt, strong toward the sea in such degree as forts may be to ironclads, is no invulnerable defence for the Russian capital on the land side. In addition to the half-million troops possessed by Great Britain, she possesses 100,000 admirable Indian troops, including 20,000 of the finest light cavalry in the world.

I have said nothing about allies, because the British Empire must be prepared to stand alone against all comers; but an exception is made in the case of Japan, the one assured and efficient ally England possesses all the world over, firm and dignified in its patient attitude, but ready to act at England's signal. Yet the strong never fail to attract allies. The Ameer of Afghanistan has his finger on the pulse of Islam. He knows it throbs with hatred of the Russian. Would Turkey keep aloof from the movement under the Green Flag of the Prophet that promised her revenge and relief from suffocation? The participation of France in the struggle entails the alliance of Italy against her, and a more rapid clearing of the Mediterranean. The war could not be many weeks old before these alliances would pass into the sphere of accomplished facts. After its development by successes on the sea and at Port Arthur, there would be still more powerful European alliances at England's disposal. Finland would be a warning to Sweden and Norway, if Russian movements on the Mourman coast rendered any further warning necessary; and the

fine Scandinavian people would not be backward in participating in a movement that promised to dispel the danger of annexation, with which they are repeatedly threatened in a wanton and bullying spirit. Nor is it conceivable that Austria, which is tied to the Triple Alliance without gaining much benefit from it, could stand aloof when so favorable an occasion presented itself to relieve the pressure on her eastern borders, and to take part in a resuscitation of that kingdom of Poland, the downfall of which commenced her own deterioration.

Has the moment come for this historic and earth-shaking struggle? I say that the reckless and defiant proceedings of Russia leave England no honorable choice. England has tolerated acts on Russia's part within the last four years that have injured British prestige, discouraged the friends of England and given the Government of the Czar many material advantages. Russia is about to crown them all with an act that will filch away the most important province of Persia and with more than one affront in Manchuria. If Great Britain overlooks or condones these acts, the injury will be irremediable and the Russian Government will be justified in thinking that it has been granted *carte blanche*. But it is impossible for the British Government to remain forever passive in face of Russia's aggressions, and it is now time to put down its foot and warn Russia off. England has had more than enough of Russia's threats as to what is to be done in the direction of India, and the hour has come to bid the Muscovite Power to stand on her guard and do her worst. Now is the moment to expose the hollowness of her menaces and to expel her from the positions which she had seized, threatening the tranquillity of India and the integrity of China. So favorable an opportunity from every point of view as the morrow of the overthrow of the Boers will be to establish British security in the East may never recur, and the wave of enthusiasm that would pass through India as well as through the British Empire when it became known that England had decided to end the insolent pretensions and aggressions of Russia would electrify the world and leave no room for doubt as to the issue.

DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER.

GREAT BRITAIN IN ASIA.

BY THE RIGHT HON. SIR RICHARD TEMPLE, BART.

At a moment when the British Empire is gravely exercised by a war in the Antipodes, to result, as we hope, in a victorious issue and an honorable settlement, it is well to consider what its position is in Asia, and whether that is at all affected by our pre-occupations and avocations for the moment elsewhere.

If, in modern phrase, stock were to be taken of Great Britain's Asiatic belongings, the sum total would be magnificent, practically immense, exceeding effectively that of any other Power, of white or dark race, in that quarter of the globe. In the first place stands the Indian Empire, with an area of nearly two millions of square miles and a population of nearly three hundred millions of souls—figures which alone equal those of the Continent of Europe. But outside this Empire, and often in connection with it, there have grown, and are growing daily, various possessions and interests, forming, as it were, a vast chain of imperial affairs. Let these be momentarily recollected in geographical order.

From her base at Suez, Great Britain looks out on the Red Sea. She further extends her potential vision over that sea from Suakin, on the African side and in Egyptian territory. At Jedda, on the Arabian side, the gateway, so to speak, of Mecca, she has a dominating influence, and from ships under her flag or from her dominions are landed the pilgrims who travel by sea. At the very mouth of the Sea is the Island of Perim, merely a rock indeed, but one on which the British standard is flying. Just outside the mouth is the first-class fortress and coaling station of Aden, a volcanic formation often called the Gibraltar of the East. From this point the southeastern corner of Arabia, known to geographers as Arabia Felix, is dominated. It is not necessary here to recount how this position is supported by British control

over Socotra, commonly reckoned an African island, and over the opposite coast of Africa called Somalie. But enough has been said to show how Britain commands the Red Sea, one of the most important of her water highways on the face of the globe. The Royal Mail which passes weekly up and down this way, carrying dispatches for India, China and Australia, is probably the largest in the world.

Round the corner from Aden comes the sea approach to the Persian Gulf, a sea known to geographers as the Gulf of Oman, to poets as "Oman's green waters," and there lies Muscat, a place in the closest relations with Britain, as was recently and forcefully shown in a certain transaction with France. Inside the Persian Gulf are the two ports of Bender Abbas and Bushire, ports which though in Persian territory have heretofore been distinctly under British influence. Near the head of the Gulf is the island of Karak, once occupied by a British force. Heretofore, the maritime police of the Gulf, the suppression of piracy and the protection of the fisheries, pearl and other, have been managed by British warships. The Gulf has indeed been regarded by Anglo-Indian statesmen as a British lake. Into the head of the Gulf are discharged the united waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris, the confluence taking place above Basra or Bussorah, about a hundred miles from the coast. From the Gulf up to Bussorah the river is navigable for the ships of war, and the maritime control has been British also. In Persia itself, throughout the northern part of that kingdom, near the Caspian, Russia has asserted for herself a paramount position. But for the southern half of the kingdom Britain has a similar position fully as great, if she continues to assert it as well as she has hitherto done. Adjoining the Gulf is Beluchistan. A portion of that is Persian, but Beluchistan proper is British, and to that may be added Mekran, which carries on the coast line to near the mouths of the Indus.

North of this lies Afghanistan, which is under British protection, of which the boundaries, as against the coterminous Russian territory, have been marked off by British Commissioners meeting Russian Commissioners at the request of the Afghans, and which is under British suzerainty and within the Red Line. Yet further north rises the plateau of Pamir, mostly snow-clad, which has been divided between Britain and Russia.

Returning to India, we see Ceylon in equatorial latitudes and

commanding the entrance to the Bay of Bengal. Now that Burma and Tenasserim, with regions right up to the Chinese frontier, have been added to the Indian Empire, that great Bay is unquestionably a British lake. Onward from this Bay lies Siam, in which Britain has an equal interest with France, and for the independence of which there is a joint British and French guarantee. Heretofore it is the East to which attention has been directed. But now it will be the Far East to which thought must be turned.

The gateway of the Far East consists of the British possessions in and about the Strait of Malacca. Here is the fortified coaling station of Singapore, one of the keys of Asia, and second only to Aden in importance; by many, indeed, the two places might be deemed sisters in imperial importance. Thus the reader in imagination emerges on the Chinese waters and soon arrives at Hong Kong, a fortified island, with its strip of adjacent coast, commanding the mouth of one of the great rivers of China, a busy centre of Chinese commerce and a first-rate coaling station. Further north again is Shanghai, another centre of Chinese commerce, dominated by British merchants and virtually commanding the mouths of the Yangtse Kiang, the greatest of all Chinese rivers. Further north comes the Gulf of Pechili, which, branching from the China sea, runs right up towards Peking, and close underneath the southern shore of Manchuria. Near the mouth of this Gulf is the naval and military station of Wei-hai-Wei, which gives to Britain, in that vitally important Gulf, as good a position as that which she has in the Mediterranean.

Thus it will be seen how the southern and eastern portions of Asia, which are incomparably the richest and most populous, come to be either owned or controlled by Britain. The western and northern, and even the central portions, which are wholly inferior in fertility and in all resources—except mineral—may be owned or controlled by others. Of the sum total of European ocean-borne trade, the main bulk belongs to Britain; the remainder may be divided among other nations. Such, then, is the present British portion, as yet uniquely favorable. The immediate question is whether it is likely to be diminished or endangered by the general trend of events, by the conduct of other European Powers, or by anything consequent on the present war in the Antipodes.

An imaginative survey will remind the British reader of what the Persian ambassador in the days of Darius said, to the effect

that his master's rule extended so far north as to be frozen with perpetual frost, and so far south as to be glowing in perpetual heat.

Now, it is generally recognized that, whatever may be the conduct of the Continental press or the popular sentiment among the leading nationalities, the language and attitude of the several European Governments have been diplomatically correct. So far, no complaint on the British side has arisen. Nevertheless, certain movements have taken place, which may perhaps have been in previous contemplation, but which do affect some of the Asiatic interests of Britain as already described, and which have assumed particular activity since, say, the autumn of 1899. They synchronize, so to speak, with the fact of Britain's being much occupied in the Antipodes. The coincidence of time is, indeed, curiously suggestive.

As is well known, Russia has for some time past had a line of railway from the Caspian Sea eastward on to Bokhara and Samarcand; and to all that no objection could, under existing circumstances, be made. But from that line she has recently constructed a branch right up to a place named Kushk, on the Afghan frontier, near Herat, the capital of Western Afghanistan. She had technically and lawfully a right to do this. Nevertheless, her doing so was an unfriendly act towards Britain. It was not done for any sufficient commercial reason. The real object must have been to menace British interests and to disturb the minds of the Afghans. Still, whatever she might think, Britain could not so far remonstrate. But now Russia has sent, within the last few months, a body of troops to this place, Kushk, facing the line of British protectorate. As was doubtless anticipated, this move has caused much remark all over Asia. Thus this dispatch of troops was a still more unfriendly act, at which Britain may well take umbrage. It lays Russia open to the imputation of trying to profit (we hope quite vainly) by Britain's preoccupation in the Antipodes, and of doing that which she would hardly have ventured to do had Britain been wholly disengaged.

Again, Russia has long been known to have in contemplation some plan of railways in Persia. So long as that plan was confined to the northern half of that kingdom, Britain could hardly object, for no doubt Russian influence is preponderating there. But, as regards railways in the southern half, the arrangements

for them ought to be Britain's affair. Nevertheless, just at the present time, it is announced that Russia has obtained concessions from the Shah of Persia that would allow of railways being prolonged right down to the Persian Gulf. Here again is a direct menace to the British position in Asia. As usual, the precise facts as touching British interests are not, perhaps cannot be, made known to the public in Britain. Doubtless, there is some diplomatic correspondence going on; the limits of the concessions may not have been settled; probably Britain will have something serious to say to the Shah of Persia before the arrangement is concluded; and ultimately British interests may be vindicated. Meanwhile, it is well to take note of the disposition of Russia, as evinced by any such extensive attempt being made at such a time as the present. How the capital is to be found for these Persian railways, what trade or traffic there can be to pay the interest on the outlay, and who will defray the interest charges if the lines do not pay—these are questions for Russia to answer. It remains only to remark that, if she is from her own treasury to subsidize these railways should they prove unremunerative, she must have a political purpose. And that can only be to assert a political position in Southern Asia, inconvenient to the just and the long established interests of Britain.

Again, it is at this time that Germany has arranged with Turkey a concession for a railway from some point in Asia Minor to the basin of the Tigris and Euphrates, to Bagdad, at least, and perhaps onwards. This is a project which has been often mooted in Britain, but never undertaken, because the line did not seem likely to prove remunerative and because the communication by land did not appear able to compete with the existing communication by sea, and because there was no prospect of local or intermediate traffic to justify the outlay. These considerations apply equally to Germany, and, though banks are employed, there must be some state subsidy or support, substantial even though indirect. For such outlay from German resources—and it will come to that in some way or other—there must be a reason. That must be the extension of trade ultimately by political expansion; though the commercial profit to meet the German national expense can be, not at all in the present, but only in the remote future.

But expansion in this direction is approaching the British sphere too near to be pleasant. For, if a German line reaches

Bagdad, is it to be extended to Bussorah, of which the situation has been already described? If so, then is German influence to extend to the mouth of the joint river and to the coast of the Persian Gulf? This is, indeed, a grave question for Britain; inasmuch as any participation by a European Power in the control of the Persian Gulf is a distinct derogation from the British position as heretofore maintained in that quarter.

In the Far East, the consolidation of Japan, the settlement of her political constitution, the development of her forces by sea and land, are all favorable to British interests. In the Japanese Britain has a really friendly Power, on the eastern flank quite able to hold its own against Russia or other ambitious European Power.

The appearance of the United States of America in the Philippine Islands is convenient and apparently beneficial to British interests, and may serve in part as a counterpoise to any possible combination of Russia, France and Germany. Although Germany has in some instances acted excellently well with Britain, yet in the transactions following on the peace after the war between Japan and China she acted with France and Russia, while Britain withheld approbation.

Further, it is now understood that American diplomacy has secured the recognition by all the European Powers of the policy of the "open door" in China, implying that they all agree to keep all ports of which they may have the control within Chinese limits quite free, and without any duties, differential or other, levied against any one. If this really be secured, without any reservations or countervailing hindrances, it will be a boon to British interests. Indeed, it is the very thing for which British merchants throughout China have long been contending. Although they may obtain by far the largest commercial sphere of all—if China were to be partitioned out into spheres—they do not wish to have a sphere at all. For then they would have certain access to their own sphere only; in neighboring spheres they might be hindered; indeed, according to the heretofore established policy of other nations, they positively would be. They say in effect that British trade runs throughout all parts of China without exception; that, wherever British trade is, there is the sphere of Britain! Thus they will see in the general recognition of the "open door," by other nations, a blessed relief from disputes with

their European neighbors, and from embarrassments without end. This will be especially the case with British affairs in Manchuria, in which province Russia has so entirely superseded Chinese authority, in many respects, that she might easily, if so minded, oppose obstacles to long established British enterprises, commercial and industrial, in that quarter. Much trouble was apprehended in this respect, as British merchants in Manchuria were not likely to submit to the usual Russian procedure. But, if there is to be the "open door" in Manchuria, Britain may be glad, for really the prospect was almost too good to hope for.

There is, also, one particular trouble with France looming on the horizon of Southern China. Britain is establishing a through line of imperial communication from the Bay of Bengal to the Chinese waters on the Pacific Ocean; that is from Rangoon, at the mouth of the Irrawaddy of Burma, to Shanghai, near the mouth of the Yangtse Kiang of China. This route is to pass through Burmese railways to the borders of the Chinese province of Yunnan; negotiations are in progress with China for carrying on the line through Yunnan; thus the province of Czechuen would be reached, and then the lower course of the Yangtse Kiang, which would be controlled by gunboats from Shanghai. Whatever lines in China may be marked out by other Powers, this is *par excellence* the British line, and nobody knows this better than the French Government. The fact has been recognized by Russia, who gave Britain an agreement not to promote any railways near this line, in return for an agreement by Britain not to promote any railways in Manchuria. Nevertheless, France is striving to set up, as it were, a fence across this very line, just as she did across the line of British advance up the Nile at Fashoda. She is now asserting some shadowy rights in Yunnan; and she has recently, according to common report, been dispatching surveyors and other agents to search out the land in that quarter. All this on her part is incompatible with the maintenance of the British line. We are ready to respect whatever portions she may have acquired or may yet fairly acquire in China: but we expect her to do the same by us.

From this summary review of the British position in Asia, it is manifest that Britain from her imperial watchtower ought to be perpetually on the lookout to descry, discern, detect the beginning of future trouble. Transactions are undertaken by the

European Powers, who, though they be friendly in a national sense, are yet commercially and politically jealous of British predominance, and would rejoice at any reduction or weakening of the British position. Often such transactions may, to a cursory or short-sighted view, appear innocuous at first, and yet may ultimately lead to evil conjunctures and complications. Britain, looking far behind her to see how often in Asiatic history this has happened to her, should look far before her, to beware in time before matters have gone too far for retrieval.

Whether the present is a fitting time for other Powers to try any contests with Britain, is a question for them to determine. Britain is at the acme of her "puissance"; never has she displayed such resourcefulness as she has recently displayed in South Africa, and yet her resources are very far from exhaustion; indeed, they have not even yet been adequately called forth. She is still ready to meet any combination that could reasonably be anticipated, and if the present war shall be speedily terminated, then she will have forces available in a strength never before equalled in all her eventful history. She can afford to regard other nations quite complacently, whatever they may say, realizing what her rights are throughout the world and knowing well how to guard them.

RICHARD TEMPLE.